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Foreword 
Greenhouse gas emissions are considerably changing atmospheric conditions, leading scientists across 
the world to conclude that a profound process of global climate change has been set in motion. These 
changes are expected to exacerbate the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events such as 
storm surges, flooding, and hurricanes which are rapid in their occurrence and have a high impact on 
human security and people’s livelihood. However, this is not the only implication of climate change, 
as slow onset disasters such as drought or desertification have also manifested social and economic 
consequences while being less visible in the mass media. According to a report of UNCCD (2010), 50 
million people are at risk of displacement in the next ten years if desertification continues unchecked.
Since the beginning of humankind, migration has always been an adaptation strategy for people to 
cope with the wide range of environmental changes. However, we are faced with much greater chal-
lenges than ever before: the global population has increased from 2.5 billion to 6.9 billion people in the 
past 60 years (UN/DESA 2008); we are experiencing more significant environmental change, especially 
caused and expedited by climate change. In addition, globalization facilitates people’s mobility by 
creating easier access to the transportation infrastructure, and also to information by the mass media. 
Hence, the scale of environmentally-induced migration is likely to take on a new dynamic and dimen-
sion. The IPCC report of 2007 cited expert sources estimating that tens of millions of climate change 
induced migrants may be expected in the years leading up to 2050. Those who decide or are forced to 
leave their places of origin to seek alternative livelihoods may encounter discrimination or other abuse, 
or could be perceived as criminals if they become undocumented workers in another country. The 
act of movement of people in response to environmental change is so far not defined uniformly, nor 
are these migrants sufficiently protected by international law or conventions. The gaps in protection 
present key challenges for governments, particularly for both sending and receiving countries, where 
migrants cross borders to protect their lives or to seek alternative livelihoods. 
The 2010 Summer Academy, "Protecting Environmental Migrants: Creating New Policy and Insti-
tutional Framework", aimed to develop policy options for decision makers to better address the needs 
of such environmentally induced migrants. This SOURCE issue presents the outcomes of the 2010 
Summer Academy and the selected papers of PhD students from different academic backgrounds. 
These papers cover various aspects of the complexity of protection issues for environmental migrants 
and analysis of current protection regimes. Using case studies conducted in both developing and devel-
oped countries, these papers identified legal and institutional gaps and explored possible policy options 
for decision makers.  
It is one of the goals of the UNU-EHS, and especially for me as the new Director of the Institute, to 
facilitate interdisciplinary knowledge exchange and to support young scientists in developing potential 
solutions to a growing global problem. I hope this publication will serve as a departure for further aca-
demic discussions and improved policy options for the protection of environmental migrants.
Dr Jakob Rhyner
Director UNU-EHS
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Foreword 
Social vulnerability has been a central topic for discussion at the Summer Academies. In 2010 the 
fifth academy, in collaboration with UNU-EHS, took place. We have long been concerned with the 
complexities of climate change, environmental changes and migration and the social consequences for 
people living in vulnerable areas. Such people are frequently forced to migrate when the environmental 
conditions they live in deteriorate.  
Migrants rarely enjoy the protection of the law. They are rarely given a warm welcome, no matter 
where they go, and they have to find a new home under the most hostile of conditions. At the 2010 
Academy we asked what legal mechanisms are in place to protect migrants. In considering this point, 
it is important to distinguish between national migration and cross-border migration. The international 
community has so far been slow to grasp the political reality of environmental migration. According to 
IPCC estimates, migration will increase drastically with climate change. People are already having to 
migrate in Alaska, Canada, Papua New Guinea or on the low-lying islands of the Pacific. Many experts, 
including Lord Stern of Brentford, believe that by 2050 there will be up to 200 million environmentally 
induced migrants. In order to cover as many aspects as possible in our investigations, the experts in-
vited to Hohenkammer came from a wide range of disciplines: social scientists, geographers, and PhD 
students specializing in international law, European law, and human rights. 
Proceedings at the Academy were chaired by Professor Michelle Leighton, Director of the human 
rights programmes, Centre for Law and Global Justice at the University of San Francisco, and a re-
nowned expert in international law on these issues. The questions tackled were every bit as diverse and 
multifaceted as the formats selected in which to discuss them: workshops, learning sessions, roundta-
bles, presentations and group work gave participants the opportunity to learn more about the topic, 
discuss the problems involved, and come up with possible solutions.
Because it is important that researchers bring their findings to policymakers, we also invited ex-
perts from important political institutions that have been examining migration and its effects for some 
time. The debates and working sessions were attended by José Riera, Senior Policy Advisor at UNHCR, 
Geneva, and Simon Tonelli of the European Committee on Migration (CDMG), Brussels. Both high-
lighted the importance of the Summer Academy’s work and praised the results that the young scien-
tists produced. They also encouraged the participants to take their ideas to important committees and 
events like the Global Forum on Migration and Development (Mexico, November 2010) and the World 
Climate Summit (UNFCCC COP16, Mexico, December 2010) in order to develop them further.
It will be very gratifying if the results of the Summer Academy can indeed find their way into politi-
cal discussions and have some impact there. The essays in this SOURCE are a cross-section of contribu-
tions from the Academy participants. They mark the first steps in a field of research and action that 
deserves much more attention that it has been given so far.
 
Thomas Loster 
Chairman MRF
14
15
Table of contents
Overview of Academy Findings
1.   Section One
  Improving National Governance and Regional Cooperation in  
 Managing Displacement and Migration: Selected Case Studies
  Rapid-Onset Disasters                                                                           22
1.1 Vulnerability and Population Displacements due to Climate-Induced  
  Disasters in Coastal Bangladesh                                                              22
  Dulal Chandra Roy 
1.2 Community Resilience and Hurricane Ida: 
  How Marginalized Salvadorans Lacking NGO and Governmental 
      Support Cope with Climate Shock                                                          32
  Elizabeth Tellman
1.3 United States Environmental Migration:
  Vulnerability, Resilience, and Policy Options for Internally Displaced  
 Persons                                                                                                   46
  Michelle A. Meyer Lueck
  Slow-Onset Disasters                                                                             61
1.4. Food Insecurity and Environmental Migration in Drought-Prone 
   Areas of Ethiopia                                                                                    61
   Aschale Dagnachew Siyoum
1.5 The Agulu-Nanka Gully Erosion Menace in Nigeria:
  What Does the Future Hold for Population at Risk?                               72
  Chukwuedozie Kelechukwu Ajaero and Arinze Tagbo Mozie
2.   Section Two
  Improving International Law and Regional Cooperation on Migration   
      to Enhance Development and Climate Change Adaptation: 
  Selected Case Studies                                                                            81
2.1 Regional Labour Migration as Adaptation to Climate Change?:  
 Options in the Pacific                                                                              81
  Fanny Thornton
2.2 Temporary Labour Migration for Victims of Natural Disasters:  
 The Case of Columbia                                                                            90
  Nicole de Moor
2.3 Climate Change and Institutional Change in UNHCR                          102
  Nina Hall
16
17
Introduction
 
Climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions 
is now, at some level, a fact. IPCC and other sci-
entific bodies have modelled a number of future 
scenarios estimating changes in weather pat-
terns, ocean currents, and (more recently) eco-
systems. Average atmospheric temperatures are 
increasing and with this increase scientists expect 
(and in some cases may already be observing) 
more rapid melting of the earth’s ice sheets, sea 
level rise, and greater seasonal variability in rain-
fall. They are documenting more frequent storms 
and intense flooding in some areas, and severe 
and prolonged droughts in others, predicting fur-
ther water scarcity, diminished food production, 
and unemployment.  With the increase in natu-
ral disasters, vulnerable communities (those with 
weak support systems, governance, and capac-
ity to respond) are most at risk. Many may be 
displaced or increase their reliance on migration 
as a coping strategy for survival. The rise in hu-
manitarian crises presents enormous challenges 
for poorer countries and the international organi-
zations called on for assistance. These challenges 
are exacerbated by the lack of consistent policies, 
standards, and practices in disaster planning re-
lated to human displacement and migration. As 
the findings of the Academy and case studies 
presented in this volume reveal, human mobility 
is not always adverse to community development 
but in some circumstances may help build resi-
lience. Better understanding the opportunities 
and impacts of migration, and how to protect 
those displaced by disaster, can help govern-
ments to improve their climate adaptation strate-
gies. So, too can improving cooperation among 
neighboring states with shared natural resources 
and among countries of migration origin and des-
tination. To do this effectively, governments will 
need to rethink existing disaster planning, migra-
tion policy, and institutional frameworks.  
The findings and recommendations in this 
introductory chapter are the result of the 2010 
Summer Academy on Social Vulnerability organ-
ized by UNU-EHS and MRF from 25 to 31 July 
2010 in Hohenkammer, Germany. They provide a 
foundation for further consideration of how gov-
ernments can better manage displacement and 
migration related to climate disasters.  The papers 
that follow this introductory chapter in Sections 1 
and 2 below are the selected work of Academy 
participants who undertook specific case studies 
as part of their graduate or post-graduate work 
and in preparation for the programme. In some 
circumstances they refined their analysis to incor-
porate their learning experience.  The compilation 
of works is not meant to represent a comprehen-
sive study of all issues relevant to climate-related 
migration. Rather, the individual studies provide 
a unique, in-depth focus on various aspects of 
the issue and on multiple regions where climate 
change impacts may be significant. They suggest 
new avenues for research, policy, and law that 
may be relevant to decision makers in affected 
regions, and bring a greater depth to the issues 
discussed by the Academy.
Overview of Academy Findings
In 2010, the Academy brought together twenty 
PhD researchers from 13 countries with inter-
national scholars to consider issues of climate- 
related migration and future policy needs. The 
findings were derived from focused workshops 
and from the results of four roundtable sessions 
convened with experts from UNHCR, IOM, the 
European Commission, and the Council of Eu-
rope. The sessions explored a myriad of issues 
on human displacement and migration related to 
climate variability and disaster, with a particular 
focus on identifying the gaps in current legal and 
institutional frameworks to protect vulnerable 
populations, and suggested ways that policymak-
ers can seek to close these gaps. The Summer 
Academy prepared a synthesis of these meetings 
in a separate report that can be accessed via the 
UNU website. This overview presents a summary 
of the Academy’s findings and its recommended 
policy reflections, in a format that responds to 
a series of questions posed by international ex-
perts. 
What are the Key Challenges for Governments 
and Humanitarian Organizations in Addressing 
Climate-Related Migration?  
In less than a decade, by 2020, 75 to 250 mil-
lion people in the region are expected to be liv-
ing in areas suffering increased water stress due 
to climate variability1. Food security will become 
a much more serious challenge. By 2050, the 
number of people living in over-stressed river 
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systems, which are important for agriculture and 
human livelihood, will probably increase by three 
to five times the current level, reaching between 
four and seven billion.  Some countries, especially 
those with an expected significant population in-
crease, are likely to lose between 30 and 60 per 
cent of their agricultural production2.
The deepening of problems for developing 
countries in water scarcity, food insecurity, spread 
of disease, job losses, and human displacement 
may increase the population’s vulnerability to di-
sasters, and lead to migration. Those dependent 
on subsistence agriculture are at greatest risk of 
livelihood loss from slower-onset disasters, such 
as drought and desertification, and more immedi-
ately from potential rapid-onset hazards leading 
to disasters. Rapid-onset hazards, such as storm 
surges, floods and hurricanes, can cause the de-
struction of homes and infrastructure, displacing 
populations and leading to additional humanitar-
ian crises. Even before the worst impacts of disas-
ters occur, people may migrate in anticipation of 
livelihood loss. The dearth of studies in this area 
makes it difficult to disaggregate pure environ-
mental factors from other socio-economic factors 
that drive migration. Nonetheless, research sug-
gests that some people are already engaging in 
migration as a coping strategy and response to 
climate shocks. 
The potential for increased migration and hu-
man displacement presents key challenges for 
governments; for those with growing internal 
population movements as well as those serving 
as the source and destination countries when mi-
grants cross borders. People forced to move as 
a result of climate change impacts may encoun-
ter discrimination or other abuse in the areas in 
which they settle. They may be viewed as crimi-
nals if they are forced to move to and work in 
another country without legal documentation. 
The movement of a greater number of people 
may also create additional stress on the natural 
resources of other communities or on urban in-
frastructure, and this too may engender conflict.
While the needs of those affected by climate 
change and the level of protection and assist-
ance required in any disaster is context-specific, 
few national or international standards have been 
adopted to protect climate-related migrants. 
There is both a lack of standards and financial 
resources to assist governments in managing 
current and additional migration flows due to in-
creasing climate variability or disasters. This could 
change. There is increasing international recog-
nition that climate variability plays a role in mo-
tivating migration and that migration should be 
considered within adaptation planning. While de-
cision makers, including those within the climate 
change negotiations, have not deepened their 
consideration of the issue, many humanitarian 
experts and organizations have begun to analyse 
the gaps in policy, research, and institutional gov-
ernance. There is a need to evaluate the most ap-
propriate migration management strategies that 
could serve as models to help countries better 
prepare for and/or adapt to migration impacts. 
Where countries already face humanitarian and 
human rights challenges, the use of governance 
approaches that can more humanely and effec-
tively address the needs of persons displaced, or 
who migrate due to climate events, is particu-
larly critical. To better plan for adaptation pro-
grammes and assist with the short and long-term 
needs of those affected, government planning 
should identify and incorporate best practice and 
international standards related to displacement 
and migration management. 
As a foundation for moving forward, 
governments and aid agencies should con-
sider the adaptation needs of affected 
communities through the lens of potential 
migration impacts. For example, govern-
ance strategies and programmatic planning 
should better recognize and seek to under-
stand how migration is used by communities 
as a coping strategy for current or anticipated 
climate-related impacts. The challenge will be to 
construct adaptation programmes that are suf-
ficiently dynamic to include investigation and 
research into these areas, and to incorporate 
the findings into official planning and policy re-
sponse on an on-going basis. This type of dynamic 
action-oriented research can help to clarify the 
role that climate variability and disaster play in 
migration decision processes – processes that are 
often complex and difficult to deconstruct.
There is also a need to better understand how 
ecosystem change may influence the interaction 
of human social organization and economics 
more generally, i.e. to see how these relation-
ships are influenced by government stability and 
its provision of welfare and justice at all levels of 
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society – the household, local, national, regional, 
and international levels. Thus, a further challenge 
in managing the burdens of human migration or 
displacement, and building community resilience 
to disaster, is identifying the policies that can en-
hance stability and social justice. In some cases, 
governments may need to consider new laws and 
policies that can support positive migration or re-
settlement, and incorporate international stand-
ards.
The policy reflections discussed below were 
identified by participants as those that can help 
governments to better manage internal displace-
ment and international migration, and presup-
pose that governments with populations that 
are vulnerable to displacement and migration 
may need substantial technical or financial sup-
port from the international community. Certainly, 
there is a critical need to facilitate and support 
future dialogue among governments and inter-
national experts on these issues and to provide 
better guidance to governments in adaptation 
planning.
What Policy Reflections Can Help Governments 
to Manage Internal Migration Flows Related to 
Climate Change?
Past experience in pre-disaster and post- 
disaster management demonstrates that govern-
ments face enormous challenges in identifying 
and adopting successful strategies for regulating 
population movements due to climate disasters 
and in undertaking resettlement before or after 
disasters occur. In part, this is due to a lack of 
standards, institutional planning and cohesion, 
and financial resources. 
Many existing institutional structures in de-
veloping countries do not have the capacity to 
handle the impact of human displacement or to 
help communities build resilience. Communities 
themselves may lack the social capital necessary 
to improve their resilience or ability to recover. 
A series of slow-onset disasters in consecutive 
growing seasons caused by prolonged drought, 
for example, can deplete the social capital of a 
farming community as significantly as a rapid 
flood or hurricane. This may, in turn, create sig-
nificant vulnerability to the next disaster, and 
make migration a more feasible survival strategy.
Disaster planning has not consistently or sig-
nificantly included a deeper understanding of the 
socio-economic factors that contribute either to 
building or weakening the resilience of communi-
ties.  In some cases, resettlement schemes related 
to infrastructural development and disaster relief 
have resulted in further impoverishment for those 
affected. Moreover, disaster relief has tended to 
be short-term, leaving inadequate time for some 
communities to fully build resilience to future dis-
aster. Corruption in some areas has hampered 
agency and community planning processes.  
Disaster risk reduction and adaptation plan-
ning is likely to be more successful if it incorpo-
rates information on community vulnerability to 
migration, the local cultural context and scientific 
knowledge, and more effective local participa-
tion.  Each community may be different in terms 
of whether it is adversely affected by migration 
or is receiving benefits, whether existing migrant 
remittances are helping to build resilience or frac-
turing community ties. Government institutions 
that plan for and respond to disasters should 
have the capacity to assess this information and 
incorporate the data into early warning systems 
that can facilitate their work with communities 
on disaster preparedness and planning. Many 
institutions need additional structural support 
to ensure that at each level the local, state, and 
national government agencies coordinate their 
work. The success of institutional planning and 
response may also depend upon increasing the 
level of long-term disaster assistance to particu-
larly vulnerable countries. 
To better assist governments and communi-
ties to integrate migration concerns in adaptation 
planning, the following policies and institutional 
tools are proposed as priorities for consideration:
•  Adopt socio-cultural and environmental impact in-
dicators that incorporate migration data and trends. 
Tools currently exist to build indicators on vulnerabil-
ity.  These indicators can help to identify the com-
munities most vulnerable to disaster impact displace-
ment and migration due to extreme climate events, 
and to help identify appropriate resettlement options 
if necessary in consultation with communities of ori-
gin and those of the potential destination communi-
ty. Indicators will be most successful if they consider 
how vulnerabilities may vary across communities, 
particularly in regard to gender and sociologi-
cal factors.
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•  Incorporate the guiding principles on Inter-
nally Displaced Persons (“IDP”) into nation-
al law. Domestic law should clarify how the 
standards apply to persons affected by both 
rapid-onset and slow-onset disasters, such 
as drought and desertification. At present, 
many governments have yet to incorporate 
these principles into law and their applica-
tion has been inconsistent among vulnerable 
communities. There is also some speculation 
as to how the IDP principles affect voluntary, 
drought-related population movements.
•  Reorient work of institutions on disaster pre-
paredness and response to include potential 
climate-related migration factors. Agencies 
engaged in disaster risk and adaptation plan-
ning should re-evaluate their current pro-
grammes to identify capacity gaps in both 
slow-onset and rapid-onset disasters. Plan-
ning should be reoriented to include climate-
related displacement and migration. Improved 
coordination in this area can strengthen syn-
ergies in reducing risk and responding to im-
pacts.
•  Professionalize resettlement personnel. Profes-
sional and standardized training programmes 
should be adopted for disaster response and 
resettlement personnel. These should be based 
upon international good practices. Adaptation 
and other funding for disaster preparedness 
should be provided to governments in need of 
assistance to support such programs.
•  Designate a responsible agency or institu-
tion with authority to coordinate migration 
and resettlement in response to disaster 
(particularly weather-related extremes). 
This agency should coordinate with other 
adaptation planning and disaster prevention 
agencies on incorporating migration data into 
planning efforts.
•  Build national research and data collection 
capacity to support long-term development 
of information on community migration and 
displacement trends. Scientific research and 
data collection on migration as a coping re-
sponse to climate variability has not been col-
lected consistently, accurately, or on a scale 
over time that is relevant to national-level 
planning. This information can significantly 
enhance official planning and response ef-
forts. Collecting accurate data is often re-
source and time intensive, and therefore 
should be built into long-term adaptation 
planning programs with durable financial sup-
port.
What Policy Reflections Can Help Governments 
to Manage International Migration Flows Re-
lated to Climate Change?
Although the majority of population movements 
related to climate change are likely to be inter-
nal,  it is believed that some portion will also cross 
neighbouring borders, or add to the growing 
number of migrants already moving longer dis-
tances, such as from regions in northern Africa to 
Europe. At present, there are limited opportuni-
ties for legal or regularized international migra-
tion, particularly for those without professional 
skills who are living in climate-vulnerable com-
munities. There are also significant gaps in the 
immigration law and policies of receiving coun-
tries related to the protection of people displaced 
by environmental disasters. Few countries have 
established immigration protection for those af-
fected and, even where it exists, it is unclear what 
type of weather-related extremes such protection 
would cover. These gaps can exacerbate the hu-
manitarian crises and level of human suffering. As 
climate variability contributes to more prolonged 
droughts in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and intensifies storms and floods in others, such 
as Asia and the Pacific, these gaps become par-
ticularly acute for people who have been forced 
to move across borders even temporarily.
To address these gaps, governments will need 
to consider additional migration management 
policies and strategies that relate to both climate 
adaptation and protection of migrants. At the re-
gional level, it will be beneficial for governments 
to coordinate policies on both natural resource 
protection and climate-related migration, par-
ticularly where a region shares natural resources 
and ecosystems upon which communities de-
pend for their livelihood, and where seasonal mi-
gration is already being used to cope with climate 
variability.
The following policy reflections and institu-
tional tools are recommended as priorities for 
government consideration and adoption.
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•  Develop adaptation strategies on a region-
al level that include cross-border resource 
management and migration as a potential 
component  of adaptation. Land formation, 
land use, and other biophysical features that 
span borders may be determinative of adap-
tation needs, and collaborative management 
may be an effective measure to address cli-
mate change impacts. Successful resource 
management is often influenced by cross-
border social, cultural, and economic link-
ages. Seasonal migration across neighboring 
borders may already be playing a role in af-
fecting the natural resource base and resil-
ience of communities to withstand future 
climate shocks. Understanding the benefits 
or challenges of migration not as a failure of 
adaptation but as a potential component de-
velopment will be important to effective ad-
aptation planning, and may require bilateral 
or regional cooperation. Institutional support 
and financing for such cooperation is a critical 
challenge. Global adaptation funding should 
therefore incentivise cooperation among 
neighbouring countries, for joint regional 
projects in this area.
•  Establish Migration and Displacement Vul-
nerability Assessments (“MDVA”). Govern-
ments should undertake MDVAs to assist in 
identifying the role of migration as a positive 
or negative influence on adaptation. These 
assessments could be developed with the 
assistance of international agencies, such as 
the United Nations  Office for Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), which 
already monitors potential humanitarian 
situations. Vulnerability assessments could 
include a number of criteria, such as envi-
ronmental stressors, income patterns, and 
livelihood base that are important for ef-
fective government planning and migration 
management.
•  Provide opportunities to the most vulnerable 
climate-affected communities for migration 
within a broader co-development scheme. 
Where appropriate and feasible, states should 
consider adopting circular labour migration 
schemes that incorporate development pro-
grammes and the investment of remittances 
in communities vulnerable to climate disas-
ters.  These programmes could offer com-
munity members the opportunity to work in 
another country and to learn skills that could 
help to build resilience within their community 
upon their return home. This scheme should 
build upon and scale-up existing labour-mi-
gration models to cover a larger segment of 
vulnerable populations. A useful model is the 
Colombian Temporary and Circular Labour 
Migration Scheme (TCLM). Under this pro-
gramme, Colombians facing recurring natural 
disasters are offered employment opportuni-
ties, business training, and education in Spain, 
and can send remittances home while their 
community recuperates. The scheme includes 
a co-development component in which peo-
ple who do not migrate are given social and 
financial support. Essentially, this is a co-de-
velopment scheme which views migrants as 
agents for development. 
•  Establish a Temporary Relocation Scheme 
(“TRS”) for climate-displaced migrants 
where some migration or displacement 
across borders will be inevitable.  Govern-
ments should consider establishing a TRS 
mechanism to allow  individuals to apply for 
legal temporary status in a destination coun-
try while still in their home country if:  they 
are displaced by certain extreme rapid- and/
or the slow-onset climate disasters (e.g. high-
impact storms and prolonged droughts); and 
they have no opportunity to relocate else-
where in their country. States could consider 
establishing an open-ended scheme or one 
based on a quota for such disaster victims. 
Any scheme established should include an 
appropriate framework for duration, employ-
ment, and assistance. This mechanism could 
serve to reduce irregular migration by provid-
ing temporary legal avenues for those most 
critically affected. It could also be an impor-
tant mechanism to assist countries with po-
tential mass displacement across borders from 
unanticipated natural calamities. 
•  Extend the stay of deportation for migrants or 
provide Temporary Protection Status (“TPS”) 
for those who cannot return to their home 
country. Governments should clarify nation-
al law to ensure that a stay of deportation 
is possible for those living in a host country 
who cannot safely return to their home coun-
try and where no internal flight alternative is 
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possible, or survival is threatened upon return 
due to their vulnerability. In this context, the 
extended stay of deportation would be con-
sistent with international law, granting limited 
rights and legal status where return would 
jeopardize a person’s survival.3 Supporting 
evidence of the nature of disaster could be 
provided through a review of national Migra-
tion and Displacement Vulnerability Assess-
ments (“MDVA”) or similar evaluations, re-
ferred to above. A certification process could 
also be established to verify disaster threats 
and ensure that receiving countries have ac-
cess to such information in determining legal 
status.
•  Consider the establishment of a new legal 
status akin to asylum under refugee law for 
those fleeing long-term, life-threatening en-
vironmental disasters. Governments should 
consider establishing a new legal status for af-
fected persons in immediate need of refuge to 
ensure broader and more equal treatment of 
affected victims and burden-sharing among 
the source and destination states affected 
by climate change and population displace-
ment. This underscores the global commu-
nity’s recognition that the impact of human 
rights and humanitarian concerns imposed by 
climate disasters fall on the poorest countries 
of the world, and that states contributing to 
climate change share responsibility for assist-
ing impacted communities.  It further recog-
nizes that in some cases a compelling public 
interest exists to provide a legal framework 
of protection for persons who are forced to 
move temporarily or permanently.  Similar to 
asylum criteria, the status could be granted 
on the basis that the person has fled – or can-
not be returned to – his or her place of ori-
gin due to an environmental disaster related 
to climate change. This legal status may be 
necessary to assist persons threatened by per-
manent climate disaster such as those need-
ing relocation from sinking islands.
What Are priority Areas for Future Policy 
Dialogue?
•  The implementation of appropriate migration 
policies and institutional reflections, as with 
other areas of climate adaptation, presents a 
number of challenges for governments and 
humanitarian agencies.  States would benefit 
from fostering further dialogue among inter-
national experts and with affected communi-
ties, particularly to document and exchange 
standards and tools of good practice.  Within 
the UNFCCC climate negotiating text on ad-
aptation, the Cancun Adaptation Framework 
(paragraph 14(f)) highlights the importance 
of addressing the impacts of migration and 
displacement related to climate change. The 
UNFCCC process presents an opportunity for 
governments to facilitate beneficial dialogue 
and guidance for governments on these is-
sues beyond the Cancun meeting. Govern-
ments should provide support to a process of 
dialogue among states, humanitarian agen-
cies, and NGOs, with a view to building the 
capacity of governments to better integrate 
migration and displacement into national and 
regional programs on adaptation.    
The following areas for future dialogue are 
viewed as priorities:
•  How can governments incorporate migration 
management and displacement standards 
into adaptation programs and planning at the 
national and regional levels? The main ques-
tion concerns guidance on good practices in 
migration management and alternatives for 
managing environmental stressors with a mix 
of human mobility, livelihood options, and so-
cial capital.
•  How can governments support more in-depth 
qualitative and quantitative research, the col-
lection of necessary demographic, socioeco-
nomic, and environmental data on different 
patterns and scenarios of climate change, mi-
gration, and displacement?
•  How can national lead agencies for adapta-
tion, humanitarian, and emergency response 
planning institutions best collect, document 
and exchange information with affected com-
munities on local practices, migration experi-
ences, and future projects?
•  How can the diaspora communities be involved 
as effective partners in addressing climate 
change adaptation planning processes?
23
•  How can effective disaster risk reduction and 
conflict mediation policies be implemented 
to reduce the likelihood of emergency move-
ments with accompanying humanitarian con-
sequences?
Given the understanding among most experts 
that migration related to climate variability is con-
text-specific (climate shocks may drive migration 
in some households and communities, while in 
others they may not), further research into vul-
nerability, appropriate impact assessments, and 
fostering inter-ministerial agency collaboration 
will be important in improving future policy de-
velopment in this arena. 
1 World Bank (2008): Adaptation and Mitigation of Cli-
mate Change in Agriculture. <http://go.worldbank.
org/3Y6KXLNFH0>, 11 November 2010.
2 Cline, W. (2007): Global Warming and Agriculture: New 
Country Estimates Show Developing Countries Face Declines 
in Agriculture Productivity. <http://www.cgdev.org/content/
publications/detail/14425/>, 11 november 2010
3 International human rights law serves as the basis of criteria 
where the return of a person to desperate conditions would 
breach the right to life or amount to inhuman or degrading 
treatment. In certain cases, return may arguably be prohib-
ited, for example where land is uninhabitable and cannot 
support life, or there is little possibility of survival. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has stated: The reali-
zation of the right to life, and to physical security and integrity 
is necessarily related to and in some ways dependent upon 
one’s physical environment. Accordingly, where environmen-
tal contamination and degradation pose a persistent threat to 
human life and health, the foregoing rights are implicated. Re-
port on the Human Rights Situation in Ecuador OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.96Ch 8, Yanomami case (case 7615 of 5 March 1985), ref-
erenced in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 1984 – 85.
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Section One
Improving National Governance and 
Regional Cooperation in Managing  
Displacement and Migration: Selected 
Case Studies
Rapid-Onset Disasters
Vulnerability and Population  
Displacements due to Climate-induced 
Disasters in Coastal Bangladesh
Dulal Chandra Roy 
Abstract
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges 
for the world today. The intensity and frequency 
of climate induced disasters have increased in re-
cent years. Low-lying and coastal countries like 
Bangladesh are the most vulnerable to the ad-
verse effects of climate change. These countries 
are already experiencing disasters such as floods, 
cyclones, tsunamis, etc. with millions of popula-
tion displacements over the past years. The cli-
mate induced migrants are often discriminated 
against, and face different socio-economic and 
cultural problems during or after the displace-
ments. In many cases, the existing policies and 
institutional frameworks are not sufficient to pro-
tect the displaced people. Therefore, there is an 
urgent need to review the existing policies and 
institutional frameworks for protecting the cli-
mate induced migrants. In this paper, the author 
discusses vulnerability and population displace-
ment issues, reviews existing policy frameworks, 
and suggests necessary policies and institutional 
frameworks with regard to extreme climate-in-
duced disasters in coastal Bangladesh.
Key-words: Climate change, Sea level rise, 
Vulnerability, Displacements, Environmental mi-
grants, Bangladesh
Introduction
Climate change has emerged as the greatest 
threat facing mankind today (Clime Asia 2009). 
The adverse effects of climate change undermine 
economic development, human security, and 
people’s fundamental rights (UNDP 2007). They 
worsen the poverty situation and obstruct the 
achievements of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) of the least developed countries. 
These countries are highly vulnerable to climate 
induced disasters (Vashist and Das 2009).
Disaster research findings show that the fre-
quency and intensity of extreme natural events 
have increased in recent years (UNDP 2004). 
Additionally, global climate change and sea level 
rise may affect low-lying and coastal countries, 
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displacing millions of people from their homes, 
their occupations, and their livelihoods (World 
Bank 2007). IOM has estimated that there will 
be 250 million people who could be described 
as climate or environmental migrants by 2050 
(IOM 2009). The findings of a joint report by 
UN OCHA, the Internal Displacement Monitor-
ing Centre (IDMC), and the Norwegian Refu-
gee Council (NRC) show that at least 36 million 
people were displaced in 2008 by sudden-onset 
natural disasters (IDMC and UN OCHA 2009). 
Among them, 20 million people were displaced 
due to extreme climate-related events. As the 
frequency and intensity of weather-related events 
are increasing, the number of displaced people is 
expected to rise in coming years.
UNFCCC recognizes that Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS), low-lying and coast-
al countries, Africa, and the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) are particularly vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change (UNFCCC 2007). 
The Global Climate Risk Index 2011, which was 
developed by the German-based organization 
“Germanwatch”, recognized Bangladesh as the 
country most vulnerable to extreme weather 
events and the one most affected in the period 
of 1990-2009 (Harmeling 2010). On the other 
hand, UNDP (2004) identified Bangladesh as the 
most vulnerable country in the world to tropical 
cyclones, and the sixth most vulnerable country 
to floods.
Millions of people in the coastal areas of 
Bangladesh are under threat of climate change 
and climate variability problems. According to a 
recent report, over 35 million people will be dis-
placed from 19 coastal districts of Bangladesh in 
the case of a one metre sea level rise this century 
(Rabbani 2009). IOM (2009) has indicated in a 
report that many people have already migrated 
to the urban slums from the coastal zones of 
Bangladesh due to frequent cyclones, storm surg-
es, river erosion, etc. 
The recent Cyclone "Aila", which hit the coast 
of Bangladesh on 25 May 2009, caused a huge 
loss of property and infrastructure, and displaced 
a large number of people from their homes (DMB 
2009). A survey by Oxfam found that the dam-
aged coastal embankments in the severely af-
fected areas had still not been repaired, even 
though a long time had passed (Oxfam 2010). As 
of November 2010, a large number of displaced 
people had been living in the makeshift houses 
on the damaged embankments without adequate 
food, safe drinking water, proper sanitation facili-
ties, etc. 
To protect these displaced people, the 
relevant policies and the institutional frameworks 
should be reviewed urgently to identify the key 
gaps in protection needs. In this paper, the au-
thor reviews the vulnerability and population 
displacement issues, identifies the critical gaps 
and challenges, and suggests important policy or 
institutional frameworks. This paper focuses on 
examples from Bangladesh, specifically the ex-
periences of Cyclone ‘Aila’ 2009 as a means of 
identifying challenges and solutions for other de-
veloping countries.
Vulnerability of Bangladesh to Climate-Induced 
Disasters
Since Bangladesh has around 160 million inhabit-
ants, it is highly vulnerable to climate change and 
sea level rise (Rabbani 2009). The geographi-
cal location and low-lying characteristics of the 
country make it more vulnerable and susceptible 
to different natural and climate induced disas-
ters. It is the third most vulnerable country in the 
world to sea level rise in terms of the number of 
people, and among the top ten countries in terms 
of percentage of people living in low-lying coastal 
zones (Pender 2008). 
At present, almost 40 million people live in 
the coastal areas of Bangladesh. The vulnerable 
coast of Bangladesh is particularly exposed to 
cyclones and storm surges. Due to sea level rise, 
the coastal areas are at great risk. Loss of coastal 
lands to the sea is currently predicted to reach 
three per cent by the 2030s and six per cent in 
the 2050s (Tanner et al. 2007). Therefore, this is 
likely to generate a steady flow of displaced peo-
ple over time. 
Over the past few years, several natural 
disasters such as cyclones, storm surges, floods, 
droughts, etc. have caused enormous loss of 
life and property in Bangladesh. Table 1 shows 
the major natural disasters in Bangladesh by the 
number of affected population during the last 30 
years. It can be seen that in the 1988 flood alone, 
a total of 45 million people were affected, includ-
ing a large number of internal displacements. 
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Disaster type          Time           Number of affected population
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Drought
Storm
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
June, 1988
June, 2004
May, 1984
July, 1987
July, 1983
April, 1991
May, 1998
July, 2007
June, 1995
January, 1993
45,000,000
36,000,000
30,000,000
29,700,000
20,000,000
15,438,849
15,000,050
13,771,380
12,656,006
11,469,537
These disasters also affected the economic devel-
opment of the country to a large extent.
Bangladesh has also been highly vulnerable in 
terms of number of people killed in natural dis-
asters in past years (see Table 2). In the 1991 cy-
clone, a total of 138,866 people were killed, with 
millions of injuries, huge loss of property, damage 
to the physical infrastructure, socio-economic 
disruption, etc. Among other extreme events, the 
super cyclone "Sidr" in 2007 killed 4,236 people 
and caused great damage to agriculture, fisher-
ies, forestry, health, water supply, sanitation, and 
other sectors.
Table 1: Major natural disasters by affected population in Bangladesh during the last 30 years (Source: EM-DAT 2010)
The IPCC estimates that climate change will 
contribute to 0.6 metre or more of global sea level 
rise by 2100 (Harvey and Nicholls 2008). Accord-
ing to a World Bank report, Bangladesh will face 
30 cm and 50 cm sea level rises in 2030 and 2050 
respectively (Faisal and Parveen 2004). A recent 
study has revealed that sea levels in the Bay of 
Bengal have risen much faster over the past few 
decades. As a result, low-lying and small islands 
are at great risk. Recent satellite images show that 
the New Moore Island or South Talpotti (the un-
inhabited territory) in the Bay of Bengal has dis-
appeared due to sea level rise (Rahman 2010). 
It is predicted that other small islands in the Bay 
Disaster type          Time           Number of people killed
Cyclone
Cyclone
Cyclone 
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
April, 1991
May, 1985
November, 2007
June, 1988
July, 1987
May, 1984
July, 2007
July, 1998
138,866
15,000
4,236
2,379
2,055
1,200
1,110
1,050
Table 2: Major natural disasters by number of population killed in Bangladesh during the last 30 years (Source: EM-DAT 2010)
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of Bengal, such as South Talpotti, may disappear 
in the coming decades.
The coastal areas are particularly vulnerable 
to tropical cyclones and associated storm surges. 
The cyclones that occurred in 1970, 1985, 1991, 
1997, 2007, and 2009 caused great loss of life 
and property, and displaced millions of people 
in the coastal areas (Akter 2009). As shown in 
figure 1, in the 1991 cyclone, around 15 per cent 
of the population of the coastal area and 4 per 
cent of the population in the context of the coun-
try as a whole were displaced from their homes.
In addition, a large number of people have 
been displaced over the years due to floods and 
river erosion. More than 500,000 inhabitants of 
the Bhola island in Bangladesh lost their homes 
when the island was permanently submerged by 
floods in 2005 (Chhabara 2008). A vast number 
of families lost their homes and were compelled 
to move to urban slums in metropolitan areas 
such as Dhaka, Rajshahi, Khulna and Chittagong 
(IOM 2009). Dhaka’s slum population is esti-
mated at 3.4 million, and  is expected to grow as 
400,000 migrants arrive each year from rural and 
coastal areas as a result of natural-induced disas-
ters (World Bank 2009). Along with the internal 
displacements, 12 to 17 million people have re-
portedly migrated to the adjacent states of India, 
mostly in West Bengal, Assam and Tripura since 
the 1950s (Reuveny 2005).  
The Consequences of Cyclone "Aila" 2009
Cyclone "Aila", which struck on 25 May 2009, 
caused enormous loss of property, infrastructure, 
social and economic disruption, environmental 
degradation, etc. in the coastal areas of Bang-
ladesh. A total of 190 people were killed and 
around 4.82 million people were affected in a to-
tal of 11 coastal districts (see Table 3). 
The cyclone and tidal surges collapsed the 
coastal embankments at several points and in-
undated vast areas (DMB 2009). The houses, 
livestock, assets, crops, etc were washed away 
by the floodwaters. Over 1,700 km of flood em-
bankments were damaged by the cyclone and 
tidal surges. The people, who lost everything, left 
their homesteads and took shelter in the make-
shift houses on roads, damaged embankments, 
in markets, schools, or even in the open (Sarawat 
2009). 
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Figure 1: Percentage of displaced people in recent cyclones in the context of the coastal area and the country  
(Source: Akter 2009)
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Affected districts           Number of deaths             Number of affected people
Table 3: Number of deaths and affected people in 2009 Cyclone ‘Aila’ (Source: DMB 2009)
Satkhira
Khulna
Noakhali
Bhola
Barishal
Patuakhali
Laxmipur
Bagerhat
Pirojpur
Chittagong
Barguna
Total (11 districts):
59
57
24
18
11
8
7
4
1
1
-
190
563,783
546,630
1,163,071
584,970
292,105
615,785
17,071
497,036
248,470
13,630
284,079
4,826,630
The embankments, built in the 1960s, had 
been a source of protection to the coastal peo-
ple from the rivers and tidal flooding (Sarawat 
2009). For the last 20-30 years, these embank-
ments had been cut at several points to allow the 
saline water to enter the land for shrimp cultiva-
tion. In addition, these embankments had not 
been maintained properly for the past years by 
the responsible authorities. As a result, these vul-
nerable embankments collapsed easily during the 
recent Cyclone ‘Aila’, and huge areas were inun-
dated. 
The precarious situation created by Cyclone 
‘Aila’ resulted in increased migration to the cities 
and other areas. More than 400,000 people were 
reportedly displaced by the cyclone in the coastal 
areas of Bangladesh (Wapedia 2010). According 
to the ECHO (European Commission’s Humani-
tarian Aid Office) partners’ assessment, about 
40,000 people migrated due to Cyclone ‘Aila’ 
from the Koyra upazila (sub-district) of Khulna 
District in Bangladesh (ECHO 2009).  
Figure 2 shows the number of displaced fami-
lies in Dacope and Koyra upazila in different pe-
riods of 2009 and 2010. According to the esti-
mation of IOM in November 2009, the numbers 
of displaced families in Dacope and Koyra upazila 
were 11,118 and 5,533 respectively (IOM 2010). 
As of April 2010, some displaced families had re-
turned to their homes, but around 7,705 families 
in Dacope upazila and 2,809 families in Koyra 
upazila could not return. Along with the inter-
nal displacements, a number of affected families 
from the coastal areas have reportedly migrated 
to neighbouring countries such as India (Gain and 
Ray 2010).
As per the information of November 2010, 
many IDPs were still living on the damaged em-
bankments and other high strips of land. The 
poor became extremely poor, and many non-
poor were thrown into poverty and food insecu-
rity by the destruction caused by "Aila" (Mallick 
2009). As the drinking water sources and latrines 
were greatly damaged, people were living in un-
healthy and unhygienic conditions without ade-
quate food, pure drinking water, or proper sanita-
tion facilities (Dhaka Mirror 2010). The IDPs also 
faced the problems of physical insecurity, stress 
due to traumatic experiences, lack of livelihood 
opportunities, loss of documentation, etc. (CRG 
2006). In addition, educational activities of the 
schools, colleges, and other institutions in the af-
fected areas were disrupted to a great extent.
The responses from the Government of 
Bangladesh to overcome this disaster were not 
adequate or well-coordinated (Ahmed 2010). 
The government provided 20 kilograms of rice 
monthly for each affected family through Vulner-
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able Group Feeding (VGF) cards. This was not 
sufficient to maintain these families (IOM 2010). 
The government also made a number of attempts 
to repair the damaged embankments with the 
help of the local authorities and the community 
people. However, due to the lack of timely initia-
tives, adequate funding and coordination among 
the concerned agencies , the embankments had 
not been repaired even after a long time had 
passed. Some repaired embankments collapsed 
repeatedly due to water pressure during new 
moon tides (NNN-IRIN 2010). 
A number of international organizations, such 
ECHO, Oxfam, and Caritas undertook emer-
gency responses and  relief operations in the af-
fected areas. IOM made two field assessments in 
the affected areas in response to Cyclone ‘Aila’ 
and at the request of the government and the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of the 
United Nations (IOM 2009). Based on these as-
sessments, IOM undertook a project to assist 
over 24,000 displaced families, providing tem-
porary shelter support and other essential non-
food items. To facilitate the implementation of 
the project, IOM opened a temporary office in 
the affected areas. It closely coordinated with 
the local administration and partner NGOs to 
ensure effective and rapid implementation of the 
project. 
Existing National Policies and Institutional 
Frameworks in Bangladesh
Bangladesh, being one of the most vulnerable 
countries, has adopted a number of policies and 
institutional frameworks over recent years. These 
Figure 2: Number of displaced families in Cyclone ‘Aila’, which affected Dacope and Koyra Upazila (Source: IOM 2010)
measures have been undertaken to combat fre-
quent natural disasters and the adverse effects 
of climate change. However, recent research find-
ings and experiences suggest that these policies 
and institutional frameworks need to be reviewed 
to address gaps in knowledge and challenges for 
protection of the climate induced migrants (NRC 
2009). 
The institutional framework of Bangladesh 
consists of different disaster management com-
mittees at different levels comprising govern-
ment, non-government, voluntary, and other 
relevant stakeholders. The National Disaster 
Management Council (NDMC) headed by the 
Prime Minister is the highest-level forum for the 
formulation and review of disaster management 
policies. The Inter-Ministerial Disaster Manage-
ment Coordination Committee is responsible for 
implementing disaster management policies and 
the decisions of the NDMC, and  is assisted by 
the National Disaster Management Advisory 
Committee. 
The Ministry of Food and Disaster Manage-
ment is the focal ministry for disaster manage-
ment in Bangladesh. Its Disaster Management 
Bureau (DMB) is mainly responsible for coordi-
nating national disaster management interven-
tions across all agencies. In 2000, the govern-
ment published ‘Standing Orders on Disaster’, 
which provides a detailed institutional framework 
for disaster risk reduction and emergency man-
agement, and defines the roles and responsi-
bilities of different agencies and committees. In 
addition, the Ministry of Environment and For-
est is responsible for addressing climate change 
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challenges, including international negotiations. 
Under its Department of  Environment (DOE), a 
climate change cell has been established to sup-
port the mainstreaming of climate change into 
national development planning. It has developed 
a network of 34 focal points in different govern-
ment agencies, research institutions and other 
organizations (MoEF 2008). 
Bangladesh National Environmental Policy 
(1992) and the Coastal Zone Policy (2005) deal 
with the adverse effects of disasters and envi-
ronmental problems. In 2005, the Government 
of Bangladesh launched its National Adaptation 
Programme of Action (NAPA), which highlights 
the main adverse effects of climate change and 
identifies adaptation needs. Bangladesh supports 
the Bali Action Plan, which identified a set of ac-
tions essential to achieve a secure climate future. 
The plan was introduced in the 13th Conference 
of Parties (COP 13) to the UNFCCC, held in Bali 
in December 2007. In response to the Bali Action 
Plan, the Government of Bangladesh launched 
the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Ac-
tion Plan (BCCSAP) in 2009.
Currently, the Bangladesh Government is un-
dertaking a development project aimed at build-
ing 207 eco-villages for re-housing the climate 
change victims and creating self-employment op-
portunities (Daily Purbanchal 2010). In these eco-
villages, a total of 10,650 families affected by re-
cent climate induced disasters may be rehoused. 
Though the above policies and programmes have 
been adopted by the government, there are still 
many gaps in knowledge and challenges in pro-
tecting the vulnerable people of Bangladesh.
The Gaps in Knowledge and Challenges Regarding 
Policies and Institutional Frameworks
The national policies and institutional frame-
works of Bangladesh are not sufficient to protect 
climate induced migrants (Akter 2009). The na-
tional policies concerning climate change and en-
vironmental issues such as the National Environ-
ment Policy 1992, the Coastal Zone Policy 2005, 
NAPA 2005, the Bangladesh Climate Change 
Strategy and the Action Plan 2008 point out the 
problems due to climate change. However, there 
are no clear indications of how population dis-
placement problems will be addressed in these 
policies. In addition, there are no detailed action 
plans with a timeframe to tackle this problem.  
Experiences from the 2009 Cyclone ‘Aila’ in-
dicate that weaknesses and inefficiency exist in 
managing natural disasters. The concerned au-
thorities were not able to repair the damaged 
embankments caused by the cyclone for a long 
time. There were no proper and adequate reha-
bilitation programmes for the displaced people. 
In addition, there was lack of accountability and 
transparency in implementation of emergency re-
sponses and rehabilitation programmes. In many 
cases, negligence and corruption of the local dis-
aster management authorities and local leaders 
were reported in relief and emergency manage-
ment programmes (Ahmed 2010). 
Various study findings show that the exist-
ing United Nations and international policies for 
protecting internally displaced persons are insuf-
ficient (NRC 2009). As per the normative frame-
works under the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, the respective states have 
the primary responsibility to help internally dis-
placed persons. However, there are challenges on 
the ground to ensuring the protection of inter-
nally displaced persons. This is because the af-
fected countries are sometimes unable to protect 
the displaced people, and in some cases even 
deny the entry of international protection and 
assistance agencies, referring to the principle of 
national sovereignty and non-interference. 
The international migration policies do not 
adequately support the protection of environ-
mental or climate migrants. As the numbers of 
climate or environmental migrants are expected 
to rise in coming years due to climate change 
and sea level rise, developed countries may face 
demands to accept climate refugees from vulner-
able and affected countries. Accepting climate 
refugees already faces opposition in some coun-
tries. For example, India has planned to fence off 
Bangladesh by erecting a 2,500 mile long barbed-
wire barrier to prevent the entry of terrorists and 
illegal immigrants (Chhabara 2008; Buerk 2006). 
A gap between disaster research and prac-
tice exists. Disaster management strategies are 
often not adopted on the basis of intensive and 
in-depth disaster research and analysis. The lack 
of proper vulnerability assessment to climate 
change impacts in vulnerable communities is a 
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major drawback. Additionally, there are the chal-
lenges of raising necessary funds and implement-
ing adaptation programmes for the most vulner-
able countries. 
Recommendations and Conclusions
The problems and challenges identified from 
the examples of Bangladesh may be of concern 
and relevance to many other developing coun-
tries facing similar situations. It is true that some 
Bangladeshi issues are different from other coun-
tries, given their cultural and geopolitical situa-
tions. Despite these differences, most of the rec-
ommendations made here may be applicable to 
other vulnerable and developing countries. 
Existing policies of vulnerable countries 
should be reviewed and re-evaluated for better 
disaster preparedness and emergency responses. 
NAPA of the respective countries should include 
explicit and effective strategies for addressing cli-
mate induced migrations. In addition, adequate 
assessment of vulnerabilities in terms of different 
social, cultural, and environmental impact indica-
tors is needed within the vulnerable communities. 
Proper vulnerability assessment can assist go-
vernments and other relevant authorities to take 
appropriate action for disaster risk reduction.
Synergies among disaster risk reduction, cli-
mate change adaptation and development should 
be developed ensuring representation, participa-
tion, and coordination of different stakeholders 
in the community. Poverty reduction strategies of 
the climate vulnerable countries must take into 
account the impacts of climate change. Neces-
sary measures should be undertaken to protect 
the vulnerable population and their livelihoods. 
An integrated approach involving many differ-
ent ministries and agencies, civil society, and the 
business sector is needed to tackle climate change 
in these countries. 
The gaps and weaknesses in existing insti-
tutional frameworks for disaster responses and 
rehabilitation activities should be properly ad-
dressed. In Bangladesh, the coastal embank-
ments damaged by Cyclone ‘Aila’ 2009 need to 
be repaired and rebuilt urgently to protect the 
internally displaced persons and their livelihoods. 
Affected and displaced people need greater re-
habilitation and resettlement support from the 
government as well as international communities. 
Expert help and local knowledge should be incor-
porated in the resettlement programmes. 
The capacity of the governments and other 
concerned organizations to plan and implement 
adaptation programmes should be strengthened. 
Proper educational and training programmes 
will have to be undertaken for building capaci-
ties and raising public awareness. People-friendly 
and timely early warning systems should be es-
tablished, taking into account regional variability. 
Additionally, proper implementation of the rel-
evant policies and guidelines needs to be ensured 
for better protection of displaced persons. 
Recent natural disasters indicate that Bang-
ladesh and other vulnerable countries, which 
are under the threat of sea level rise and climate 
change, may face more climate refugees in com-
ing years. Therefore, international migration 
policies and programmes should be reformulat-
ed in the light of the influx of climate refugees. 
Countries and humanitarian agencies should 
review their legal and institutional frameworks, 
and identify any legal gaps in protection. More 
research activities and systematic monitoring of 
displacements are needed in this regard.
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Community Resilience and Hurricane 
Ida: How Marginalized Salvadorans 
Lacking NGO and Governmental  
Support Cope with Climate Shock
Elizabeth Tellman
Abstract
El Salvador is extremely vulnerable to disasters 
due to many factors, including poverty, defor-
estation, urbanization, and mass internal migra-
tion during the Civil War (1980 – 1992). The low 
capacity of the national and local governments to 
address social vulnerability and respond to disas-
ters left El Salvador again exposed to Hurricane 
Ida in 2009. This paper explores vulnerability 
and capacity in response to the landslides caused 
by Ida. It does so using three nested scales: na-
tional, municipal, and communal. The case study 
highlights the lack of both governmental and 
non-governmental response in two communities 
forced to rely on their own resources of social 
capital and emergent organization in the after-
math of Ida. Comparative quantitative analysis 
of the two communities identifies the social fac-
tors of the more resilient community, as well as 
the roles of remittances and migration for post-
Ida reconstruction. El Salvador must foster and 
replicate local and international good practices in 
Community-Based Disaster Management to suc-
cessfully adapt to climate change.
Key-words: Resilience, El Salvador, Disasters, 
Vulnerability, Climate change adaptation
Introduction
El Salvador appears as one of the countries most 
vulnerable to natural disasters by nearly all met-
rics used to form top 10 lists in the World Bank’s 
2005 Natural Disaster Hotspots analysis. Exposed 
to earthquakes, droughts, floods, landslides, and 
volcanoes, it is not surprising that in the most 
recent UN report (UNDAC April 2010), 88.7 per 
cent of the territory is considered at risk from one 
or multiple threats. Even more alarming, the high 
population density and location of the capital San 
Salvador exposes 95.4 per cent of the population 
and 96.4 per cent of the GDP to natural disaster.
The main factors contributing to increas-
ing vulnerability to disasters include population 
density, urbanization, deforestation, and pov-
erty. In terms of demographics, the small area 
(21,040 km2) and high population (6.2 million) 
make El Salvador the most densely populated 
country in Central America (290 persons/km2) 
(UN data 2009). The population is concentrated 
in urban areas, a trend stemming from mass mi-
gration during the Civil War (1980 – 1992). The 
Civil War displaced 737,000 people internally and 
1.5 million externally, with the dominant internal 
migration trend being rural to urban as the poor 
fled the violent countryside (Mendoza 1999). Ur-
banization has had lasting effects, changing the 
geography of poverty; 58 per cent of El Salva-
dor’s poor now live in cities (FLASCO et al. 2010). 
This unplanned migration not only caused 
hasty and unsustainable development in cities, 
but also had negative environmental effects in 
rural areas. The need for food often caused culti-
vation unsuitable for soil types, which combined 
with the napalm and bombs dropped during the 
war provoked land degradation, increased de-
forestation and exaggerated drought and flood 
cycles (Wisner 2001). El Salvador now has the 
second highest level of deforestation in Latin 
America, with only two per cent of original for-
est cover remaining. Moreover, deforestation has 
had serious consequences for El Salvador’s natu-
ral capacity to mitigate flooding1, one of the dis-
asters that disproportionably affects the poor.  
Although poverty has decreased by a third 
since the Civil War, it is once again on the rise. 
Poverty actually rose from 40 per cent to 46 per 
cent in 2007 – 2008, and GDP was negative in 
2009, decreasing by 2.5 per cent (Banco Central 
de Reserva El Salvador 2010). El Salvador remains 
one of the 10 poorest countries in Latin America, 
and is in danger of slipping further into poverty 
if disasters increase as predicted (UNDAC 2010). 
Undoubtedly, the country’s social, economic, and 
environmental vulnerabilities will be further ag-
gravated by climate change. Historically, 96.4 
per cent of economic impacts of disasters in El 
Salvador are due to climatic events, and just one 
climatic shock can devastate the economy (UN-
DAC 2010). One such shock in 2009 was Hur-
ricane Ida.
During 7 – 8 November 2009, a low pres-
sure system on the tail of Hurricane Ida resulted 
in heavy rains of 355 mm that fell in four hours, 
rivalling the deluge of Hurricane Mitch (1998), 
whose 400 mm rains over four days caused 
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20,000 deaths in Central America. Official data 
cites 275 dead or missing, and over 75,000 per-
sons displaced in five of the country’s 14 depart-
ments (Proteccion Civil 2009). A drought earlier 
that year left crops exceptionally vulnerable to 
climatic stress, such that the untimely arrival of 
torrential rains caused by Ida in the heart of the 
bean harvest completely destroyed the already 
vulnerable crop, causing total damage valued at 
$996 million dollars (Marroquin 2010). The dam-
age placed Ida as the third most economically 
disastrous event in El Salvador’s history, with an 
estimated 90,000 Salvadorans directly affected 
(EM-DAT 2010).
Hurricane Ida was not an isolated inci-
dent. Predicted increases of El Niño years in the 
Southern Oscillation, which will exaggerate flooding 
in the future, will make climate change adaptation 
extremely difficult for El Salvador (Turcios and Amaya 
2007). Predicting adaptability to climate change de-
pends on analysing El Salvador’s current vulnerability 
and capacity to handle climatic events and how it can 
improve resilience on the community level.
Conceptualizing Vulnerability, Resilience, and 
Social Capital 
Vulnerability analysis crosses between political 
economy and political ecology to understand 
who is vulnerable, how they are vulnerable, 
and why (Eakin and Luers 2006). Social rela-
tions create vulnerability as well as capacity, and 
understandings of both recognize socio-enviro 
reciprocity, “the environment as a socially medi-
ated force…just as society expresses itself envi-
ronmentally.” (Oliver-Smith 2004: 12). The paper 
draws heavily on Wisner et al. (2004) and their 
pressure and release model and access models to 
understand disaster causation, magnitude, after-
math, and coping mechanisms. This paper draws 
upon the concepts of resilience from the same 
authors (Wisner et al. 2004) to emphasize that 
mere “recovery” to the status quo after disasters 
is unacceptable. The pressure and release model 
dictates that resilience, or the increased capacity 
for a community to absorb future climate shocks, 
is necessary for disaster reconstruction that ad-
dresses the roots of social vulnerability (Wisner 
et al. 2004).
The paper also explores non-material, socio-
logical phenomena of resilience, recognizing that 
“social capital is a necessary glue for adaptive 
capacity, particularly in dealing with unforeseen 
events…social capital substitutes local manage-
ment for state control” when the state fails, as 
it did in the aftermath of Hurricane Ida in El Sal-
vador (Adger 2003: 400). Social capital has been 
previously documented in El Salvador as funda-
mental in disaster risk reduction (Lavell 2004) 
and as a “positive feature for adaptation proc-
esses” (Schipper 2006). Sociological resilience 
has been documented elsewhere in Vietnam, 
Peru, Honduras, and Nepal (Moench and Dixit 
2004; Adger 2003; Comfort et al 1999).  Even so, 
many risk models do not include the capacity to 
adapt, ignoring diverse coping strategies of social 
groups and communities that may include pool-
ing resources, migrating, or using social capital to 
access external networks (Adger 2003). Evidence 
of social capital is most obvious when a “shock” 
disturbs the system, as explored in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Ida in El Salvador. (Smit and Wandel 
2006).
The “shock” of Hurricane Ida and responses 
is examined using three nested scales, national, 
municipal, and communal. Beginning with the 
macro level, the first section analyses vulner-
abilities of the state exposed by Hurricane Ida. 
The second section explains the specific history 
leading to the vulnerability of the municipality of 
Santiago Texacuangos to Hurricane Ida as well as 
its capacity in Ida’s aftermath. The third section 
explores local intricacies of vulnerability and ca-
pacity in a case study of two small communities 
in Santiago Texacuangos, Santa Maria de la Espe-
ranza, and Joya Grande. The fourth section con-
tains statistical analysis of the case study, com-
paring and contrasting different coping strategies 
post-Ida. The fifth and final section focuses on 
national gaps in disaster risk reduction, and inter-
national good practices that El Salvador can learn 
from to fill such gaps.
National Level Analysis: Hurricane Ida and the 
Landslides of November 2009
The loss in human life, infrastructure, and crops 
from Hurricane Ida goes beyond social and en-
vironmental vulnerability and was in large part 
due to the institutional vulnerability of the na-
tional government. Disarticulation between sci-
ence and government always happens to some 
extent in disaster governance (Hillhorst 2004). 
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However, El Salvador’s Civil Protection Agency, 
created in 2005 to “prevent, mitigate, and effec-
tively attend to natural and anthropic disasters” 
(Proteccion Civil 2010), had not even read the 
disaster emergency manuals prior to November 
2009, according to a representative from IOM 
(personal interview 2010). This led to civil protec-
tion, responsible for managing the country’s early 
warning systems (colours in order of increasing 
danger: green, yellow, orange, and red, a na-
tional emergency). Although civil protection had 
enough climatic information from (OV-Servicios 
Nationales de Estudio Territorial, the national me-
teorological institution) to raise the alert level as 
early as 12:25 p.m. on 7 November, civil protec-
tion maintained the “green” alert2,  which was 
not elevated until 6 a.m. the following morning 
(La Pagina 2010). When the warning was finally 
raised to “orange” on 8 November, hundreds had 
already died. The Human Rights Department of 
El Salvador blames inadequate state bureaucracy 
for failing to activate warning and evacuation 
systems until the morning after the disaster had 
struck. The state permitted the death of citizens 
whose lives could have been saved (PDDH 2010). 
Even if the warning systems had been ac-
tivated, little could have been done due to the 
failure of civil protection to create municipal 
commissions. Such commissions would have 
been responsible for relaying information to lo-
cal communities, yet only 100 commissions out 
of 262 municipalities had been formed pre-Ida, 
leaving more than half the nation without writ-
ten emergency plans. However, even if local and 
national committees were previously formed and 
activated during Ida, there is minimal funding for 
disaster risk reduction. Mayor’s offices have no 
budget for disaster projects. The national fund 
for disaster prevention, PROFOMID (Fondos de 
Presupuesto de Mitigación de Desastres/Funds 
for Disaster Prevention), has a budget of only $4 
million; miniscule in comparison to the amount of 
damage caused by Ida.  The lack of government 
response exposed the institutional inadequacy of 
the state to handling disasters, the consequences 
of which play out unfavourably at the municipal 
level. The next section explores how Hurricane 
Ida affected one specific municipality, with its 
specific set of vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability on the Municipal Level: Santiago 
Texacuangos
The backdrop to the case study area is the mu-
nicipality of Santiago Texacuangos, which lies 30 
minutes south of the capital on the south edge 
of the volcanic crater lake Llopango. The region 
is 30.52 km2 in area, with a dense population 
of 534 people/km2. Settlements are scattered 
throughout ravines, with altitudes ranging from 
478 to 934 metres. The fragile soil is classified as 
tierra blanca joven, consisting of white volcanic 
ash 10,000 years old from the Llopango eruption. 
The estimated population in Santiago before the 
Salvadoran civil war was 8,965 in 1971 (CO-
SUDE 2003), yet this nearly doubled to 16,295 
by 1992 and continued to grow to 23,212 by the 
year 2000 (COMURES 2000).  The in-migration 
to the area caused rapid land use change, as for-
est cover was converted to chemical agriculture. 
Though the soil of the area is suitable for coffee 
cultivation, the war migration influx (see Figure 
1) and 2001 coffee crisis have made coffee unvi-
able as a crop, and only 17.2 per cent of the soil 
is considered to be used appropriately, putting 
88 hillsides at risk of landslides (COSUDE 2003). 
Clearly, rapid land use change put many of the 
inhabitants at risk, and they would suffer accord-
ingly in November 2009.
Santiago Texacuangos has historically suf-
fered from earthquakes, but not landslides. The 
first recorded landslide was in 1929, with only 
one life lost (Desinventar 2010).  Curiously, the 
next recorded landslides were in 1998 (Hurricane 
Mitch), 2007, 2008, and 2009 (Hurricane Ida), 
reinforcing how recent deforestation has made 
the area vulnerable (COSUDE 2003). The most 
recent landslides after Hurricane Ida in November 
2009 caused 18 deaths and destroyed 65 houses 
according to official statistics, making this mu-
nicipality the third most affected in the country 
(Proteccion Civil 2009; Ministerio de Vivienda 
2010).  An unquantifiable amount of agricultur-
al assets were lost, and soil erosion will prevent 
cropping for up to 10 years in some areas. Such 
environmental damage is rooted in the pre-exist-
ing environmental vulnerabilities of deforestation 
and dense population. 
In addition to environmental problems facing 
the area, Santiago Texacuangos suffers from cor-
rupt local governance, made explicit in times of 
disaster. Disaster governance and distribution of 
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Figure 1: Migration patterns from two communities in Santiago Texacuangos, Santa Maria de la Esperanza and Joya Grande, 
over time, with the majority migrating in the late 80s, at the peak of the civil war. N=107 (Source: author)
aid is highly political, because “disasters reinforce 
existing power relations when people with re-
sources manage to profit from the potential over 
more vulnerable people” (Hillhorst 2004: 61). 
Corruption of aid happens everywhere from El 
Salvador to Mozambique (Hillhorst 2004) as local 
actors jockey for position to gain access to both 
material resources and political capital. The domi-
nant political parties in El Salvador today [FMLN, 
Farabundo Marti Liberación Nacional (politically 
left) and ARENA, Alianza Republicana Nacion-
alista (politically right)] were opposing armies 
during the Civil War from 1980 – 1992.  The con-
tinued political polarity today reduces capacity in 
disaster response in El Salvador, as coordinating 
aid across governance scales (local-municipal-
national) complicates distribution and decision-
making (Boyce 1995). Politicized humanitarian 
aid in Santiago Texauangos particularly proves 
this point.
 While the national government had stock-
piles of beans and water in central reserves, “too 
much” aid was sent to other regions of the coun-
try while communities in Santiago Texacuangos 
were left out of the distribution. The aid game 
became political as official aid requests sent into 
the national government by the mayor’s office 
exclusively contained lists of names and com-
munities that supported the ARENA party, while 
perceived “FMLN” communities were left out 
off the aid lists. Community leaders took matters 
into their own hands, accessing political networks 
through the local FMLN party to contact NGOs 
and get aid to non-ARENA communities. When 
the Ministry of Public Works had not come to 
open roads blocked by landslides, members of 
the FMLN party mobilized 700 volunteers from 
across the country to remove earth, shovel by 
shovel, so aid could reach isolated communities. 
This network played an essential role in support-
ing emergent resilience and leadership in the 
aftermath of the November 2009 landslides for 
Santiago Texacuangos, exhibiting the power of 
“networking social capital” (Adger 2003). Some 
communities gave up on the local government 
and instead tapped their own networks, leverag-
ing support from NGOs for food aid, crop recon-
struction, and trauma therapy.  
Disaster victims expressed the need for a lo-
cal NGO, since they felt unsupported by the mu-
nicipal government.  However, instead of feeling 
frustrated with government corruption and lack 
of response in the 2009 landslides, interviews 
with these victims who were still in shelters 
months later, in January 2010, reveal frustra-
tions that, “We have no local NGO in Santiago 
Texacuangos; that is why no one has come to 
help.”  There is a culture of relying on NGO and 
humanitarian aid in post-disaster El Salvador, ac-
cording to local community leader Don Ramon 
(Alvarado 2010). The government enforces NGO 
dependency, a common theme in neoliberal Latin 
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American states like El Salvador where the state is 
the “promoter” instead of the “doer” of develop-
ment (Tedesco 1999). Schipper fears that states 
evade responsibilities of  development by pass-
ing on such tasks to NGOs, which may, “promote 
unsustainable systems by merely preventing their 
collapse,” enabling El Salvador to avoid investing 
in disaster prevention by relying on continued 
foreign aid for reconstruction (Schipper 2006: 20; 
Anderson and Woodrow 1998). The $150 million 
in international aid post-Ida far surpasses the na-
tional $4 million disaster prevention budget, for 
example.  
Effective disaster response requires more than 
foreign aid and NGOs; only 10 per cent of survival 
in emergencies is due to external factors, proving 
that communities are always the first respond-
ers (Duffield 1993, cited in Hillhorst 2004). Don 
Ramon identifies the importance of community 
capacity: “A community without organization 
is a community drowned in poverty” (Alvarado 
2010). At the local level, latent social capital both 
“binding” (community organization) and “net-
working” (ability to reach out to external actors) 
appears in disasters, supporting theories that 
emergent organization is more common than so-
cial chaos (Adger 2003; Wisner et al. 2004). The 
extent to which “emergent organization” prevails 
over “social chaos” depends on highly local con-
texts, explored in the following case studies.
Methods to Compare Social Resilience in Two 
Communities
Participant observation during Ida and its after-
math made apparent that the key to community 
resilience against this disaster was cognitive (not 
material) infrastructure.  All communities in San-
tiago Texacuangos seemed to be floundering in 
November 2009, except one, Santa Maria de la 
Esperanza.  Though not the most damaged com-
munity, it received large amounts of aid relief and 
many development projects. Meanwhile, Joya 
Grande, just a few kilometres down the road, 
and the community most severely affected by Ida 
in the municipality, received very little aid. This 
case study attempts to understand the different 
histories and realities of these two communities 
via surveys (72 of 350 households in Joya Grande 
and 41 of 70 households in Santa Maria) to em-
pirically test observations and make statistical 
generalizations about each community with a 
confidence internal of 103. Survey questions draw 
on previous research in community-based disas-
ter risk management (Bollins and Hidajat 2006; 
Wisner 2006) and from focus groups with com-
munity leaders, who identified relevant indicators 
in vulnerability and capacity. Household surveys 
designed to measure these relevant indicators 
provide statistics to test three hypotheses: First, 
that community organization is the most signifi-
cant factor in climate shock resilience; second, 
that remittances are important coping strategies 
in the reconstruction process; and third, internal 
migration is an undesirable or unattainable adap-
tation strategy for the poor.
Santa Maria de la Esperanza: Empowered and 
Resilient
The first community in the case, Santa Maria de 
la Esperanza, was founded in 1982 with the sup-
port of two North American nuns, Maura Clarke 
and Ita Ford, who purchased land just before 
their assassination by the state in 1980. The com-
munity was designed for refugees fleeing perse-
cution in the northern countryside (see Figure 
2), who share a common identity in Catholicism 
and liberation theology and a strong belief that 
each person deserves and should fight for human 
rights. Seventy households and 28 years later, 91 
per cent of the community retains their Catholic 
identity. Community participation is high, as 92 
per cent of households attend general assembly 
meetings and nearly half (49%) have a chair posi-
tion on one of the many committees. Women hold 
positions on the Junta Directiva, or community 
governance board, the legal form of local elected 
governance in El Salvador. Though 25 per cent  of 
households are single mothers or grandmothers, 50 
per cent of the remaining households claim to have 
equal power sharing between men and women, 
including share of decision-making and household 
chores. Residents in Santa Maria have access to 
information via an internet café, which is unheard 
of in any other rural community in the region. The 
community administers its own water system, a 
community coffee farm, and a community store, 
all of which generate employment and profits ad-
ministered by a community fund.  Communal work 
is administered in mandatory mingas, or workdays 
once a month, and community members who do 
not attend pay a $5 fine – the average daily wage 
of a Salvadoran worker – into a community fund.
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During the disaster, Santa Maria lost three 
lives, four houses, water and irrigation systems, 
and suffered uncountable loss in bean crops and 
soil fertility. However, by the following morning, 
nearly the entire community was sheltered in the 
church, pooling resources, and cooking meals. 
Within two days, the community had covered its 
needs, and was directing aid to other communi-
ties.  Within one week, the community made con-
tacts with NGO Geologists of the World to assess 
environmental risks and plan safe spaces to build 
new housing and use community funds to rebuild 
the water system. Within two weeks, volunteer 
psychologists from CRISOL (Psicólogos para In-
tervención en Crisis, Solidaridad) chose Santa 
Maria de la Esperanza as their only site for psy-
chosocial intervention. Within one month, organ-
ic farming had started, and within three months, 
the community fund had recovered enough to 
purchase radios for its emergency committee. 
Most recently, Santa Maria transported water 
to communities such as Joya Grande, whose wa-
ter systems broke during Tropical Storm Agatha. 
Clearly, the community has a high level of resil-
ience and quick recovery, contrary to the second 
community in the case study, Joya Grande.
Joya Grande: At Risk and Disorganized
The second research site, Joya Grande, does not 
share Santa Maria’s strong identity and cohesion 
within the 350 families that make up the com-
munity. Though the majority of migration to 
Joya Grande occurred during the war (see Fig-
ure 2), refugees were not necessarily connected 
to movements centred on Catholicism, liberation 
theology, or the FMLN (Farabundo Marti Lib-
eración Nacional) army. Joya Grande’s religious 
mix is fairly evenly divided between Catholics, 
Evangelicals, and non-believers. Though nearly 
every family abstained from answering the po-
litical preference question out of fear it would 
jeopardize eligibility for aid from the municipality, 
focus groups agreed that Joya Grande is evenly 
divided politically between FMLN and ARENA 
(Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) with a nearly 
99 per cent voting rate.   
Community participation is low.  Only 53 per 
cent of households are represented at general as-
semblies, and only 140 persons came to elect the 
community representative to the municipal civil 
protection and disaster prevention commission. 
Only 22 per cent of those surveyed claim to have 
Figure 2: Shows homogeneity of motivation for migration to Santa Maria. N=72 and 41 (Source: author)
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positions on three committees that rarely meet. 
Three men run the legal Junta Directiva and make 
community decisions, while competing with yet 
a second ARENA-supported but illegal Junta Di-
rectiva. 
Joya Grande does not share Santa Maria’s 
gender equality, as no woman in the community 
holds any sort of recognized leadership position. 
Like Santa Maria, 20 per cent of households are 
headed by single mothers, yet of the remaining 
households, 90 per cent are considered to be run 
by men. Joya Grande has no community fund and 
does not manage its own water supply, meaning 
it must wait for slow centralized government sup-
port to fix its water issues. There is no organized 
work system, and community members say that 
the community is not united and rarely works to-
gether to solve community problems. 
The disaster was devastating to Joya Grande, 
with 50 houses and five lives lost. Two restau-
rants collapsed into the lake, and landslides bur-
ied cars, clothes, the school, and the health clinic. 
Families who suffered no damage to their home 
lost their livelihoods. While nearly impossible to 
accurately assess all damage, residents agreed 
that Ida was by far the most devastating disaster 
ever to hit Joya Grande. 
Recovery in Joya Grande was slow, partially 
due to the massive devastation, but also due to 
the lack of community organization. There was 
no attempt to ask for NGO or government aid, 
and although humanitarian relief came slowly 
from organizations like the United Nations, Plan 
International, and the Red Cross, no long-term 
projects were implemented. The only long-term 
project, the World Food Programme’s six month 
food for work programme, was organized by a 
community leader from Santa Maria. Psychologi-
cal attention came four months after the disaster 
and was only available to children. Water sys-
tems were not fixed until months later, and the 
last temporary shacks were built five months af-
ter the disaster. Joya Grande is still waiting for a 
geological risk and map study of the kind Santa 
Maria had within a week after the landslides. Joya 
Grande lacks the social resilience that is so evi-
dent in Santa Maria. The next section uses quan-
titative methods to analyse resilience by exam-
ining major differences in how each community 
recovered from the disaster.
Summary of Findings: Community Organizing, 
Remittances, and Migration
This section examines the role of community 
organization, the role of remittances, and inter-
nal migration as coping mechanisms post-Ida in 
these geographically similar communities with 
distinct histories.  The major observed difference 
between the two communities was the effective-
ness of community organization in Santa Maria, 
and the evident disorganization in Joya Grande. 
Santa Maria’s superior organization is confirmed 
in an independent samples t-test comparing the 
perceived effectiveness of each Junta Directiva, 
Figure 3: 1=non-existent, 2=very poor, 3=satisfactory, 4=good, 5=excellent. Independent Samples T-test. Community Organi-
zation (t=-4.743, df=96, p=.001, equal variances assumed); Emergency Response (t=-6.931, df=92, p=.001, equal variance not 
assumed); Reconstruction (t=-.632, df=77, p=.529 equal variances assumed) (Source: Author) 
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on general community organizing, emergency re-
sponse, and reconstruction in figure 3.
Santa Maria’s local governance is signifi-
cantly more effective in general organization and 
disaster response than that of Joya Grande, 
though reconstruction efforts proved to be in-
significant. Reconstruction is the longest and 
most challenging stage of the disaster cycle be-
cause humanitarian aid ends when the media fo-
cuses on the world’s next major disaster. In this 
case, Santa Maria lost important reconstruction 
projects as NGOs funnelled aid away from El 
Salvador and towards the Haitian Earthquake in 
January 2010.  Still, residents of Santa Maria note 
their more effective local governance in respond-
ing to the community’s needs during Hurricane 
Ida.  However, Junta Directivas are not the only 
form of social support.  
Households also ranked eight different types 
of support: family, neighbours, churches, Junta 
Directivas, political parties, their community, 
municipal government, and NGOs on a scale of 
1-5 (1=no support whatsoever, 2=little support 
3=more or less supported, 4=well supported, 
5=excellently supported).  The three sources of 
support that were significantly different between 
the two communities and all of which ranked 
higher in Santa Maria are political parties, Junta 
Directiva, and community as graphed in figure 4. 
Figure 4: Independent Samples T-test. Political Parties (t=2.004, df=8.623, p=.077, equal variance not assumed); Junta Di-
rectiva (t= -3.301, df=47, p=.002, equal variance); Community (t= -3.956, df=53, p=.001, equal variance assumed); Family 
(t=-.747, df=72, p=.458, equal variance assumed); Total (t=1.205, df=104, p=.231) (Source: Author) 
The political party support given to Santa 
Maria is also not surprising given its history with 
the FMLN.  The most notable and significant sup-
port factor is community organization and cohe-
sion. “Binding” social capital like local leadership 
and solidarity were key to recovery after Ida and 
will continue to be a determining factor in climate 
change adaptation for resilient communities like 
Santa Maria.  However, the one support factor 
both communities considered of utmost impor-
tance was family. Family will always be the first 
line of support in disasters, especially in places 
like Santiago Texacuangos where the govern-
ment and NGOs may arrive late or never.  For 
countries in the Global South such as El Salvador, 
family support often comes in the form of remit-
tances from abroad.
Although remittances are often an important 
component of disaster relief for Salvadorans, the 
2008-2009 financial crisis reduced the amount 
of cash Salvadorans abroad could afford to send 
after Hurricane Ida. Reduction in remittances has 
a huge economic impact, since the largest single 
portion of El Salvador’s economy (17%) rests 
on remittances from the United States (Ratha 
et al. 2010). Halliday’s work on remittances and 
the 2001 earthquake suggests a surge in remit-
tances provided essential relief assistance to af-
fected communities in El Salvador (2006). Other 
research (Clarke and Wallsten 2003) in Jamaica 
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after Hurricane Gilbert suggests that remittanc-
es act as disaster insurance, and the higher the 
damage per household, the higher the remittance 
sent.  The most recent example of remittance as 
insurance may be Haiti, discussed in the final sec-
tion concerning TPS as disaster relief. Despite the 
evidence and expectation of increased remittan-
ces after Ida, remittances did not increase on the 
national or local scale (Banco Central de Reserva 
El Salvador 2010). Part of this is due to the glo-
bal recession due to the 2008-2009 financial cri-
sis, as remittances decreased by 12 per cent in 
El Salvador (Orozco 2009; Ratha et al. 2010). 
The other element is the local context; only five 
per cent of households in the communities stud-
ied in Santiago Texacuangos reported receiving 
any remittances. Of these few families, only 35 
per cent  of these houses received a remittance 
boost after the disaster, and only 15 per cent of 
remittance-receiving households reported plans 
to use remittances as their primary resource to 
rebuild their house. Leaders in Joya Grande spe-
cifically mentioned that the drop in remittances 
this past year had negatively affected the com-
munity, while leaders in Santa Maria assumed 
almost no one receives remittances. The reality 
is that remittances did not play a large part in Ida 
reconstruction or as a coping mechanism for ei-
ther community, probably due to the recession.
Disasters do not directly increase interna-
tional migration in El Salvador, but may increase 
internal rural-urban migration (Halliday 2006). 
There is no government census of either internal 
migration, environmental migration, or migration 
caused by disasters.  However, other studies (Hal-
liday 2006) indicate increased urbanization after 
the 2001 earthquakes. The case study indicates 
that after Hurricane Ida several families from Joya 
Grande and Santa Maria migrated to urban ar-
eas such as Llopango and Apopa, poor slums on 
the outskirts of San Salvador with marked levels 
of poverty and “social exclusion” (FLASCO et 
al. 2010). Housing in the neighbouring village of 
Shangallo was offered to several families in Joya 
Grande, though not a single family accepted the 
offer, as Shangallo is characterized by high rates of 
crime, gangs, and HIV/AIDS. Salvadorans forced 
to choose between the threat of natural disaster 
and daily disasters of crime and extortion seem to 
be choosing the former; trading a familiar vulner-
ability for an unfamiliar one is riskier. A little less 
than half (47%) of households in both communi-
ties expressed a desire to migrate within El Salva-
dor if they had the chance, on the condition that 
their new home would be in a community free 
from both disasters and gangs.  Considering the 
cheapest land is exposed to multiple environmen-
tal risks or in gang territory, internal migration to 
safer, more expensive land seems out of reach for 
the rural poor from Santa Maria or Joya Grande, 
who have a monthly income of $100-200.  In this 
local context, neither internal migration nor re-
mittances provide community disaster resilience. 
Strong community organization and catalyzing 
social capital seem to provide the quickest road to 
recovery and the best insurance against disasters 
for communities in Santiago Texacuangos. 
National Reforms to Build Local Resilience
In order to foster resilience at the local level, El 
Salvador must reform its legal frameworks and 
disaster risk reduction system at the national 
level. Important reforms include passing key en-
vironmental legislation and reforming the civil 
protection system to foster local social resilience. 
Civil society has long called for a Ley de Orde-
namiento Territorial, a national environmental 
zoning law. This law would be the first step in le-
gally regulating housing construction and soil use 
that could slow deforestation and build ecological 
resilience to disasters in places like Santiago Tex-
acuangos. There is no legal mechanism to ensure 
that internal migration or relocated communities 
rebuild houses in risk free areas based on environ-
mental assessment or risk mapping.  The environ-
mental zoning law should include requirements 
for construction permits as well as environmen-
tal, cultural, and social impact assessments.  Four 
of the 18 deaths in Santiago Texacuangos were 
caused by poor siting of a Catholic retreat centre 
above four houses, whose retention wall had no 
water filter system and collapsed, burying four 
people alive. Legal frameworks with real enforce-
ment could prevent disaster-caused deaths such 
as these.  However, strengthening El Salvador’s 
weak disaster governance system will require 
more than just adding environmental zoning laws. 
Civil protection’s 2009-2014 plan is well 
framed and makes reference to Hyogo principles, 
but lacks adequate coordination, communication, 
and funding mechanisms (UNDAC 2010). The 
meagre $4 million dedicated to disaster mitiga-
tion when matched against the average tempo-
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rary shelter costs of $2,000 per family post-Ida 
makes clear that investing in prevention could 
significantly reduce relief costs (IOM, personal 
interview 2010). However, funds post-Ida have 
not been spent on reconstruction, let alone in-
vested in reducing vulnerability. As of 13 May 
2009, of the $150 million in Ida reconstruction 
funds, a mere $8.5 million (5%) have been spent 
(Avalos and Mejia 2010). Not only lack of funds, 
but lack of efficient investment of funds available 
is a recurrent problem with the Salvadoran Gov-
ernment4. Identifying vulnerable communities 
and investing in social resilience is crucial, and 
requires coordination at the local level. 
Civil protection has failed to achieve local 
coordination. When the “vulnerable communi-
ties” list was released in April 2010, not a single 
community from Santiago Texacuangos was on 
the list (Protección Civil 2010). Not only can the 
government not identify vulnerable communities, 
but communities cannot identity the government 
ministry charged with disaster risk reduction. 
Even after Ida in November, only 40 per cent 
of households in Joya Grande and Santa Maria 
could identify that civil protection was related to 
disaster management. If vulnerable Salvadorans 
cannot identify the government agency that miti-
gates disasters and handles emergency response, 
the system fails to be participatory. Civil protec-
tion has a framework that lends itself to being 
participatory and community-based, because 
the system’s foundation is local communal com-
missions, who then coordinate at the municipal, 
departmental, and finally national levels. Civil 
protection needs to strengthen communal com-
missions, fostering exchanges to share good 
practices in Salvadoran community resilience 
from places like Santa Maria and the Bajo Lempa. 
The Bajo Lempa had no fatalities during Hurri-
cane Mitch in 1998 due to advanced commu-
nity early warning systems, and has experience 
with community-based disaster management 
to share that should not be compartmentalized. 
The civil protection system should capitalize on 
local knowledge, horizontally strengthening the 
system by building community to community re-
lationships and ultimately increasing “linking” of 
social capital. 
International Good Practices: Learning from 
Cuba and TPS
El Salvador, as well as other countries in Central 
America and the Caribbean, could build resilience 
from the grassroots by learning from Cuba’s 
disaster risk reduction and capitalizing on remit-
tances for reconstruction. The most successful 
country with transferable knowledge on disaster 
management for Central America is undoubtedly 
Cuba. Only 16 people were killed in the six hur-
ricanes that hit Cuba between 1996-2002. Cuba 
has the national framework to reduce social vul-
nerability and therefore vulnerability to disasters. 
Legal protections like environmental land zoning 
are in place, and emergency plans are updated 
every year after hurricane season, complete 
with an annual national emergency drill. The 
government coordinates NGOs in disaster relief 
efforts such as housing via government depart-
ments whose organizational structure reaches 
down to the neighbourhood level. The popular 
participation in annual community risk mapping 
and neighbourhood vulnerability assessments 
that take place before a disaster results in high 
levels of preparation, leadership, and community 
education (see Thompson and Gaviria (2004) for 
more details on effective community-based dis-
aster management in Cuba). Cuba understands 
how to build local sociological resilience, and it 
has effectively reduced the impacts of disasters. 
El Salvador should examine Cuba’s model to learn 
how to upscale experiences of sociological resi-
lience such as those found in Santa Maria.
The case studies exemplified that communi-
ties like Santa Maria that fare well in emergency 
response often struggle in long-term reconstruc-
tion. One way to increase efficacy of local recon-
struction, is to give communities more financial 
resources via remittances. Although the 2009 
recession meant that remittances did not play a 
role in disaster reconstruction, Ida was a special 
case in terms of the insignificance of remittances, 
which played a large role in the reconstruction of 
El Salvador after the 2001 earthquakes.  Protect-
ing migrations abroad after a disaster should be 
a priority not only because of the human rights 
perspective, but also because it fosters com-
munity resilience at home since remittances can 
be used for reconstruction. The TPS is a stay of 
deportation mechanism that grants immigration 
protection to citizens of countries who cannot 
44
handle the return of their own nationals and re-
quest protection after an environmental disaster 
for up to 18 months with possibilities of exten-
sion. The most recent TPS status granted to Sal-
vadorans from the 2001 earthquakes was ex-
tended to 9 September 2010, covering 229,000 
Salvadoran Nationals in the USA, nine years after 
the earthquake. TPS was also granted to Nicara-
guans and Hondurans in the United States after 
Hurricane Mitch. The recent examples of TPS for 
Haiti, a country whose GDP is 25 per cent remit-
tances, could amount to $360 million to support 
victims and reconstruct the country according to 
estimates by Ratha et al. (2010). If TPS is extend-
ed, which it probably will be, based on past his-
tory, Haiti could receive $1 billion in remittances 
over three years, or even more if the Haitian Gov-
ernment would issue what Ratha terms Diaspora 
bonds to encourage Haitians overseas to invest in 
$1,000 bonds to rebuild Haiti, though SEC regu-
lations in the US would have to allow a tempo-
rary exemption to allow its marketing. The role 
remittances can play in disaster recovery could be 
more effective than international aid from devel-
oped countries, and programmes like TPS should 
be taken seriously as methods of grassroots re-
covery and of allowing migrants to be legally in-
volved in reconstructing their own families and 
communities. Community resilience in all phases 
of the disaster cycle needs to be supported by 
migration policies in receiving countries in order 
to facilitate participatory reconstruction. 
Conclusion
The increasing likelihood of El Niño years, tropi-
cal storms, and hurricanes for vulnerable Central 
American countries like El Salvador are causes for 
concern.  The low capacity of the state to deal 
with vulnerable populations before, during, and 
after times of disaster will make climate change 
unbelievably challenging for El Salvador. How-
ever, climate change adaptation should start with 
disaster mitigation and prevention, recognizing 
that community resilience is social, not material. 
The experience of Santa Maria is not unique, and 
similar experiences of social resilience have been 
documented across the globe. Community-based 
disaster management should be a priority, and 
must be implemented horizontally via communi-
ty-community knowledge transfer networks and 
vertically by forming local civil protection com-
missions as prescribed by law. The most effective 
way to reduce vulnerability of internal migrants 
would be to pass the environmental zoning law, 
so that rural disaster refugees do not mistakenly 
relocate to another high-risk or urban area. Inter-
national migrants should be protected by a stay 
of deportation mechanism such as TPS to aid in 
participatory reconstruction of their own com-
munities.  Building local resilience to disasters is 
now the surest way to build resilience against cli-
mate change for Salvadoran communities. 
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 1 The largest river basin in the country, the Lempa, has dimin-
ished in capacity from 11,260 m3 to 4,482m3 from 1985-1993 
(Trujillo et al 2000).
2 “Green” alerts do not mandate any government action or 
authorize spending, and prohibit the opening of emergency 
shelters and evacuations, which cannot be legally activated 
until “orange” alerts or higher.
3
 The size sampled in surveys relative to the entire community 
population is large enough that we can generalize statistics 
obtained in the sample population to the entire community 
with 90% confidence.
4 Major past disasters such as the January and February 2001 
earthquakes caused a staggering amount of economic dam-
age (exceeding 1.5 billion) and claimed over 1000 deaths 
(EM-DAT 2010). The devastation was surprising given that $9 
billion in aid poured into El Salvador after Hurricane Mitch 
(1998), which unfortunately was not invested in planning, ur-
banization, or social infrastructure. Likewise, $1.4 billion in 
aid from the 2001 earthquakes was focused on infrastructure, 
not on reducing social vulnerability (Wisner 2001).
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United States Environmental Migration: 
Vulnerability, Resilience, and Policy  
Options for Internally Displaced Persons
Michelle A. Meyer Lueck
Abstract
This paper explores the complex process of en-
vironmental migration in the United States of 
America (U.S.) focusing on vulnerability to and 
resilience following this migration. It will be re-
viewed how internal environmental migration 
has resulted from many environmental changes 
and disasters in the U.S., and the potential for 
increased movement from both gradual-onset 
and sudden climate impacts will be discussed. 
Drawing on evidence from previous disasters, it 
is argued that environmental migration is a social 
phenomenon in which environmental changes 
are filtered through social structures to force the 
most vulnerable populations to permanently mi-
grate and, once displaced, these populations face 
numerous barriers to becoming resilient. With 
this understanding of U.S. environmental migra-
tion, Domestic disaster, social service, and dis-
crimination policy are analysed to determine how 
displaced populations’ resilience, related to hous-
ing, economic resources, health, and discrimina-
tion, is addressed. It is concluded that although 
current policies show potential for increasing the 
resilience of forced and permanently displaced 
populations, incorporation of international stand-
ards for internally displaced populations is neces-
sary to ensure the broadest protection and assist-
ance and to fully address the social-demographic 
consequences of environmental change. 
Key-words: Resilience, Vulnerability, Disaster, 
Displacement, Environmental migration, U.S. 
Policy
Introduction
The potential for large-scale permanent reloca-
tion of populations from areas vulnerable to sea-
level rise, droughts, floods, and extreme weather 
events – including relocation of entire island na-
tions – underscores the urgency of studying en-
vironmental migration and creating safeguards 
to protect displaced populations. Within this 
discussion, the U.S., like other wealthy nations, 
is viewed as an aid and refuge provider for pop-
ulations displaced from less wealthy and more 
physically vulnerable nations. Because the U.S. 
will experience fewer climate change impacts and 
has the financial resources to mitigate or adapt, 
environmental migration within the U.S. is under-
researched and even considered unimportant for 
“international concern, cooperation, and assist-
ance” (Biermann and Boas 2010: 65). 
The ability to mitigate or adapt means that 
most populations affected by climate impacts 
in the U.S. will be able to remain in their com-
munities, unlike populations in other parts of 
the world. Yet, a small but significant number of 
those affected in the U.S. will be forced to per-
manently migrate. The U.S. has previously expe-
rienced internal environmental migration (e.g. the 
Dust Bowl and Hurricane Katrina) and potential 
climate impacts and demographic forces are pre-
dicted to increase this migration (Gutmann and 
Field 2010). Based on literature from past dis-
placements, it is shown how U.S. society shapes 
social vulnerability to environmental migration, 
meaning that the most vulnerable are more likely 
to be represented among those permanently dis-
placed from climate impacts. Also it is shown how 
social vulnerability then affects the resilience of 
IDPs, making the most vulnerable the least able 
to bounce back from the climate impact and the 
forced migration. Finally, by focusing on who is 
most vulnerable, four main barriers to IDPs’ resil-
ience (housing, economic resources, health, and 
discrimination) are discussed in the light of current 
disaster, social service, and discrimination policy. 
While these current policy arenas have potential, 
it is concluded that the incorporation of interna-
tional standards, specifically the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, is 
necessary to fully support IDPs’ resilience. 
United States Environmental Migration
Environmental migration means the migration of 
persons due to sudden or gradual changes in their 
environment (Biermann and Boas 2010). Within 
the U.S., four main climate change impacts may 
induce environmental migration – droughts, sea 
level rise, floods, and extreme weather events. 
These are likely to affect three geographic 
areas – the south-western U.S., flood zones, and 
areas along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts (Field 
et al. 2007). This migration is not a determinis-
tic response from climate induced environmental 
changes, but works indirectly through the loss 
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of homes, crops, and livelihoods (Perch-Nielsen 
et al. 2008). In the U.S., gradual-onset environ-
mental changes, such as droughts and sea level 
rise, will disproportionately impact resource- 
dependent populations through “environmental-
ly induced economic change” (Gutmann and Field 
2010: 14). This terminology emphasizes econom-
ic resources as the mechanism compelling migra-
tion. The 1930s “Dust Bowl,” a drought through-
out the Great Plains (Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, 
Colorado), is the most dramatic U.S. example of 
environmentally induced economic change that 
generated large-scale migration of farm labour-
ers. In the present situation, farm labourers in 
the south-west, fishers along the coasts, tourism 
employees, indigenous populations, and other 
natural resource extractors and labourers will be 
compelled to migrate for work if climate impacts 
affect their economic sectors; whereas wealthi-
er, land-owning, and non-resource-dependent 
populations will have greater choice in whether 
they migrate (Field et al. 2007; McLeman and 
Smit 2006; Molnar 2010). While many commu-
nities may be impacted by climate change, only 
indigenous Alaskan populations have received 
attention, though policies and resettlement plans 
have yet to be implemented (Kolmannskog 2009; 
Raleigh et al. 2008). 
Sudden-onset disasters – floods, hurricanes, 
tropical storms, and waves – also cause displace-
ment in the U.S. through the destruction of 
homes, property, and employment. Unlike migra-
tion due to gradual-onset events, sudden disas-
ters cause “distress migration” in which affected 
populations temporarily evacuate to escape from 
immediate harm (Hunter 2005; Raleigh et al. 
2008). Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is depicted as 
an exception to the temporariness of distress mi-
gration, with New Orleans recovering to only 80 
per cent of its previous size by 2009 (GNOCDC 
2010). However, many disasters in the U.S. have 
induced large-scale and permanent migration. 
For example, Levine, Esnard, and Sapat (2007) 
identified five disasters besides Hurricane Katrina 
that caused large, forced and sometimes perma-
nent migration: Hurricane Andrew (Florida 1992), 
the Mississippi river floods (Iowa, Illinois, and 
Missouri 1993), the Loma Prieta and Northridge 
earthquakes (California 1989 and 1994), and 
Hurricane Floyd (North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Virginia 1999). Rivera and Miller (2007) also 
noted large, permanent migrations from the 1927 
Louisiana flood and the 1948 Portland, Oregon 
flood, and Gutmann and Field (2010) included 
the San Francisco earthquake (California 1999). 
Permanent migration even occurs in small disas-
ters, such as a tornado that caused a two per cent 
permanent out-migration from a town of 3,000 
(Gutmann and Field 2010).  
As these examples show, environmental mi-
gration does occur in the U.S. Environmental 
migration, like other disaster impacts, is a social 
phenomenon – environmental factors create the 
initial “push” but the underlying causes of migra-
tion are “political, economic, social, and demo-
graphic processes” that leave certain populations 
more vulnerable to disaster impacts (Hugo 1996: 
118). Social vulnerability to disaster and envi-
ronmental impacts “results from social inequali-
ties and historic patterns of social relations that 
manifest as deeply embedded social structural 
barriers that are resistant to change” (Phillips and 
Fordham 2010: 4). When disaster impacts are fil-
tered through the U.S. social structure, they cre-
ate “…multiple and highly unequal processes of 
resettlement” (Fussell and Elliott 2009: 389). In a 
seminal study, Morrow-Jones and Morrow-Jones 
(1991) found that those displaced due to disas-
ters were more likely to be from marginalized and 
socio-economic vulnerable groups including fe-
male-headed households, minority group mem-
bers, lower income, and less educated strata, 
than those who moved for other reasons. In the 
following sections, it is shown how social vulner-
ability causes certain populations to face forced 
and permanent migration from climate impacts, 
and how this vulnerability affects their resilience 
following migration. 
Environmental Migration: A Social Process
On the theoretical “continuum of agency” from 
voluntary to forced, Hugo (1996) placed environ-
mental migration as a subset of forced migration 
because changes in the resource base compel 
people to move, and sudden disasters force im-
mediate distress migration. Others have similarly 
regarded environmental changes as “push” fac-
tors differentiated by the agency of the mover 
(Bates 2002; Henry et al. 2004; Hunter 2005; 
O'Lear 1997).
Using a social vulnerability framework moves 
the discussion beyond simplistic push/pull or 
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rational choice and human capital migration 
models to focus on how certain populations are 
more vulnerable to environmental migration 
(Fussell and Elliott 2009). Both economic and so-
cial characteristics generate social vulnerability. 
Economic assets (e.g. home ownership, financial 
assets, insurance) and social status (e.g. political 
power, marginalization, minority status, educa-
tion, gender, age) affect vulnerability to forced 
displacement and permanent environmental mi-
gration (Fothergill and Peek 2004; Norris et al. 
2002; Phillips et al. 2010). 
Social vulnerability influences the likely trajec-
tories of populations through each stage of en-
vironmental migration (climate change impacts, 
agency, and permanency of displacement) and 
then affects the resilience of populations who 
have permanently migrated. Figure 1 depicts the 
general stages of environmental migration in the 
U.S. and the likely path of the most vulnerable 
populations. Socially vulnerable populations are 
more likely to face environmental migration due 
to the differential initial risk and because they 
have fewer resources to help them recover from 
any losses (see Figure 1: differential impacts). Be-
cause they face greater impacts and have fewer 
resources, vulnerable populations have less choice 
about whether to move, and are more likely to 
be forced or compelled to migrate (see Figure 1: 
continuum of agency). Displacement is more like-
ly to become prolonged and even permanent for 
vulnerable populations (see: Figure 1 permanen-
cy of migration). Finally, once permanently dis-
placed, the most vulnerable face greater obsta-
cles to bouncing back from the climate impacts 
and the migration (see Figure 1: resilience). Each 
stage will be discussed in detail below.
Climate 
Change
High
High
Low
Low
Voluntary Forced
Returner IDP
LowHigh
Social
vulnerabilty
Differential
impacts
Continuum
of agency
Permanency
of migration
Resilience
Figure 1: Social vulnerability framework of internal U.S. environmental migration (Source: Author)
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Differential impacts and continuum of agency. 
The initial impact and agency of the mover are 
intrinsically linked—the greater the initial impact 
of climate change, the more likely that affected 
populations will be compelled or forced to mi-
grate. Because socio-economic status affects 
one’s ability to mitigate impacts or to adapt, vul-
nerable populations are at greater risk from cli-
mate change impacts and have less agency or the 
freedom to choose whether and when to move. 
Initial risks from climate change impacts include 
risk of both property and job loss. 
Poor and minority populations are often 
segregated into environmentally risky areas or 
areas with less disaster mitigation, leaving them 
at greater risk of initial damage from sudden-
onset events (Bullard and Wright 2009; Dyson 
2006; Freudenburg et al. 2009). For example, 
Rivera and Miller (2007) discussed how African 
Americans are consistently segregated into risky 
areas, ignored during evacuation, and forced to 
permanently migrate. Due to years of structural 
racism, the poorest New Orleans citizens lived in 
the most flood-prone communities; and without 
financial resources to help them evacuate, they 
were stranded for days following Hurricane Kat-
rina before being forcibly relocated to sometimes 
unfamiliar destinations (Dyson 2006). These in-
dividuals were often displaced the farthest from 
their former homes, making their return difficult 
(Quigley 2007). 
The social dimensions of rural resource-
dependent communities – niche economic de-
pendence, underestimation of risk, and belief in 
technological advancements – limit adaptive ca-
pacity and reduce proactive response to risk from 
gradual-onset events (Molnar 2010). Within 
these communities, resource-dependent labour-
ers have higher initial risk due to their depend-
ence on ecosystem services, and thus they will 
have less choice in migration than wealthier, land-
owning, and non-resource dependent popula-
tions (Field et al. 2007). For example, in the Dust 
Bowl, landowners could avoid migration because 
they had assets to last through the drought, or 
they increased rents from farmers and received 
federal aid (McLeman and Smit 2006). In con-
trast, crop failure forced labourers with external 
social ties to migrate for work and left other la-
bourers destitute (Henry et al. 2004). 
Permanency of migration. Social vulnerability af-
fects the length of environmental displacement in 
three ways. First, initial damage is correlated with 
return rates, thus differential impacts increase the 
likelihood of longer-term displacement for vul-
nerable populations (Finch et al. 2010). Evidence 
from Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina indicated 
that the quickest returnees were predominantly 
white, older, better educated, homeowners, and 
had sustained less damage to their property 
(Fussell et al. 2010). Forms of affordable hous-
ing, including rental properties and government-
subsidized housing, are often severely damaged 
during disasters, and are not a priority for quick 
reconstruction. Also, increased rent from lack of 
supply prevents poorer residents from returning 
(Crowley 2006). Second, even with equivalent 
damage, wealthier individuals, especially home-
owners with insurance, returned more quickly. 
Higher socio-economic status provides the finan-
cial resources to rebuild and the cultural knowl-
edge to manoeuvre through the complicated 
U.S. disaster aid process (Finch et al. 2010). Fi-
nally, besides damage to homes, lower-income 
populations are more dependent than others 
on wage labour, which is lost during disasters. 
For example, Hurricane Katrina caused half of 
Mississippi households with annual incomes be-
low $10,000 to lose employment, compared to 
15 per cent of households with incomes above 
$20,000 (Abramson et al. 2007). Without hous-
ing and employment, vulnerable populations face 
longer displacements and are more likely to be-
come permanently displaced than other popula-
tions.   
The likelihood of permanent migration for 
resource-dependent populations also increases 
as gradual-onset impacts increase in duration or 
severity in environmentally-dependent economic 
sectors. For instance, Raleigh et al. (2008) stated 
that compared to other disasters, populations 
threatened with drought indicated the highest 
probability of permanently migrating. Also, se-
cond and third moves of resource-dependent la-
bourers commonly result in transitions to service 
sector or manufacturing employment, leading 
to permanent migration (Portes and Rumbaut 
1996). 
Unfortunately, those most affected by envi-
ronmental impacts and most likely to be displaced 
are those who have the least capacity to adapt 
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or respond to environmental changes (Fothergill 
and Peek 2004; Hunter 2005). Thus, not only is 
vulnerability to environmental migration socially 
structured, so is the resilience of IDPs. 
Socially Structured Resilience Following  
Displacement 
Resilience is the long-term ability of individuals 
or communities to “bounce back” from disaster 
impacts, and involves social and economic capi-
tal, community preparedness, and mitigation and 
adaptation planning (Manyena 2006; Mayunga 
2007). Usually focused on the original location, 
environmental migration refocuses resilience re-
search across space (Fussell and Elliott 2009). 
Environmental migration negatively affects 
the resilience of all IDPs, whether socially vulner-
able or not. IDPs are slower to “bounce back” 
compared to voluntary movers and those return-
ing to the original community. Since vulnerable 
groups are more likely to be represented among 
the small population of permanent environmen-
tal migrants in the U.S., the focus is put on socio-
economically vulnerable populations. Vulnerabil-
ity and resilience are also interrelated (vulnerable 
populations are often least resilient), and previ-
ous vulnerabilities become exacerbated by disas-
ters and migration making resilience a slow, dif-
ficult process (Weber and Peek 2010). To discuss 
the resilience of IDPs, in this section four areas 
for policy attention are highlighted: housing, eco-
nomic recovery, health, and discrimination.
Housing. Individuals who are forcibly displaced 
are more likely to lose housing during disaster re-
covery than those not displaced (Hori and Schafer 
2010). Morrow-Jones and Morrow-Jones (1991) 
noted that the number of homeowners declined 
sharply and significantly from 43 to 31 per cent 
after distress migration, and the population in 
public housing more than doubled. Homeowner-
ship is central to Americans’ economic security, 
and homes represent a disproportionate amount 
of minority households’ wealth compared to 
whites (Finch et al. 2010; Li et al. 2010). Renters 
and low-income individuals (neither renters nor 
homeowners) also lose housing, but have fewer 
options for aid from federal disaster housing pro-
grams (Hori and Schafer 2010).  
IDPs are also more likely than other movers 
to relocate numerous times. Morrow-Jones and 
Morrow-Jones (1991) found that 60 per cent of 
disaster displaced persons changed residences 
within three years. In Weber and Peek (2010), 
those displaced from Hurricane Katrina moved 
anywhere from two to more than 12 times. In par-
ticular, Li et al. (2010) found that African Ameri-
can females experienced the highest number of 
moves after Katrina. These “serial relocations” 
require continued adjustment and prolong recov-
ery (Picou and Marshall 2007). 
Economic recovery. IDPs also face economic bar-
riers to recovery. After Hurricane Katrina, IDPs 
had lower odds of employment recovery (African 
Americans had the lowest odds) and larger de-
clines in income (Hori et al. 2009). Also, house-
holds on public assistance face barriers to receiv-
ing their pre-disaster benefits. For example, Lein 
et al. (2010) discussed how displaced families 
waited months for smaller benefit allotments. 
The social networks of the poor are crucial 
during normal times for financial assistance, 
childcare, food, and shelter. Poor populations are 
less likely than non-poor populations to move 
from their original communities, so when a large 
disaster displaces entire communities, families 
and social networks are severely disrupted (Li et 
al. 2010). Without social network resources in a 
new community, resilience is limited. 
Finally, because of the extreme impact of 
Katrina, many individuals evacuated without per-
sonal documentation such as birth certificates, 
social security cards, licenses, vehicle registra-
tions, and educational, medical, and other identi-
fying documents. These losses made job hunting, 
driving legally, and enrolling children in school 
difficult (Peek 2010). Research shows that regular 
school attendance is crucial to children’s disaster 
recovery, but displaced children miss more school 
and make numerous school changes compared 
to children who are not displaced (LaRock 2005; 
Peek and Fothergill 2008; Phillips et al. 2010). 
Health. “It is the reluctance to uproot oneself, 
and the absence of positive original motiva-
tions to settle elsewhere, which characterizes all 
refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee 
from the voluntary migrants” (Kunz 1973: 130). 
Forced migration increases mental and physical 
trauma – higher levels of stress result from the 
loss of homes, family, friends, and employment 
(Morrow-Jones and Morrow-Jones 1991). After 
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Hurricane Katrina, forced evacuation caused sep-
aration of families, relocation to unfamiliar cities, 
and loss of recovery information – all amplifying 
the emotional and physical toll of the migration. 
Compounding these effects, displaced individuals 
are more likely to lack health insurance (Morrow-
Jones and Morrow-Jones 1991). More frequent 
migrations and poor subjective perception of new 
communities further reduce IDPs’ health out-
comes (Yabiku et al. 2009). 
Discrimination. Large-scale migrations trans-
port place-specific disasters to other communi-
ties. As discussed above, minority communities 
are often disproportionately represented among 
the displaced and can face racial and ethnic dis-
crimination in the receiving community, either 
immediately or within a short time period. For 
example, many communities receiving evacuees 
from Hurricane Katrina differed culturally, ra-
cially, and economically from the Gulf Coast; and 
discrimination occurred immediately in housing 
placements, assistance programs, and from pri-
vate citizens offering assistance (Crowley 2006; 
Fussell et al. 2010). In Weber and Peek (2010), 
many displaced persons reported suffering racial 
slurs, employment discrimination, and refusal of 
leasing agents to accept government housing 
vouchers. Trauma from the disaster and unknown 
surroundings amplify the effect of discrimination 
on this population. Also, undocumented immi-
grants were eligible for disaster assistance, but 
did not have deportation immunity. Thus, many 
immigrants did not seek governmental assistance 
(Wing 2006).  
Disaster response is usually temporary, so 
discrimination against those displaced has been 
shown to grow with time. Peek (2010) described 
“Katrina fatigue” in which the compassion of 
destination communities for evacuees faded 
within months. With evacuees not leaving and 
not becoming self-sufficient quickly, anger and 
discrimination increased. IDPs were no longer 
seen as victims, but as competitors for jobs, social 
services, and other amenities while facing accusa-
tions of changing the racial and cultural composi-
tion of the community. Even short-term migration 
increases the demand for services, infrastructure, 
and resources, leading to resentment and hostil-
ity (Moore and Smith 1995; O'Lear 1997). 
Populations displaced from gradual-onset 
disasters are compelled to move due to a loss of 
ecosystem services or agricultural opportunities. 
For this reason, their movement and their expe-
riences following migration will probably mirror 
the experiences of labour migrants. However, lit-
tle research has addressed the resilience of labour 
migrants within the U.S., focusing instead largely 
on international migration. Within this literature, 
discrimination is a known outcome of labour 
migration and probably after environmental mi-
gration because these populations are funnelled 
into economically and ethnically segregated com-
munities – slowing the recovery of economically 
induced migrants (Foulkes and Newbold 2000; 
Portes and Rumbaut 1996). 
While the country as a whole has the resourc-
es to mitigate climate impacts and thus reduce po-
tential environmental migration, policy response 
to environmental damage and disasters is often 
reactive (Birkland 2006), making this mitigation 
unlikely – especially considering that the burden 
of climate change falls unequally on socially vul-
nerable populations (Paavola and Adger 2002). 
Thus, with these housing, financial, health, and 
discrimination issues in mind and an understand-
ing of who are the most vulnerable populations, 
we now turn to potential policy arenas that could 
address the most urgent concerns for these popu-
lations after they are displaced. 
Policy Considerations for Environmental Migration
Climate change has increased attention on inter-
nal, permanent migration across the world. Yet in 
the U.S., internal migration is seen as a rational 
choice process related to economic and demo-
graphic changes (Hall 2009). There are no inter-
nal migration policies addressing the vulnerability 
of IDPs or their resilience. Evaluating other poten-
tial policy arenas, I argue that 1) current disaster, 
social service, and discrimination policy show po-
tential for addressing the resilience of IDPs, but 
2) incorporation of international displacement 
standards is necessary to ensure the broadest 
protection and assistance. 
Disaster Policy
The guiding laws relevant to disaster recovery are 
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Relief Act of 
1988 and its amendments and the Post-Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Acts of 2006. 
The Stafford Act’s purpose is to provide “orderly 
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and continuing federal assistance to state and 
local government in carrying out their respon-
sibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage 
caused by disasters” (Godschalk et al. 1999: 11). 
Under the Stafford Act, the United States Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) sup-
ports state and local governments in the event 
that a disaster overwhelms their capacity. Once 
the President declares a federal disaster, housing, 
economic, and health assistance is offered to lo-
cal governments and affected populations. 
The Post-Katrina Reform Acts extended 
FEMA’s authority to provide housing assistance 
beyond three months and outside the vicinity of 
the disaster area (Bea 2006). Though still focused 
on short-term, in-situ recovery, these changes 
expanded the federal government’s assistance in 
disasters and potentially environmental migration 
by creating a case management function within 
FEMA, the National Disaster Housing Strategy, 
and the National Disaster Recovery Framework 
(NDRF). 
Case management. Populations displaced from 
federally-declared disasters receive up to 18 
months of housing assistance or $26,200 (adjust-
ed yearly for inflation), whichever limit they reach 
first. These populations are also offered 26 weeks 
of disaster unemployment insurance and finan-
cial support for healthcare and other expenses 
under the Other Needs Assistance Program. This 
assistance is not streamlined, so case manage-
ment helps populations manoeuvre through the 
complicated assistance structure. Disaster case 
management "address[es] long-term recovery 
needs, such as health care, employment, hous-
ing, and other social services… may directly pro-
vide assistance, make referrals to organizations 
that have agreed to meet specific client needs, 
contract with other organizations, or otherwise 
arrange for individuals and families to receive 
needed services and resources." (GAO 2009a: 4) 
While some Hurricane Katrina victims are still 
receiving case management, the Program faced 
discontinuous funding streams, lacked clear as-
signments, had high case-worker turnover, and 
did not reach the most vulnerable populations 
(GAO 2009a). 
National Disaster Housing Strategy. Drafted 
in 2008, the National Disaster Housing Strat-
egy aimed to streamline collaboration with the 
United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) and address low-income 
and special needs populations (those with dis-
abilities, children, and the elderly). One of the 
strategy’s key goals is “to move disaster victims 
into permanent housing as quickly as possible” 
(FEMA 2008: 58). The strategy calls for a “Hous-
ing Taskforce” to define the specific programme 
policies. 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) strongly criticized the strategy for not de-
scribing the role of HUD or addressing vulnerable 
populations—its two main purposes (2009b). 
While affordable housing was mentioned, the 
proposed solution involved tax credits for devel-
opers to rebuild. HUD subsidies for low-income 
populations were briefly mentioned as transfer-
able to other locations, but extra assistance for 
low-income homeowners depends upon appro-
priations passed by Congress following specific 
disasters (FEMA 2008: 65-68). The strategy also 
failed to provide streamlined assistance process-
es, transportation funding, or discussion of the 
costs, staffing, or training necessary to assist in 
permanent housing transitions. 
National Disaster Recovery Framework. Drafted 
in 2009, the NDRF was up for public comment 
at the time of this writing. It is meant to be “a 
scalable system that coordinates and manages 
disaster recovery operations to more effectively 
deliver recovery assistance to severely impaired 
communities” (FEMA 2010b: 7). The NDRF uses 
a resiliency approach focused on rebuilding to 
reduce future disaster vulnerability. The NDRF 
identifies the socio-economically disadvantaged, 
minorities, educationally disenfranchised, women 
and children, individuals with disabilities, and the 
elderly as vulnerable or under-served groups that 
deserve special attention. The NDRF advances 
disaster policy by emphasizing participation and 
coordination among local, state, and federal 
government, NGOs, and individuals, especially 
vulnerable populations. It shows potential to in-
crease resilience during environmental migration 
by calling for federal and state recovery coordina-
tors and recovery support functions to provide a 
“one-stop shop” for assistance. 
In their review of the NDRF, the Brookings 
Institution (2010) noted the insufficient discus-
sion of forced relocation (referencing indigenous 
Alaskan populations) and vulnerable populations 
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that are unable to evacuate or relocate on their 
own. They called for incorporation of the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment (1998). 
Limitations. The case management function, the 
National Disaster Housing Strategy and the NDRF 
have little to no discussion of environmental mi-
gration. Given increased climate change impacts 
and the socio-economic dynamics of environ-
ment migration, rebuilding in place is not feasible 
for everyone. Without specific attention to envi-
ronmental migration, two key omissions exist in 
disaster policy: small disasters and gradual-onset 
events. 
A central assumption of federal policy is that 
local governments have the primary responsibil-
ity for preparing for, responding to, and recov-
ering from disasters. The President declares a 
federal disaster and offers federal assistance only 
when local and state capacity has been over-
whelmed. While over 30 disasters each year are 
federally declared, most small and many gradual-
onset disasters are not (FEMA 2010a). As dis-
cussed above, displacement occurs as a result of 
both large and small disasters. Lack of response 
capacity at the local level leaves populations dis-
placed from non-federally declared disasters and 
without assistance. Also since 1953, less than 
three per cent of federally-declared disasters 
were drought-related, and there is no standard 
for sea-level rise to prompt a federal declaration 
without storm or wave impacts (FEMA 2010a). 
Thus, economically-driven migration from gradu-
al-onset events is not covered by disaster policy. 
While FEMA is working to improve housing, eco-
nomic, and health assistance to disaster victims, 
environmental migration exposes the limitations 
of current disaster policy. 
Social Service Policy
The need for social service programmes that pro-
vide housing, food, medical care, transportation, 
and financial assistance to low-income popula-
tions increases during disasters. Populations not 
originally eligible for government assistance of-
ten meet eligibility standards following a disaster 
(Tobin-Gurley et al. 2010). For further details on 
non-disaster social service programmes see GAO 
(2010) and Winston et al. (2006).
Housing. Housing programmes are central to 
disaster assistance, and the U.S. has given HUD 
more disaster housing responsibility. This depart-
ment controls housing vouchers in non-disaster 
situations, and these vouchers are transferable to 
different locations. These housing programmes 
require individuals to find their own housing, 
which is difficult for those displaced to new com-
munities or without transportation (Paradee 
2010). Moreover, the amount of available pub-
lic housing and affordable rental options vary 
greatly across the U.S., and HUD and FEMA have 
limited funding or authority to rebuild damaged 
public housing units (GAO 2009b). 
Economic, transportation, and health. Economic 
assistance to low-income populations during non-
disaster circumstances includes: unemployment 
insurance, job placement and assistance, food 
vouchers, breakfast and lunch programmes at 
schools, early childhood education programmes, 
and bus transit programmes (GAO 2009a; Win-
ston et al. 2006). Following Hurricane Katrina, 
some social service programmes, such as Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families, Medicaid, 
the Department of Labor, and the food voucher 
programme, were awarded additional funding 
and reduced their eligibility requirements to as-
sist IDPs. Unfortunately, these disaster-specific 
programmes lasted less than six months, ending 
before displaced populations had fully resettled 
(GAO 2009a). With Katrina displacement seen as 
an exceptional event, HUD is still the only depart-
ment that officially collaborates with FEMA, and 
there is no plan for permanent disaster collabora-
tion with other assistance programmes.
Limitations. As many disaster and poverty re-
searchers note, U.S. social service provisions are 
being steadily rescinded (Lein et al. 2009). How-
ever, the need for these programmes is increas-
ing. For example, the poverty rate increased from 
11 to over 13 per cent between 2000 and 2008, 
with poverty rates among African Americans, 
Hispanics, and Native Americans double that; 
and since 2000, the number of individuals receiv-
ing food vouchers has increased from 17 million 
to 33 million (GAO 2010). 
In normal circumstances, social service pro-
grammes have limited eligibility, strict constraints 
on earnings, require state contributions, allow 
states to set eligibility standards, and have lim-
ited provisions for sudden changes in need that 
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may leave many eligible populations unaided. 
Disasters highlight additional limitations includ-
ing: cross-jurisdictional complexity, short-term 
focus, financial constraints, and unclear division 
of local-state-federal responsibilities (Winston et 
al. 2006). If federal agencies do not appropriate 
funding or relax eligibility requirements following 
a disaster, states, and localities cannot provide 
extra services; thus, IDPs from less catastrophic 
events will receive limited assistance. 
Since disaster assistance is considered a short-
term process, when FEMA programmes end, eli-
gible populations should transfer to these social 
service programmes. However, IDPs restarting 
or beginning benefits in a new location can wait 
months for food vouchers and housing assist-
ance (Lein et al. 2010). The GAO found that the 
most needy populations after Hurricane Katrina 
(the elderly, those with disabilities, and the un-
employed) were the hardest to assist (2009a). As 
the GAO states, “a disaster can exacerbate the 
long-standing challenges at-risk populations have 
in accessing needed assistance from multiple pro-
grams” (GAO 2008: 42).  
These social service issues highlight the 
breach between disaster assistance and long-term 
recovery and poverty alleviation efforts. To as-
sist IDPs, benefits need to be easily transferable, 
and must have extended time limits and relaxed 
eligibility requirements. As Winston et al. (2006) 
argued, all programmes that address hous-
ing, economic, educational, and medical needs 
should include emergency response protocols 
that specify funding mechanisms, how assistance 
is triggered, and length of assistance. 
Discrimination Policy
Policies enforcing civil and human rights relevant 
to IDPs’ resilience are the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Titles VI and 
VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibit intentional dis-
crimination in federally-funded programmes and 
in employment (Feder 2008). The Fair Housing 
Act “prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, 
and financing of dwellings, and in other housing-
related transactions, based on race, colour, na-
tional origin, religion, sex, familial status, and 
handicap” (HUD 2010). These policies do not 
address unintentional discrimination nor do they 
specifically apply to private acts of discrimination. 
These policies also cannot address community 
actions that prevent the rebuilding of affordable 
and public housing or other unintentional dis-
crimination after a disaster (GAO 2009b). Also, 
some accuse the Fair Housing Act of benefiting 
only middle class blacks, which is why it has been 
unable to end segregation and housing discrimi-
nation (Sidney 2001).
Beyond these policies, there have been recent 
calls for redevelopment of the U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights into the Commission on Civil and 
Human Rights. Supported by numerous advocacy 
agencies, the commission would focus on incor-
porating international standards on human rights 
into domestic policy and is in response to recent 
disasters (Marcus 2010). While only a proposal, 
this commission could increase attention to IDPs.
Limitations. A complaint or lawsuit is required 
before discrimination violations can be dealt 
with, which is the biggest limitation of these poli-
cies. When trying to obtain immediate housing, 
employment, and education, displaced individu-
als have little time, energy, or money to begin 
a complaint or lawsuit. Following Katrina, fair 
housing complaints were filed by NGOs after 
tests revealed discrimination and HUD initiated 
complaints for the worst offenders. These com-
plaints only addressed a small proportion of the 
estimated discrimination violations. The institu-
tional racism and racial mistrust witnessed dur-
ing disasters and migration cannot be addressed 
through individual discrimination complaints nor 
through “colour-blind” programmes that ignore 
the legacy of racism and discrimination (Henkel 
et al. 2006). 
While disaster, social service, and discrimina-
tion policy can work together to assist IDPs, there 
are still gaps, especially for migration from small 
and gradual-onset disasters. Also, the rescinding 
of U.S. social service provisions and discrimina-
tion enforcement means IDPs will continue to 
face difficulty in transferring current benefits, re-
ceiving new benefits, and receiving fair treatment 
in their new location. As shown, environmental 
migration compounds the hardships of these dis-
advantaged populations: "[After Katrina] some 
residents who were just ‘getting by’ in New Or-
leans, and others who were already impoverished 
were thrown into deeper poverty during pro-
longed displacement—a problem that could not 
be adequately addressed by either disaster assist-
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ance programs or local social assistance programs 
alone." (Fussell and Elliott 2009: 386).
These issues are why incorporation of inter-
national displacement standards is important for 
the U.S.
Conclusion: Incorporating International Standards
"Until the U.S. Government recognizes its re-
sponsibility to use all resources at its disposal in 
responding to domestic disasters – including in-
ternationally developed standards in humanitar-
ian response – the U.S. will continue to fail in its 
obligation to provide protection to its citizenry." 
(Lauten and Lietz 2008: 160)  
The United Nations has argued for rights-
based approaches to IDPs, but these provisions 
are not fully integrated into U.S. domestic policy. 
Since the federal government sets guidelines and 
goals, federal policy on environmental migration 
is important to compel state and local attention 
to the issue. This paper concludes with a discus-
sion of international standards that could support 
domestic policy, including the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement (1998), race and civil 
rights agreements, and an international resolu-
tion on climate change and human rights. 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment identify the "rights and guarantees relevant 
to the protection of persons from forced dis-
placement and to their protection and assistance 
during displacement as well as during return or 
resettlement and reintegration" (Kalin 2008: 1). 
Since refugee law is not applicable to IDPs, na-
tions are responsible for "respecting, protecting, 
and fulfilling [IDPs’] civil and political as well as 
their economic, social, and cultural rights" (Kalin 
2008: 19). The United Nations General Assembly 
argues that nations should: "Develop and imple-
ment domestic legislation and policies dealing 
with all stages of displacement, including through 
the identification of a national focal point within 
the government for issues of internal displace-
ment, and through the allocation of budget re-
sources" (Kalin 2008: 20).
Table 1 shows how U.S. policy could benefit 
from incorporating these standards, especially 
those related to discrimination and economic as-
sistance (Kalin et al. 2010): 
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Right to return or resettle and prohibition of 
forcible return
Supports discrimination coverage for IDPs 
under current laws. 
Supports special attention to socio-economi-
cally vulnerable populations.
Supports special assistance to resource-
dependent and indigenous populations.
Supports healthcare coverage based on the 
human right to the highest attainable level of 
physical and mental health.
Supports quick re-issuance of personal docu-
ments speeding social service benefit provi-
sion, job placement, and school enrolment.
Supports returning children to school imme-
diately and reincorporating them into regular 
educational programmes.
Supports government efforts to create “the 
conditions that allow displaced persons to 
rebuild their lives” in their original com-
munity, their current place, or a new area. 
(Kalin 2008: 128). Prevents forcible return (as 
witnessed after Katrina).
Table 1: Applicable components of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for United States Policy (Source: Author)
Guiding Principle     Key points                   Applicability to U.S. IDPs
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The applicability of these principles depends 
upon defining migration as “forced”. The prin-
ciples do not apply to persons moving solely for 
economic reasons (Kalin 2008). However, by us-
ing a social vulnerability perspective, we see that 
vulnerable populations are forced to migrate and 
could be better protected through the use of 
these principles. In support, the United Nations 
recently clarified that all forms of climate change 
displacement, including those from gradual-onset 
changes, are covered by the Guiding Principles 
(Kolmannskog 2009). 
The Guiding Principles are not binding agree-
ments, but the U.S. is obligated to the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of Race 
Discrimination and the International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights—both of which could 
bring attention to IDPs. After Hurricane Katrina, 
United Nations representatives called the condi-
tions “shocking and gross violations of human 
rights” (Wing 2006: 42), but others have disa-
greed, stating that the U.S. did provide necessary 
protection (Okeke and Nafziger 2006). Thus, de-
fining human rights violations in the U.S. makes 
application of these agreements difficult. 
Protection of IDPs is also supported from a 
climate change standpoint. The United Nations 
recently stated that climate change “poses an 
immediate and far-reaching threat to people and 
communities around the world and has implica-
tions for the full enjoyment of human rights” 
(Limon 2009: 443). A human rights frame should 
be “a forward-looking means of encouraging the 
evolution of, and providing a qualitative contribu-
tion to, robust, effective, and sustainable policy 
responses at both the national and international 
level, across mitigation and adaptation” (2009: 
458). However, as with other international cli-
mate change policies, the U.S. is non-committal. 
To avoid facing charges of human rights viola-
tions due to greenhouse gas emissions, the U.S. 
argues that the complexity of climate change, the 
long-term cause and effect mechanisms, and the 
global scaling of contribution make human rights 
arguments void. Thus, a climate change frame of 
environmental migration in the U.S. is not politi-
cally viable.
International standards such as the Guiding 
Principles provide great resources for new po-
licy or extension of current disaster, social ser-
vice, and discrimination policy (Kalin et al. 2010). 
Recognizing IDPs as victims of natural disasters 
rather than victims of climate change is not only 
more politically acceptable but also bypasses a 
need to define which climate changes should ini-
tiate federal assistance. Recognition of the issue 
does not require legal status for migrants to en-
courage streamlined assistance mechanisms and 
incorporation of the Guiding Principles in FEMA’s 
new case management and recovery coordinator 
efforts. 
Recognition that environmental migration 
disproportionately affects the most vulnerable 
populations is crucial to developing policy that 
addresses the resilience of IDPs; and the par-
ticipation of these populations in policy and 
programme development is necessary. This par-
ticipation is already supported in the NDRF, and 
increased participation will draw attention to dis-
crimination and eliminate the need for a disaster-
specific “Citizens’ Bill of Rights” as implemented 
following Hurricane Katrina (Sanyika 2009). The 
complexity of environmental migration in the U.S. 
should not forestall policy action; on the other 
hand modelling and understanding complexity 
could generate more successful policy options 
(Hayden 2006). Thus, whether new policy is de-
veloped or current policies are adapted, the U.S. 
must acknowledge that environmental migration 
is not an unfortunate and unlikely event resulting 
only from extremely catastrophic disasters, but a 
normal part of life in the U.S. and should thus 
begin incorporating good practices (Bullock et al. 
2009; Lauten and Lietz 2008). Focusing on IDPs 
will move the disaster resilience discussion from 
immediate humanitarian assistance and rebuild-
ing in place towards protecting human rights and 
encouraging environmental justice (Meertens 
2010). 
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Section One
Improving National Governance and 
Regional Cooperation in Managing  
Displacement and Migration: Selected 
Case Studies
Slow-Onset Disasters
Food Insecurity and Environmental 
Migration in Drought-Prone Areas of 
Ethiopia
Aschale Dagnachew Siyoum
Abstract
The study examines the extent and nature of en-
vironmentally induced migration undertaken by 
people in the face of environmental degradation 
and food insecurity in a drought-prone region of 
Ethiopia. It also describes the protection mecha-
nism currently provided to people affected by 
environmental degradation. In-depth household 
interviews and household surveys are the major 
sources of data. The study indicates that environ-
mentally-induced migration in the area took place 
in two forms: either as spontaneous migration 
or as assisted migration. The study argues that 
though migration in the area is closely linked with 
drought and environmental degradation, there is 
no single factor responsible for rural outmigra-
tion in the study area. The study also reveals that 
there are no effective social protection policies 
directed towards the protection of environmen-
tally induced displaced persons in Ethiopia. The 
study, therefore, calls for better understanding 
of the complex nature of rural outmigration and 
the formulation of appropriate social protection 
policies to address vulnerabilities associated with 
environmental degradation.  
Key-words: Environmental degradation, Food 
insecurity, Environmental migration, Internal dis-
placement, Social protection
Introduction: Environmental Change and Migration
Globally speaking, migration today has risen to 
an unprecedented level. According to the 2008 
IOM report, about 192 million people lived out-
side their place of origin (IOM 2008). Over time, 
people have chosen the option of migration as a 
means of coping with the effect of environmental 
changes, both those of a sudden and disastrous 
nature and those caused by slow onset environ-
mental deterioration. However, the root causes 
of migration are multiple, with a complex web of 
factors driving migration. The literature on forced 
displacement and the migration of people empha-
sizes the impact of natural and environmentally-
related disasters as a direct cause of migration. 
However, a common and generally agreed upon 
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definition of environmental migrants is missing 
because of a lack of consensus among research-
ers and academics (Oucho 2009).
Debates about the interconnections between 
environmental change and forced population 
displacements are not new. While it is likely that 
human settlements have always been faced with 
environmental change, the extent to which this 
changes induced migration is still largely un-
known. Moreover, the multi causality of fac-
tors that prompt migration makes it difficult to 
establish a precise causal relationship between 
environmental change and migration (Hietanen 
2009). However, it is increasingly recognized that 
environmental change plays an important role in 
people’s decisions to migrate. Environmental dis-
ruptions are generally recognized as an increasing 
important factor of migration in a sense that peo-
ple who can no longer gain a secure livelihood 
in their homelands opt for migration, having 
no other alternative. In a 1985 UNEP report, El 
Hinnawi referred to these people as "environ-
mental refugees", which he defined as; "those 
people who have been forced to leave their tra-
ditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, 
because of a marked environmental disruption 
(natural and/or triggered by people) that jeop-
ardized their existence and/or seriously affected 
the quality of their life" (El Hinnawi 1985: 4). 
However, this concept of environmental refugees 
became a centre of controversy as the term "ref-
ugee" is purely restricted by the United Nations 
Convention of 1951 and the Organization of 
African Union (OAU) Convention of 1969 (Ade-
poju 2009).
In 2007, IOM produced a definition of en-
vironmental migrants as: "persons or group of 
persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden 
or progressive changes in the environment that 
adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are 
obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose 
to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and 
who move either within their country or abroad" 
(IOM 2007: 1).
Though there are different definitions of the 
concept of environmentally induced migration, it 
is not sufficient to consider the migration-envi-
ronment relationship just in terms of migration as 
a response to a particular environmental event. 
Given the increasing trend of environmental 
degradation, it is suggested that the number of 
environmentally induced migrants will increase. 
According to Myers (1996), the number of 
environmental migrants totalled at least 25 mil-
lion people in 1995. He further predicted that 
this number could well double by 2010 and could 
reach as high as 200 million by 2050 (Morrissey 
2009). 
In Africa, multiple push factors incite migra-
tion both within the continent and to other re-
gions. Throughout its history, Africa has expe-
rienced important migratory movements, both 
voluntary and forced. Migration in Africa also 
represents an important livelihood and coping 
strategy to ecological and economic downturns 
(African Union 2006). Over the last couple of 
decades, deteriorating political, socio-economic, 
and environmental conditions, as well as armed 
conflicts, poverty and environmental degrada-
tion have resulted in a significant increase in 
mass migration and forced displacement in Africa 
(African Union 2006). In Africa, migration is also 
a way of life and an important demographic re-
sponse to conditions of poverty and environmen-
tal stress, and Ethiopia is no exception in this re-
gard. In Ethiopia over the centuries various forms 
of population movement have been recorded in 
response to drought and famine, political turmoil, 
economic crisis and security. The country has ex-
perienced severe droughts and famine beginning 
from the 19th century resulting from a combina-
tion of natural climatic variations and human-in-
duced atmospheric changes. Although a number 
of factors are responsible for rural outmigration 
in the country, the role played by environmen-
tal changes is more pronounced. Generally, in 
Ethiopia, lack of access to sufficient farmland and 
severe environmental degradation are the ma-
jor factors which force people to abandon their 
homes and migrate (Mberu 2006). 
This paper therefore examines the extent and 
nature of environmentally induced migration as 
undertaken by people in response to environ-
mental degradation, and its negative impact on 
food security. The paper will be based on eth-
nographic fieldwork conducted as part of the 
author´s PhD research in a drought-prone region 
of Ethiopia. The paper also describes and analyses 
the protection mechanism currently provided to 
people affected by environmental degradation. 
Environmentally induced migration in the study 
area took place in two forms: either as sponta-
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neous migration or as assisted migration. The 
study argued that, though migration is strongly 
linked with drought and environmental degrada-
tion, there is no single factor responsible for rural 
outmigration in the study area. Research findings 
also indicate that provision of social protection 
for  environmentally affected people is very lim-
ited and has not addressed their needs in dealing 
with the negative impact of environmental deg-
radation on their livelihoods. This paper therefore 
calls for the formulation and implementation of 
appropriate social protection strategies and an 
operational response that will lead to essential 
livelihood improvements and address vulnerabili-
ties associated with environmental degradation. 
Moreover, strengthening regional instruments 
such as the African Union Kampala Convention 
should be emphasized as it provides new mecha-
nisms, if implemented effectively by Member 
States, to enhance protection and assistance for 
those affected.
The Ethiopian Context
With more than 73 million people in 2007 (CSA 
2007), Ethiopia is the second largest country in 
sub-Saharan Africa. About 84 per cent of the 
population live in rural areas and their liveli-
hood depends on subsistence mixed farming. 
Low socio-economic status, erratic weather con-
ditions, massive land degradation, and lack of 
basic infrastructure for intensive land use have 
undermined agricultural growth and reduced the 
labour absorption potential of the agricultural 
sector. The country is characterized by extreme 
poverty, a high population growth rate, severe 
environmental degradation, as well as frequent 
drought (Degefa 2005; Ezra 1997; Getachew 
1995; Workneh 2008). Especially in the high-
lands, long and sustained human settlement and 
the absence of modern technology or a resource 
management system, have led to an acute deple-
tion of natural resources. This has resulted in the 
very poor performance of agriculture for several 
decades, which has led to the inability of the 
country to adequately feed its population from 
domestic production. This has been evidenced by 
the prevailing food insecurity, both chronic and 
transitory, which has became the way of life for 
a significant proportion of the population of the 
country (Degefa 2002; Rahmato 2007). Food in-
security in Ethiopia is a long-term phenomenon 
caused by a combination of both natural and 
man-made factors, such as lack of alternative 
income sources outside agriculture, unreliable 
rainfall pattern, land degradation, poor infra-
structure, lack of modern agricultural inputs, and 
limited credit facilities in rural areas (Macrae and 
Zwi 1994; Wisner et al. 2004). 
In such a disenabling environment poor peo-
ple are forced to use various means to survive. 
This includes agricultural production, temporary 
employment, home industries, reliance on remit-
tances and help from kin and neighbours. Migra-
tion is another mechanism employed by poor 
households in coping with declining food avail-
ability. A significant proportion of rural house-
holds live in uncertain and fragile environments 
that no longer offer opportunities to secure a sus-
tainable life because of their limited agricultural 
potential and serious environmental degradation. 
Often such households have no alternative other 
than to migrate in search of better living condi-
tions. The current study area (Ebinat District in 
the Amhara National Regional State in northern 
Ethiopia) is also one of the areas most severely 
affected by recurrent drought and environmental 
degradation, particularly since the mid 1980s. 
Ebinat is one of the chronically food-inse-
cure districts of the Amhara region, with a total 
population of about 221,000 and a total area of 
2494.27 km2. People in the district depend pri-
marily on agriculture, with 96 per cent of the 
population being involved in mixed farming. 
The information obtained from the district ag-
ricultural office indicates that livelihoods in the 
area are predominantly dependent on rain-fed 
agriculture. However, rainfall patterns are erratic 
and uneven and are characterized by late onset 
and early withdrawal. Average land size is very 
small, about 0.5 hectares per household. This is 
too small to support an average family size of 5.5 
people per household. The average production of 
cereals, the major agricultural output, is very low. 
Average duration of food sufficiency in a year is 
3-6 months. Households are thus highly vulner-
able to chronic food insecurity and a high per-
centage of households participate in the Produc-
tive Safety Net Programme which provides food/
cash transfers for up to six months a year based 
on participation in public work schemes. The vul-
nerability of the district is increased by environ-
mental degradation, frequent drought, poor soil 
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fertility, fragmentation of land, and a high popu-
lation pressure. Migration is thus an important 
livelihood option, as there are limited possibilities 
of securing a decent life in their home area. Most 
of these migrants do not cross an international 
border and are therefore classified as IDPs.
Data Source and Methods
The primary data for the research was collected 
from household surveys and in-depth house-
hold interviews conducted for over a period of 
18 months between December 2008 and May 
2010. Most of it took place in the form of ethno-
graphic fieldwork as part of the author's PhD re-
search. One of the main objectives of the survey 
and in-depth household interview was to explore 
the response of peasant households in the face of 
environmental degradation and food insecurity. 
The research also looked into how households in-
tegrate programmatic interventions, particularly 
the Productive Safety Net Programme, into their 
livelihoods and how these affected their food 
security status and rate of outmigration. The 
household survey covered 163 households living 
in two selected villages of two Peasant Associa-
tions (PAs). PAs are the smallest administrative 
structure in rural Ethiopia. Household heads were 
interviewed as part of the research and in his or 
her absence another adult household member 
was interviewed and asked a wide range of ques-
tions regarding the nature of the household’s re-
sponses to increasing environmental degradation 
and food insecurity. In addition to the primary 
data collected in the field, secondary information 
was collected to look at the nature of displace-
ment and to explore the protection mechanisms 
currently provided to affected households.
Study Findings
In Ethiopia there are three categories of inter-
nal displacements, namely: conflict-induced, 
development-induced, and environmentally in-
duced displacements (Dessalegn 2004). Conflict-
induced displacement is the most prominent of 
these, as it has resulted in the displacement of a 
large number of people within a short period of 
time. It is also the area with the greatest concen-
tration of humanitarian assistance. Development-
induced displacements are rare; the most com-
mon form of development-induced displacement 
in Ethiopia is due to road and dam construction. 
Whereas environmentally induced displacement 
is mainly attributed to drought, and in most cases 
characterized as stress migration or temporary 
displacement, drought and famine-induced mi-
grations are chronic problems in Ethiopia (Des-
salegn 2004). The following section discusses the 
nature of environmentally-induced migration as 
related to drought and environmental degrada-
tion in Ebinat district: an ecologically degraded, 
drought-prone area.  
Environmentally Induced Migration
Looking at statistics on disasters in Ethiopia, 
drought and famine account for the majority of 
the incidents. According to the information ob-
tained from the study area, environmentally in-
duced migration took place in two forms.  
1. Spontaneous Migration
One of the major forms of environmentally in-
duced migration in the area occurs in the form 
of spontaneous migration, which in most cases 
is temporary. In times of stress, people affected 
by drought and environmental degradation tend 
to migrate to places that offer employment op-
portunities, or to places where they have rela-
tives. Much of this trend can be generalized as 
a movement from the northern highlands to the 
lowlands, which offer more diverse livelihoods. 
As the level of stress increases, people migrate 
farther to the surplus-growing areas of western 
and southern Ethiopia. However, in some cases, 
during times of extreme deprivation, people also 
tend to migrate to neighbouring countries to seek 
assistance there (Dessalegn 2004; Hammond 
2000).
The household survey result showed that out 
of the interviewed 163 households, 88 house-
holds (53.98%) reported that at least one of 
their household members had migrated. Of the 
total 789 persons from 163 households, 26.1 per 
cent of them (206) were reported as migrants. 
Household heads were asked about the destina-
tion of the migrants. The response showed that 
about 81 per cent of the migrations (167) were 
rural to rural migration, 11.2 per cent (23) were 
rural to urban migration, and for the other 7.8 
per cent of the migrants, the household head did 
not know where the member had migrated. It is 
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also reported that most of the migration involved 
tended to be temporary in nature and thus most 
of those involved returned to their community at 
the end of the employment season. 
As part of the survey, household heads were 
also asked to provide reasons why members of 
their households engaged in migration. The sur-
vey result showed 58.7 per cent of the migrations 
were linked with the inability to produce enough 
food due to land degradation and drought. As the 
communities suffer regular droughts and have 
experienced the negative consequences of severe 
environmental degradation for decades, many 
people resort to migration because they have 
no alternative. Recurrent drought, coupled with 
poor land management practices, has contribut-
ed to soil erosion and reduced household income 
and thus many rural families are forced to migrate 
in order to cope with diminished incomes. Migra-
tion as a response to drought and environmental 
degradation is also documented by Bilsborrow 
(1992) who argued that as drought and deserti-
fication threaten rural household income sources 
and food security, many rural agricultural fami-
lies are forced to engage in migration. Morris-
sey (2008), in his work looking at environmen-
tal stress and short distance urban migration in 
highland Ethiopia, also found a similar result. 
Migration in response to drought was also re-
ported by Ezra and Kiros (2001) who examined 
outmigration rates in the drought-prone regions 
of Ethiopia for the ten-year period between 1984 
and 1994. 
Migration due to land shortage is another 
major reason which accounts for about 17 per 
cent of the outmigrants. Other reasons men-
tioned are looking for work (which accounts for 
about 11.7% of the migration), joining relatives 
(4.8%), migration due to marriage, to attend 
school and to join the army (all together accounts 
about 4.4%). For 3.4 per cent of the migrants, 
reasons for migration were unknown, at least for 
the heads of the households.  
2. Assisted Migration
The second form of environmentally induced 
displacement in the study area is assisted migra-
tion, which takes place in the form of resettle-
ment programmes. State-sponsored resettlement 
schemes have grown in importance in Ethiopia in 
the past forty years. Ethiopia has had resettle-
ment experience of over four decades. The his-
tory of encouraging voluntary resettlement dates 
back to 1958, when the government established 
the first known planned resettlement in Sidamo. 
Shortly after the 1974 revolution, the policy of 
the Derg Government was to accelerate resettle-
ment. In 1975/76 there were 88 settlement cen-
tres accommodating 38,818 household heads. By 
1982 there were 112 planned settlements popu-
lated by more than 120,000 people, mainly in the 
south and south-western parts of the country. By 
1986 the government had resettled more than 
600,000 people. At that time state-sponsored 
resettlement was largely undertaken to provide 
additional resources for the hard pressed north-
ern peasantry by relocating them to the southern 
regions. The government believed that resettle-
ment would provide a "lasting solution" for the 
"hard-pressed" peasantry, and particularly for 
the population living in the drought-prone areas 
(Pankhurst 1992; Rahmato 2003; Yenesew and 
Gelaw 2008).
Following the ousting of the Derg regime in 
1991, the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Front (EPRDF) took power. With the ex-
ception of a few isolated attempts to relocate 
people, it seemed that planned resettlement 
was suspended for some years. However, later 
on, the EPRDF Government demonstrated inter-
est in launching planned resettlement schemes, 
primarily to tackle the problem of chronic food 
insecurity in particular parts of the country. It 
was believed that the voluntary resettlement of 
vulnerable individuals and households would be 
instrumental in ensuring food security, while at 
the same time easing overwhelming pressure on 
the fragile resource base in the highlands (GFDRE 
2001). According to the government’s food secu-
rity policy, the objective of ensuring household 
food security could be achieved through the im-
plementation of three interlinked components: 
the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), 
Other Food Security Programmes (OFSP) and 
the Voluntary Resettlement Programme (NCFSE 
2003).
The government launched the resettlement 
programme in 2003 as part of its overall food 
security strategy to resettle a total of 2.2 mil-
lion food-insecure people over a three-year pe-
riod (NCFSE 2003). In Amhara National Regional 
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State, the resettlement programme has been 
implemented since 2003. The main objective of 
the resettlement programme is to enable up to 
220,000 chronically food-insecure households 
to attain food security within a five-year period 
of time through improved access to productive 
land. Besides providing settlers with land, the 
programme aims to establish basic infrastructure 
(such as health services, water supply, primary 
schools and roads). In Amhara region, five dis-
tricts were selected as the main destination area 
for the resettlement programme, namely Qura, 
Metema, Tsegedie, West Armechiho and Jawi. 
From 2003 to 2008 about 73328 household 
heads and 72860 family members were resettled 
in the region (Yenesew and Gelaw 2008). 
According to the information obtained from 
the Ebinat district agricultural and rural develop-
ment office, more than 365 household heads have 
been resettled to different areas in the region 
since the start of the resettlement programme in 
2003. Out of these 365 household heads, 167 
have returned back. Information obtained from 
the district agricultural office and interviews un-
dertaken with returnee settlers showed that high 
rates of environmental degradation, frequent 
droughts, shortage of agricultural land and the 
associated food insecurity form the major rea-
sons for households to join the resettlement 
programme. High expectations of resettlement 
itself, as a result of initiation propaganda, were 
also mentioned as an important reason to opt for 
resettlement. The interview results showed that 
poor households who are unable to earn enough 
to sustain their livelihood as a result of environ-
mentally-related problems have been forced to 
resettle to other areas.
Protection of Environmental Migrants
According to the African Union (AU) conven-
tion for the protection and assistance of IDPs 
adopted in 2009, all persons have a right to be 
protected against arbitrary displacement. The 
prohibited categories of arbitrary displacement 
include, among others, forced displacements in 
cases of natural and/or human made disasters. 
The AU convention states that protection of in-
ternal migrants is mainly the responsibility of 
national governments. However, the task of pro-
viding adequate assistance to displaced persons 
is costly and frequently exceeds national capaci-
ties in developing countries. The objective of the 
convention is to establish a legal framework for 
preventing internal displacement, and protecting 
and assisting IDPs in Africa (African Union 2009).
The convention states that, in cases when 
individual states do not have adequate avail-
able resources, the international community has 
a pivotal role to play in supporting the protec-
tion of basic rights and ensuring that needs are 
addressed. However, assisting and protecting in-
ternal migrants has been a difficult task for the 
international community for a variety of reasons. 
These include inadequate resources, lack of co-
operation between different agencies, lack of 
clarity and consensus over the definition of IDPs, 
contradictions between short-term relief aid and 
longer-term developmental assistance, limited 
access to displaced populations and insufficient 
political will to engage in internal matters of sov-
ereign states (African Union 2009; UNFPA 2004). 
Another reason is the fact that internal migrants 
remain within the jurisdiction of their own nation 
states and they may be eligible for legislation and 
state policies pertaining to national social protec-
tion (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003).
The term "social protection" refers to policies 
and approaches that assist people, households, 
and communities to protect themselves against 
shocks and natural disasters. Social protection is 
defined as "the public actions taken in response to 
levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which 
are deemed socially unacceptable within a given 
polity or society" (Conway et al. 2000: 1). Social 
protection is thus often associated with social as-
sistance and relief transfer provided to vulnerable 
people. It also covers some forms of promotive 
measures that provide income or consumption 
transfers to the poor in response to participation 
in community development activities.
Social protection policy initiatives have re-
cently been introduced in Ethiopia that focus on 
the protection of environmentally-related mi-
grants. However, so far, they have done little in 
achieving their intended goals of providing pro-
tection to environmentally induced migrants. It is 
evident that people displaced by environmental 
degradation and other slow onset disasters do 
not receive the same level of attention and pro-
tection as persons displaced by conflict and other 
sudden onset disasters. It is understood that per-
sons who are being forced to migrate due to en-
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vironmental reasons are often discounted, except 
for some who are registered in the government 
resettlement programme. Article three of the AU 
convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
IDPs exhorts states to incorporate their obliga-
tions under this convention into domestic law, 
by enacting or amending relevant legislation on 
the protection and assistance of IDPs in conform-
ity with their obligations under international law 
(African Union 2009). However, in Ethiopia such 
protection provided to people displaced by en-
vironmental degradation is very limited and of 
little significance in controlling environmentally-
related displacements. 
The following section of this paper will discuss 
some of the available social protection mecha-
nisms currently provided to rural households 
both in their place of origin in order to reduce 
migration, as well as in their place of destination 
for those people who have been resettled by the 
government resettlement programme. These dis-
cussions on social protections are limited to mi-
grants place of origins and destinations, because 
social protections provided by governments de-
mand that people should settle in a particular 
place in order to be registered for social protec-
tion programmes.
Protection of Households from Displacement at 
the Place of Origin 
Article 4 of the AU Convention for the Protection 
and Assistance of IDPs explains the obligations of 
states parties relating to protection from internal 
displacement. This article states that "States Par-
ties shall respect and ensure respect for their obli-
gations under international law, including human 
rights and humanitarian law, so as to prevent and 
avoid conditions that might lead to the arbitrary 
displacement of persons" (African Union 2009: 
6). In line with this principle, evidence in Ethiopia 
suggests that existing government initiatives seek 
to reduce forced displacement by providing local 
opportunities in migration source areas. There 
are interventions specifically aimed at reducing 
rural outmigration through local development 
and employment generation activities. The level 
to which such initiatives have reduced migration 
is not known. What is known is that outmigra-
tion has taken place irrespective of the services 
and transfers provided in people’s home areas. 
However, such initiatives are encouraging signs 
of government commitment to enhance devel-
opment more broadly in order to reduce vulner-
ability and the associated forced displacement of 
people.
As part of the national food security policy, 
the Government of Ethiopia developed the Food 
Security Strategy in 2002 which focuses on en-
vironmental rehabilitation designed to reverse 
the current trends of land degradation, thereby 
reducing the displacement of people due to prob-
lems associated with ecological disruptions. The 
government food security strategy consists of 
three components: the PSNP, the OFSP, and the 
Voluntary Resettlement Programme (MoARD 
2004). The PSNP provides social protection by 
providing transfers (food and/or cash) to the 
food-insecure population in chronically food-in-
secure districts. This aims to prevent asset deple-
tion at the household level while simultaneously 
creating assets at the community level (MoARD 
2004). Its purpose is to improve the effectiveness 
and productivity of transfers to food-insecure 
households, thereby reducing household vulner-
ability, promoting sustainable community devel-
opment, and consequently addressing the under-
lying causes of food insecurity and outmigration. 
The PSNP started by assisting five million people 
in 2005 and covered over 8.3 million people in 
2009. Participating households are guaranteed 
cash and/or food transfer in exchange for their la-
bour in environmental rehabilitation activities to 
bridge their food gaps, and are enrolled in credit 
schemes and other projects offered through oth-
er food security programmes in order to enhance 
their asset bases (MoARD 2009).
In the study district, about 36 per cent of the 
rural population, which is about 76,618 people, 
had participated during the last five years in the 
PSNP programme, through which people en-
gaged in public work activities designed to reha-
bilitate degraded lands. In return, participating 
individuals were provided with cash and/or food 
transfer on the rate of 10 birr per day, which is 
equivalent to 0.75 dollar per day (the payment 
increased from 6 birr in 2006 to 10 birr in 2009) 
in order to cover their food gaps and reduce the 
level of outmigration in the area. 
Evidence from the field also showed that, in 
addition to the food security interventions, other 
longer-term development and climate change ad-
aptation programmes are being implemented. These 
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programmes aim  to protect local communities from 
displacement associated with natural disasters and 
environmental degradation. However, the effect of 
these programmes is not yet clear. The Red Cross 
Climate Change-Induced Disaster Risk and Vulner-
ability Reduction (CCIDRVR) Program implemented 
by the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) is worth 
mentioning. This is a programme supported by the 
Netherlands Red Cross and the Netherlands Govern-
ment. MERET (Managing Environmental Resources 
to Enable Transitions to more sustainable livelihoods) 
is also another project supported by the World Food 
Programme. The objective of the Red Cross CCID-
RVR programme is to reduce the impact of climate 
change induced risks on local communities and im-
prove their living condition. This is to be achieved 
through different developmental interventions using 
the food for work approach. An important objective 
of the MERET project is also to increase incomes of 
the poor through asset creation and environmental 
rehabilitation. It includes activities, among others, 
to conserve, develop and rehabilitate degraded ag-
ricultural and community lands (ERCS 2008; Kehler 
2004).
Though these interventions have focused on 
environmental rehabilitation to ensure food security 
and reduce rural outmigration, the study shows that 
the rate of outmigration in the study area is still high. 
This suggests that these interventions have done lit-
tle to reduce the displacement of people out of the 
area. According to the district food security coordina-
tor, the programmes fell short of their intended goals 
as a result of various factors, the major ones being:  
•  Poor quality of public work activities which failed 
to bring significant change in environmental re-
habilitation
•  Lack of investment in own farm land (since reha-
bilitation activities by the PSNP public work are 
only undertaken on community lands)
•  Lack of adequate support for poor households 
who are unable  to produce and earn enough 
for their households due to natural and/or man-
made disasters 
•  Poor targeting mechanisms used to select 
 beneficiary households 
•  Aspiration failure and hopelessness of the 
 beneficiary households.
Protection of Displaced Persons at the Place of Des-
tination 
This type of protection is mainly provided to assist-
ed migrants in the form of humanitarian assistance 
upon arrival at the place of destination. In this re-
gard, Article 5 of the AU Convention for the Protec-
tion and Assistance of IDPs explains the obligations 
of states parties relating to protection and assistance 
of IDPs. This article states that "States Parties shall 
provide sufficient protection and assistance to IDPs, 
and where available resources are inadequate to en-
able them to do so; they shall cooperate in seeking 
the assistance of international organizations and hu-
manitarian agencies, civil society organizations and 
other relevant actors" (African Union 2009: 8). How-
ever, information obtained from returnee migrants 
showed that the nature of protection provided to as-
sisted migrants at their place of destination is not suf-
ficient, as is clearly demonstrated by the high rate of 
returnees from the resettlement sites. For instance, in 
Amhara National Regional State, from 2003 to 2008 
about 146,188 household members were resettled in 
five different districts of the region. However, only 
75,716 household members (51.8%) remained in the 
resettlement areas by mid-2008 (Yenesew and Gel-
aw 2008). The information obtained from the district 
agricultural office also showed that, from the study 
area, out of the 365 household heads that were re-
settled since 2003, 45,75 per cent of them (about 
167 household heads) had returned to their place of 
origin.
In line with the resettlement guidelines devel-
oped by the government, settlers will be provided 
with land, agricultural tools, oxen, proper provision 
of basic infrastructures and food aid until their first 
harvest. However, interviews conducted with re-
turnee settlers revealed that the government had not 
lived up to its promises, and this was said to be the 
key reason why they returned to their home areas. 
Returnee resettles also mentioned other factors that 
contributed to their return. These included poor soil 
fertility, prevalence of malaria, and failure of crop 
production. Development agents in the study area 
also mentioned that selection criteria for potential 
settlers were not appropriate, and that this explained 
the high return rate. 
Conclusion
This study examined the response of peasant 
households in the face of environmental degra-
dation and food insecurity. The study also looked 
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into the kind and level of protection mechanisms 
put in place by the government with the aim of 
reducing the extent of environmentally-induced 
migration. The study shows that environmentally 
induced migration in the study area took place in 
two forms. The first one was in the form of spon-
taneous migration, by which vulnerable people af-
fected by environmental degradation and chronic 
food insecurity migrated to other areas in search 
of better living conditions. The results indicate 
that vulnerability to food insecurity, as a result 
of land and forest resource degradation and un-
predictable weather conditions, determined rural 
outmigration in the study area to a considerable 
extent. Furthermore, the study revealed that en-
vironmentally induced migration in the area also 
took place in the form of assisted migration as 
part of the government resettlement programme. 
Resettlement has been a major policy of the Derg 
regime since the 1974 revolution. The recent gov-
ernment also introduced resettlement as part of 
its overall food security policy and this is seen as 
a major policy instrument to tackle the problem 
of chronic food insecurity and environmental 
degradation in Ethiopia. Environmental degrada-
tion, recurrent drought, and chronic food inse-
curity were some of the main reasons expressed 
by the interviewed household heads for joining 
the resettlement programme. However, it was 
found that though migration was closely linked 
to drought and environmental degradation, there 
was no single factor responsible for rural outmi-
gration in the study area. Therefore, in order to 
grasp the full picture of rural outmigration, one 
should examine it under multiple lenses and at-
tempt to understand its complex vulnerabilities. 
The study also found that there are no ef-
fective policies directed towards the protection 
of environmentally induced displaced persons in 
Ethiopia. However, there are two types of social 
protection mechanism currently implemented by 
the government as part of the national food se-
curity strategy, and these focus on environmen-
tally induced migrants. The first one is the PSNP, 
which aims to provide support in the form of 
income and/or consumption transfers to vulner-
able communities in response to their labour in 
environmental rehabilitation activities. This kind 
of protection mechanism aims to ensure house-
hold food security, thereby reducing the displace-
ment of people from their place of origin, though 
evidence from the study suggests that the pro-
gramme is not effective in meeting its intended 
goals. The second type of protection is assistance 
provided to settlers in their place of destination. 
Returnee settlers said that protection provided to 
settlers upon their arrival up to the time of their 
first harvest fell short of expectations. This was 
evidenced by the high percentage of returnee 
settlers. Unmet promises of the government dur-
ing mobilization were a major reason for settlers 
being forced to return to their place of origin. This 
underlines the importance of formulating policies 
and strategies in accordance with international 
principles that aim for effective social protec-
tion schemes and livelihood improvements. Such 
policies and strategies are essential to address 
vulnerabilities associated with environmental 
degradation and climate change impacts, and for 
strengthening protection of IDPs. In this regard, 
assistance provided by other AU Member States 
or the wider international community should be 
utilized as outlined under the AU Kampala Con-
vention.
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The Agulu-Nanka Gully Erosion Menace 
In Nigeria: What Does the Future Hold 
for the Population at Risk?
Chukwuedozie Kelechukwu Ajaero and  
Arinze Tagbo Mozie
Abstract
The Agulu-Nanka area of Anambra State has 
gained national recognition as an ecological 
disaster zone because of the incidence of gully 
erosion. The aim of this work is to examine the 
impact of this menace on the population of the 
area, and to examine the management and cop-
ing strategies adopted by individuals, the com-
munity, and the government. Data used in this 
study were derived from a questionnaire survey, 
key informant interviews, government and pub-
lished sources. The analyses and presentation 
of the data and results utilized a combination 
of complementary qualitative and quantitative 
techniques. The findings indicate that the men-
ace has over the years been responsible for in-
creasing losses of houses and land of the people, 
thereby displacing affected inhabitants of the 
area. Also, it has led to the loss of life of people 
and livestock, as well as the destruction of farms 
on which the majority of the population depend 
for survival. Consequently, the local people have 
been employing indigenous management strate-
gies, while the Government of Nigeria has tried 
over the years to control the menace without 
making much progress. The paper therefore rec-
ommends, among other things, that the man-
agement strategies of the government should be 
harmonized with those of the local people with 
regard to the unique environmental and social 
features of the area if the menace is to be sus-
tainably tackled. This will minimize and even halt 
the displacement of the population as well as the 
perennial loss of lives and properties associated 
with the hazard.
Key-words: Population displacement, Gully ero-
sion, Climate change, Responses, Vulnerability, 
Adaptation
Background of the Agulu-Nanka Gully Erosion 
Menace
Disasters have been defined and categorized in 
diverse ways by various scholars (see for instance, 
Bates (2002), Keane (2004), Hugo (2009) and 
Naik (2009)). Disasters which occur from natural 
or man-made processes often involve large-scale 
alterations of the areas they occur in and the suf-
fering of a sizeable number of persons by way of 
injuries, loss of life, and loss of property. Human 
responses to disasters vary according to the na-
ture of the disaster with respect to its effect on 
the land and the people of the area, as well as 
the peoples’ responses to this ever-present threat 
to lives and property. Disasters have been part 
of human history and they still befall mankind 
today (Bell 2000).This paper discusses the Agulu-
Nanka gully erosion area in Anaocha local gov-
ernment area of Anambra State, south-eastern 
Nigeria. Agulu is situated on the Awka Uplands. 
The Agulu-Nanka area is an area of dense and 
very long human habitation on the Awka-Orlu 
uplands. The topography is generally gentle to 
undulating, characterized by slopes of between 
20-50. Slopes reach between 500 -700 at the 
scarp point of gully advancement. The original 
vegetation of the area has been largely cleared. 
What exists today is secondary climax vegetation 
made up of mainly anthropic species. The climate 
of the area is tropical humid with a mean period 
of eight months of rainfall. The Agulu-Nanka 
gully erosion area is a wide area that is being 
eaten away gradually, and continuously eroded 
by the advancing gullies. The gully erosion zone 
covers the following communities: Agulu, Nanka, 
Ekwulobia, Oko, Amaokpala, Ezira and Ogboji 
and affects about 2.5 million persons. The present 
study covers Agulu, Nanka, Ekwulobia and Oko. 
Oko is the home community of Nigeria’s former 
Vice President, Dr Alex Ekwueme.
Methodology
Questionnaires were used to elicit information 
from 300 randomly selected respondents across 
the communities within the gully erosion area. 
Not all parts of the communities studied are af-
fected by the gully erosion, thus responses were 
obtained from the most knowledgeable persons 
in the communities and the families identified as 
having been victims of the disaster. Our study is 
a development of the already documented facts 
on the disaster via field observations from July 
2009 to March 2010. The respondents were not 
less than 45 years of age at the date of contact. 
Using the questionnaire, nineteen structured 
questions were put to the selected respondents. 
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The questions related to the different aspects of 
the gully erosion menace in the study area such 
as the trends, regularity, causes, impacts,  and 
coping and management strategies utilized by 
the affected population. In addition, key inform-
ant interviews were conducted with some nota-
ble stakeholders or leaders in the communities, 
such as traditional leaders, town union leaders, 
and some retired civil servants. The research also 
utilized personal observation methods and made 
extensive use of published literature from various 
relevant sources. The analysis of the data was 
carried out with simple descriptive statistics and 
the use of logistic regression to estimate the im-
pacts of the gully erosion on the population of 
the study area. Finally, the authors were able to 
produce a diagram of the environment-human 
interactions that typically have characterized the 
climate and soil erosion impacts of the area.
Formation of the Gully Erosion Menace
According to Nwajide and Hoque (1979) and 
Egboka and Okpoko (1984), the gully erosion 
menace started around the year 1850 (about 160 
years ago) as narrow channels of erosion which 
have since metamorphosed into gully erosion. By 
1920, the gully area had an estimated area of 120 
km2; in 1950, 250 km2; in 1960, 780 km2; 930 
km2 in 1979 and by the year 1983, the gullies 
covered an area of about 1100 km2 and it is esti-
mated to have been expanding at a rate of 20-50 
m per year (Mozie 2010). Egboka and Nwank-
wor (1985) discovered that the fragile soils, which 
much earlier in time were protected by dense for-
est cover, were left to the mercy of the weather 
when the people deforested the area and thus 
exposed the soils to heavy downpours and char-
acteristically concentrated runoffs. In the view 
of the inhabitants, the causes of gully erosion 
by proportions of respondents from the findings 
of the fieldwork of this study are as follows: de-
forestation (48.6%), geology (33.3%), high rain-
fall (66.7%), infrastructural development, poor 
drainage (54.2%), and topography (61.1%). In 
addition, 55.6 per cent of the respondents are of 
the view that there has been an increase in the 
number of the gullies in the past ten years, while 
22.2 per cent are of the view that there has been 
a decrease in the incidence of the menace, and 
another 22.2 per cent note that in the last ten 
years, the trend of occurrence of the gullies has 
shown no significant variation. Subsequently, the 
impact of gullies as perceived by the inhabitants 
of the study area is shown in table 1. According to 
Chief Okoye (Mbuze 1 Nanka), "the gully erosion 
in Nanka and Ekwulobia started from the flood 
waters that flow down from Isuofia some seven 
kilometres, and seventy five metres higher, to the 
west of Nanka, Oko and Ekwulobia. The people 
had wanted to tackle the problem, but were told 
to wait for the Government. In Agulu, the sur-
face flood incidence was also the genesis of the 
erosion problem and was left unattended, thus 
the gullies were created. Mbuze means ‘gully’ in 
the Igbo language of the people of south-eastern 
Nigeria. That one of the chiefs of the community 
is Mbuze, is an acknowledgement by the people 
that the gully erosion has become their unavoida-
ble nearest environmental disaster. Consequent-
ly, they have come to see the menace as part and 
parcel of the affected communities – a phenom-
enon that inflicts severe losses on the people." 
The years of gully advance are usually years 
of exceptionally heavy rainfall. The slides occur 
between June and early October. Changes in 
climatic patterns resulting in flooding and cases 
of slides in the area were rare, but are gradually 
becoming more regular. These changes in the cli-
mate pattern of the area, whenever they occur, 
have devastating effects because they are gen-
erally atypical and so unexpected (Okoye 2009). 
Furthermore, deforestation and development of 
infrastructure, such as houses and roads, have 
induced increases in runoffs and created the gul-
lies. This has created the badland topography 
of today and led to continuous advancement of 
the gully heads. Unfortunately, the increasingly 
vicious downpours have been yielding greater 
runoff due to climate change. The runoff is made 
more devastating by the continuous conversion 
of agricultural land to residential land as more 
rainfall is intercepted and made to flow overland 
in poorly made channels. 
It can be seen from table 1 that most people 
surveyed believe loss of human life has decreased 
and the displacement of populations from severely 
affected areas has increased within the past ten 
years. The displaced and migrant populations have 
in essence become environmental refugees in safer 
locations within and outside their communities.
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Efforts at Controlling the Gully Erosion Menace
Measures of the Government in Nigeria to pre-
vent and manage the gully erosion menace
The first attempts by the government at contain-
ing the menace were through the establishment 
of a soil conservation scheme financed by the 
Colonial Welfare and Development Fund (Udo 
1971). The project was to serve as a model for 
checking gully growth and as an anti-erosion 
demonstration for other agencies working in 
areas suffering similar problems. By 1950, 805 
dams, 24 miles (384 km) of contour ridges and 33 
miles (53 km) of path with 4336 sumps had been 
built. The government of the eastern region of 
Nigeria in 1964 declared its intention to fight the 
gully expansion but the pogrom and the Nigeria-
Biafra civil war halted every plan in the project. 
After the war in 1970 attempts to meaningfully 
combat the erosion problem were resumed but 
in a manner that grossly underestimated the 
magnitude of the menace. In 1974, the Federal 
Government awarded a multi-million naira con-
tract to an Italian firm, Technosynesis S.P.A. to 
study the erosion phenomenon in Nigeria, pro-
duce a soil erosion map of the country, and sug-
gest a battery of measures required to check 
erosion in each of gully erosion zones (Eze Uzoa-
maka et. al 1979; Niger-Techno 1978). Unfor-
tunately, the execution of the suggestions was 
inadequate and too half-hearted, and the gul-
lies kept expanding. Also in November 1983, the 
President of Nigeria awarded an interim contract 
for the construction of drainage channels with 
 Loss of human life
Loss of farms
Loss of houses
Loss of livestock
Loss of forests
Loss of pasture
Displacement of populations to 
other areas
Establishment of  badlands
Loss of fertility
19.4
72.2
58.3
33.3
59.7
47.2
56.9 
59.7
65.3
59.7
23.6
27.8
44.4
27.8
41.7
26.4 
29.2
18.1
19.4
4.2
27.8
20.8
12.5
11.1
16.7 
11.1
16.7
Table 1: Impacts of gully erosion in the last ten years (2000-2009) in the study area (%) (Source: Author)
Impacts of erosion      Increasing      Decreasing             The same 
a promise to design and award a contract for a 
comprehensive management of the menace on 
his return to Lagos, the then capital of Nigeria. 
However, the military coup in late 1983 led to the 
abandonment of the project. Consequently, the 
rating of the overall government efforts stands 
at below 40 per cent by the inhabitants of the 
area. Between 1983 and 1999, when Nigeria was 
under military rule, all governments at the State 
and Federal levels showed little or no interest in 
combating the erosion menace. The people were 
left to suffer their fate with the continued loss of 
their land and houses. The reversion to democ-
racy once again enabled the people in the area 
to make serious and vociferous petitions to the 
Federal and State governments through their lo-
cal government representatives. The continued 
cries of the people have recently elicited reac-
tions from the Federal government through the 
Federal Ministry of the Environment (FMEN). 
Following the exceptional floods in 2009, the 
Governor of Anambra State ordered the release 
of N 30 million to the people of Agulu, Nanka, 
Oko, and Ekwulobia for the construction of anti-
erosion structures and rehabilitation of affected 
persons (ANSG Bulletin, 2009). In the same year, 
pressures from the governors and members of 
the federal legislative houses in the five south-
eastern states ravaged by the gully erosion asked 
the Federal Ministry of the Environment to dis-
patch a study team to assess the cost of control-
ling the erosion. The team produced a cost sched-
ule of N 24 million (Ashekoya 2009). It should 
be noted that the respondents said that they had 
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never been incorporated into the gully expansion 
control plans of the government. Unfortunately, 
and despite these efforts, there is still no act or law 
in Nigeria targeted specifically at the management 
of soil erosion. In some of the existing laws and 
policies, soil erosion is treated as an integral com-
ponent of environmental problems despite the fact 
that it has now assumed alarming proportions, es-
pecially in the south-eastern parts of Nigeria. 
Measures of the population to prevent and 
manage the menace
For over thirty years, the people have been left to 
battle the menace practically on their own. They 
have, in the intervening period from 1983-1998, 
been on their own except when the governors of 
Anambra State (where the menace occur) visited 
to console them when lives and/or properties are 
lost. The findings of this study from fieldwork 
on the situation in the study area agreed with 
the postulations of Hunter (2005) who said that 
most rural dwellers are not aware of the disasters 
about to befall them because they do not expect 
such disasters. Even when they expect a disaster, 
they underestimate the consequences. Further-
more, when they understand the consequences 
of disasters they resign themselves to accepting 
the losses. The methods employed by the villag-
ers in response to the gully erosion menace are 
shown in order of importance in table 2. 
 
Planting of cover crops/carpet grasses 
Construction of drainage channels 
Afforestation
Contour planting of crops
Use of sumps
Construction of sand banks
Control of bush burning
Multiple cropping
Zoning/controlling of use of pasture
Mulching
Use of crop rotation
80.6
77.8
70.0
48.6
41.7
40.3
30.6
15.3
15.3
12.5
 6.9
Table 2: Measures to prevent/ manage erosion in the last ten years in the study area (%) (Source: Author)
Measures used by villagers to prevent/manage erosion          Proportion of responses (%) 
In addition, 70.8 per cent of the inhabitants 
stated that the community helps victims to re-
build houses, mainly through the supply of free 
human labour. Another 48.6 per cent of the re-
spondents said that the inhabitant-victims are 
helped out through donation of relief materials, 
while 37.5 per cent of inhabitants said that the 
community gives money to victims to help them 
weather the impacts of the menace. In consider-
ing victims’ responses to disasters, it should be 
noted that Bell (2000) added that victims may 
in some cases understand the mechanism of the 
disaster and obviate it; anticipate and obviate the 
disaster by preventive land use planning and land 
use; or resort to pre-and post disaster risk man-
agement strategies or move away from disaster-
prone zones. In the study area, about 81 per cent 
of respondents have people in their households 
who have migrated because of the erosion in the 
last ten years, while another 85 per cent of re-
spondents know people who have moved out of 
their village in the past ten years because of the 
menace. Findings from the study show that the 
displaced persons migrate permanently and are 
not able to return to their lost houses and lands 
which have been “swallowed” by the gullies. The 
area where the people live in is separated from 
the badlands by a scarp which has a mean height 
of 22 metres. The impact of the gully erosion on 
the population is appraised using regression anal-
ysis. Table 3 shows the results of the regression 
analysis.
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From the results of the regression analysis, it can 
be seen that loss of houses (0.588), displacement 
of populations (0.630), loss of farmlands (0.424) 
and loss of forests (1.804) have been significantly 
influenced by the gully erosion. For instance, the 
regression results show that any unit increase in 
the occurrence of the erosion results in a cor-
responding 1.804 increase in the loss of forest 
cover if all other variables are constant. These 
four variables significantly influenced by the men-
ace are central to the existence and livelihoods of 
the people because once they are affected the 
erosion victims usually have nothing else to fall 
back on. The situation is made worse because of 
the palpable pressure of population on land in 
an area that has a mean population density of 
950 – 1200 persons/km2. Land in the area also 
constitutes a cultural, economic, and socio-reli-
gious identity as a status symbol and as a means 
of providing food. Even though the menace has 
been increasing in intensity and occurrence, the 
vulnerability of the population in certain aspects 
of their existence has been reduced. For instance, 
the regression results show that there has been 
reduction in loss of life, loss of livestock, and loss 
of soil fertility. This reduction in vulnerability may 
be due to the enlightenment and consequent 
change of the perception of the menace by the 
population, and their responses to the menace, 
as shown in figure 1.
With regard to combating and managing the 
menace, about 45.8 per cent of the respondents 
stated that their local measures have contributed 
to a great extent to mitigating the impacts of the 
erosion. Results show that 44.4 per cent of re-
spondents are of the view that their local meas-
ures have contributed to a small extent in mitigat-
ing the menace, while 9.7 per cent of respondents 
stated that their local measures have contributed 
in no significant way to mitigating the menace. 
The local measures include use of near perpetual 
vegetation cover over the soils; use of storm-wa-
ter taps to check devastating runoff which incises 
the land surface; harvesting and underground 
storage of water; use of drainage channels and 
sumps which take surface water into the substra-
ta below the surface. The difference in percep-
tions of these groups of respondents arises from 
the halt in gully expansion in some areas, the 
continued expansion of the gully heads in other 
areas, and the frustration of people forced to live 
away from their ancestral birthplaces. Some of 
the adjustment measures show that earlier vic-
tims-migrants, according to our respondents, also 
bring over displaced relatives to live with them 
in their places of destination (33.3% of respond-
ents), send money to victims (22.2% of respond-
ents), send building materials for rehabilitation of 
damaged houses or building of new houses to re-
place lost ones (20% of respondents), send food 
to victims (19.4% of respondents), and donate 
relief materials in times of occurrence of disaster 
(16.7% of respondents).
Modelling the Agulu-Nanka Situation
Based on the literature, the history of the area 
and the findings of this study, the authors cre-
ated a man-environment interaction model that 
 
Table 3: Regression analysis of the impact of erosion on the population of the area (Source: Author)
Impacts of erosion               Regression coefficients 
Loss of life                                         
Loss of houses                                    
Loss of farmland                               
Loss of livestock                                
Loss of forest                                       
Displacement of populations          
Damage of road                                   
Loss of soil fertility                           
Creation of badlands                        
-0.297
0.588**
0.424**
-1.056
1.804**
0.630**
0.031
-0.238
0.202
** significance at 0.05 confidence level.
79
explains the situation in the study area, as shown 
in figure 1. The issue of environmental damage 
is viewed in degrees of damage and scale from 
(none) no damage, at least at the outset when the 
damage has not manifested itself; (slight) at the in-
cipient stage of the damage, through to moderate, 
until it reaches the severe stage where the damage 
reaches disaster proportions requiring prohibitive 
costs and efforts for it to be mitigated; costs which 
governments are unwilling to provide. This is the 
tipping point when the irreversibility of the disaster 
causes the inhabitants of the affected regions to 
migrate. The Agulu area appears to be adequately 
explained by its model which was derived from a 
modification of the Department for International 
Development (DFID 1999) Sustainable Livelihoods 
model as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Agulu-Nanka Environmental Sustainability Disaster-Response-Model (Source: Author)
In some cases, victims of the disaster may ac-
cept losses, especially if they have nowhere to 
go or the disaster abates and will be repeated 
after some years. In the case of the gully ero-
sion in Agulu-Nanka, the inhabitants of the area 
are forced to migrate to other places as the gul-
lies expand and “swallow” their buildings and 
farmlands. From the model, it can be seen that: 
(a) The people living in Agulu and its environs are 
not wealthy, despite the deception that a certain 
number of houses belonging to wealthy people 
exist. They survive mostly through primary eco-
nomic activities (b) The area was negatively af-
fected by bad and misguided land use practices 
(c) The ugly consequences of today resulted from 
about 160 years of deliberate abuse of the bio-
system through initial ignorance and poor land 
management. Between 1930 and 1950 the crea-
tion of environmental refugees had started, as 
evidenced by Chief John Okoye during the field 
survey at Isiama Igbo village, Agulu in November 
2009. A year ago, Umudu (2008) wrote about 
the sacking of families by the gully erosion at Oko 
and Nanka. The disaster has assumed gargantu-
an proportions due to the very large amount of 
money estimated for the restoration of the land-
soil complex in the area.
Suggestions for enabling the people to cope with 
the gully erosion menace
The gully expansion in Agulu community still re-
mains a living disaster. The situation remains des-
perate. Some 1,100 km2 of what was once good 
agricultural and inhabited land has been lost, and 
more will be lost if the menace is not controlled. 
Of course, further loss of land will translate to 
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further population displacement and creation of 
more environmental refugees. The situation calls 
for urgent, dedicated, and appropriate measures 
of response. Two main measures present them-
selves for consideration; arresting the menace 
and cushioning the sufferings of the victims.
Arresting the menace of gully expansion
The arrest of gully expansion involves the adop-
tion of restorative actions and processes as was 
successfully applied in the Tennessee Valley in 
the United States of America between 1933 and 
1940. The project would involve slope height 
reduction below the natural angle of repose for 
the soils of the study area. Surface runoff would 
have to be conducted into the main channel of 
the Aghomili river, thence to the Ezu river. Fillings 
will have to be done and the land rehabilitated 
by re-forestation. It is expected that if there are 
not any problems, the area can fully recover after 
about 15 to 40 years. The area should be desig-
nated a forest/game reserve. The water issuing 
from the area will then be exploited as a water 
supply, processed, and distributed to rural settle-
ments in the Awka (the environs). To help reduce 
the problem caused by groundwater, the exces-
sive groundwater reserve should be tapped and 
used by the people (Eze Uzoamaka et al. 1979).
Cushioning the effects on the population
Section 20 of the Nigerian Federal constitution 
of 1999 provides that the state shall protect and 
improve the environment, and safeguard the wa-
ter, air, land, and wildlife of Nigeria. This section 
has however been declared non-justiciable by the 
courts of Nigeria, thus preventing persons who 
are injured by the refusal or negligence of the 
government to care for the environment to sue 
for and/ or apply for compensation from the gov-
ernment at any level. The deceit in this provision 
has been condemned by some authors (Mozie 
2010). As futile as this situation is, political 
platforms could be used to cause the State and 
Federal Governments to consider implementing 
some palliative measures to tackle the gully ero-
sion menace. The steps to be taken would involve 
a coordinated battery of activities starting from 
a census of displaced persons, and establishing 
the degree of compensation to be awarded. They 
should be compensated for their losses with an 
agreed sum that is enough to replace their pre-
vious abode or build a simple three-bedroom 
bungalow. The people yet to be affected would 
also be compensated because the slope height 
reduction and channel construction must affect 
them. They would, however, become beneficiar-
ies of their lands, which would become a forest/
game reserve, as guides, workers or restaura-
teurs when business in the reserve takes off. As a 
last measure, property owners in the study area 
would be encouraged to take up insurance cover 
for themselves, family members, and properties. 
In all these areas, the traditional institutions, such 
as chiefs and town unions, must be brought into 
the team. 
It is also recommended that participatory in-
puts of the inhabitants be used by government 
and the population at risk in implementation of 
the above measures. Government should as a 
matter of urgency enact laws and implement pro-
grammes specifically directed at solving erosion-
related problems. Furthermore, the population 
should be educated on the sustainable use of 
their natural resources/capital in order to mini-
mize stress on the environment. 
Conclusion
From the discourse above, the following conclu-
sions are made:
(a) Over the years, gully erosion has contribut-
ed to loss of life, loss of property, and displace-
ment of population (environmental refugees). As 
a matter of fact, the erosion sites are gradually 
being converted into “tourist centres” even as 
the inhabitants are gradually being pushed out 
of their abodes and denied their primary source 
of livelihood. (b) There exists no protection insti-
tuted by government for victims of the problem. 
The affected population are left to cope with and 
manage the disaster on their own. (c) No laws ex-
ist to address soil erosion, which various govern-
ments have acknowledged as a disaster affecting 
almost all parts of the country. (d) There is no 
connection between the efforts of government 
and the efforts of the communities in manag-
ing the menace, resulting in the impression that 
nothing has been done at all to manage the prob-
lems. (e) The use of participatory approaches in 
tackling the menace remains the best solution for 
the protection of both the environment and the 
population at risk.
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Future work by the government in addressing 
these issues may be facilitated by international 
agencies. For example, in December 2010, the 
Anambra State Governor, Mr. Peter Obi, took 
representatives of UNEP to the gully erosion zone 
on an inspection tour. Afterwards, UNEP expert 
said that the UNEP would assist the Anambra 
State Government in controlling the gully expan-
sion and rehabilitating the badlands (www.thena-
tiononlineng.net. 15 December 2010).
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Section Two
Improving International law and  
Regional Cooperation on Migration 
to Enhance Development and Climate 
Change Adaptation: Selected Case  
Studies
Regional Labour Migration as Adapta-
tion to Climate Change: Options in the 
Pacific
Fanny Thornton 
Abstract
Challenges to the Pacific Islands’ long-term sus-
tainability as habitable places under climatic 
changes are manifold, and the portrayal of some 
of them as ‘sinking islands’ has stimulated debate 
about the worst implications of climate change. 
In particular, climate change is now increasing-
ly recognized as contributing to vulnerabilities 
that could generate migration and displacement 
in the region. This paper seeks to contribute to 
the emerging discourse on migration as adapta-
tion to climate change by analysing opportuni-
ties for both temporary and permanent labour 
migration within the South Pacific region in this 
context. The paper will briefly outline both the 
particular climate change induced vulnerabilities 
faced by many of the region’s island nations, and 
the islands’ history of voluntary as well as forced 
migration, especially in relation to livelihood and 
resource threats. It will then give an outline of 
current labour migration arrangements with 
metropolitan neighbours, New Zealand and Aus-
tralia, and analyse how these may or may not be 
relevant in the regional climate change context. 
Although acknowledging that labour migration 
as a response to climate change threats is not a 
panacea, the paper concludes by recommending 
frameworks that will enhance such migration in 
the region for the benefit of all stakeholders.
Key-words: Climate change migration, Pacific, 
New Zealand, Australia, Labour migration
"...rapid sea-level rise that inundates island and 
coastal settlements is likely to limit adaptation 
possibilities, with potential options being limited 
to migration." (Parry et al. 2007: 733)
Introduction
Both permanent and temporary (or circular) mi-
gration have become defining features of the 
modern age (Allegro 2006: 6, 10). They impact 
significantly on the flow of capital, services and 
ideas and often benefit not only receiving des-
tinations, frequently unable to supply internally 
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both the quantity and quality of required labour, 
especially as populations age, but also sending 
countries, who can benefit in terms of growth 
or development (Reddy et al. 2004). Where so-
cio-economic opportunities are scarce or threat-
ened, migration has acted as an important tool 
to reduce human vulnerability. Climate change 
is now increasingly recognized as contributing to 
vulnerabilities that can generate migration (e.g. 
Warner et al. 2009). In this context, however, the 
fact that migration presents an important coping 
strategy that may also assist affected communi-
ties to adapt to at least some of the impacts of 
climate change has been recognized. Barnett and 
Webber (2009: 22f), for example, have pointed 
out that migration away from affected areas can 
act to reduce per capita demand on what may 
become increasingly scarce resources, that remit-
tances returned by migrants to their home re-
gions can increase adaptive capacity there, and 
that returning migrants may also act as agents of 
positive change and sources of valuable informa-
tion.
This paper, then, seeks to contribute to the 
emerging discourse on migration as adapta-
tion to climate change by analysing opportuni-
ties for both temporary and permanent labour 
migration within the South Pacific region in this 
context. The paper will briefly outline both the 
particular climate change induced vulnerabilities 
faced by many of the region’s island nations, 
and the islands’ history of voluntary as well as 
forced migration, especially in relation to liveli-
hood and resource threats. It will then give an 
outline of current labour migration arrangements 
with metropolitan neighbours, New Zealand and 
Australia, and analyse how these may or may not be 
relevant in the regional climate change context. 
The paper will conclude by recommending im-
proved regional labour migration frameworks to 
facilitate climate change adaptation, discuss their 
broader relevance, but also highlight the inherent 
shortcomings of a labour migration approach.
Climate Change Impacts and the Pacific Islands
In the climate change displacement literature, 
the small island states of the South Pacific have 
received much attention. The portrayal of some 
of them as ‘sinking islands’ has stimulated debate 
about the worst implications of climate change, 
with at least the very low-lying island nations 
now regularly cited as facing the prospect of 
complete elimination and the relocation of their 
entire po pulation (e.g. Corlett 2008: 7, 42). This 
is an image that several of the islands themselves 
have also propagated with some vigour (Chin 
2008). Challenges to their long-term sustainabil-
ity as habitable places facing climatic changes are 
indeed manifold and many already have long-
standing environmental problems making them 
particularly vulnerable. Such vulnerabilities in-
clude: a) high population density, which increases 
vulnerability to single-event, localized disasters; 
b) water reserves that, especially on the atolls, 
are limited to shallow subterranean freshwater 
lenses which get contaminated with salt water or 
waste easily and whose replenishment is highly 
dependent on rainfall patterns, all of which chal-
lenge food production and potable water supply; 
c) high rates of coastal erosion, coastal develop-
ment and pollution, which also impact fragile reef 
and mangrove ecosystems, as well as artisanal 
fisheries (Gillespie 2003-04; Barnett and Adger 
2003).
Even drastic mitigation efforts will not pre-
vent small islands in the South Pacific from suf-
fering some impacts from global warming as a 
result of greenhouse gases already emitted. The 
main problem is a rise in mean annual temper-
atures, which may cause a sea level rise due to 
thermal expansion of the oceans and melting of 
the icecaps. The IPCC estimates of global average 
sea-level rise by the end of the 21st century range 
between 0.18 and 0.59 metres (Solomon et al. 
2007: 695). What is certain is that sea levels rose 
by 1.8 mm per year between 1961 and 2003, 
this increased to an average of 3.3 mm per year 
rise (almost doubling) between 1993 and 2003 
(Spratt and Sutton 2008: 33). However, scientists 
(Rahmstorff et al. 2007) are concerned that ac-
celerated melting of the polar ice sheets and other 
global warming-related factors could cause even 
more substantial sea level rise, resulting in major 
changes to coastlines and inundation of low-lying 
areas, with the greatest effect in low-lying del-
tas and low-lying islands such as those in the Pa-
cific. Pacific Island coastlines will almost certainly 
suffer from accelerated erosion, as well as an 
invasion of settlements and arable land with as-
sociated social and economic consequences. Sea 
level rise will also compound existing threats to 
freshwater supplies in the islands due to salt water 
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intrusion. Coupled with an expected modest de-
cline in annual precipitation in the region (Lal et 
al. 2002), this could lead to loss of soil fertility 
and shorter growing seasons, impacting food 
supply and economic activity around agriculture. 
Additionally, increasing extreme events in the 
area, such as tropical cyclones, are predicted to 
have huge impacts on agriculture, forest cover, 
biodiversity, and habitats, particularly as adapta-
tion responses on small islands are expected to be 
limited and impacts of storms may be cumulative. 
Finally, climate change is projected to lead to a re-
gional increase in diseases borne by insects, food, 
and water. These would include malaria, dengue 
fever, diarrhoea, heat stress, skin diseases, acute 
respiratory infection, asthma and other illnesses 
(including mental) (Mimura et al. 2007: 689f). An 
increase in cyclones, flooding, and storm surges 
could also affect incidences of injury, drowning, 
and malnutrition, as well as the functioning of 
health delivery systems.
Although even the lowest islands in the re-
gion may not be in imminent danger of com-
plete inundation, human vulnerability to climate 
change impacts in these places should not be 
doubted. Migration in this context will have to be 
an important strategy to cope with environmen-
tal change and to act as a buffer against resulting 
socio-economic vulnerabilities.
Regional Migration Patterns 
Patterns of migration have historically been an 
important feature in the area (e.g. Lieber 1977; 
Moore and Smith 1995). In many of the larger 
Melanesian islands (e.g. Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu) this has tend-
ed to be internal, from rural to urban centres. 
Alongside this, there has been some redistribu-
tion within rural areas, if possible, given custom-
ary land ownership patterns and traditional ri-
valries. Population pressures and climate change 
impacts will probably increase the necessity for 
international migration in future. However, these 
countries tend to have few existing migration 
opportunities with metropolitan neighbours, re-
sulting in limited diasporic communities. Reset-
tlement efforts from the coral atolls comprising 
the Carteret Islands (PNG) have gained some 
notoriety in the climate change displacement dis-
course. What is certain is that permanent habita-
tion on these atolls has become increasingly dif-
ficult on account of population growth and salt 
water intrusion. Internal resettlement efforts to 
the larger island of Bougainville (PNG) are there-
fore under way (Stewart 2007). Melanesian Fiji 
and New Caledonia also evidence strong migra-
tion to towns and cities, putting pressure on la-
bour markets and ecosystems there. However, 
the two also have prominent opportunities for 
international migration: residence rights exist for 
the former in France, a result of colonial ties, and 
there has been significant movement of Fijians to 
both New Zealand and Australia for some time. 
Furthermore, Fiji has a record of being a desti-
nation for resettlement from other parts of the 
Pacific (note, for example, the relocation of Ba-
nabans to the Fijian island of Rabi after World 
War II, following the destruction of much of their 
home island by phosphate mining. Of note also is 
the purchase of the Fijian island of Kioa by Tuval-
uans from Vaitupu in the 1940s, facilitated by the 
assistance of colonial administrators interested in 
relieving population pressures).
The islands of Polynesia have long-standing 
diasporas settled in New Zealand, Australia, and 
the U.S.. To give a prominent example, 92 per 
cent of Niueans now live in Australia and New 
Zealand (Crocombe 2001: 66). Seven of the ten 
Polynesian jurisdictions are either territories of 
another country (e.g. American Samoa) or are 
self-governing but with full access to a former co-
lonial power (e.g. the Cook Islands and Niue with 
New Zealand). The remaining three (Tonga, Tu-
valu and Samoa) are independent countries but 
maintain historically strong ties, particularly with 
New Zealand, but also with Australia and the 
United States. Migration that is relatively easily 
facilitated by these arrangements has, in recent 
decades, contributed significantly to develop-
ment in the sending countries, largely through re-
mittances (Connell and Conway 2000). At times, 
these ties have also facilitated resettlement fol-
lowing a natural disaster. For example, after Hur-
ricane Heta destroyed much of Niue’s infrastruc-
ture and many of its communities, New Zealand 
offered to resettle the entire population remain-
ing on the island, effectively proposing abandon-
ment of the island (Bedford et al. 2006). How- 
ever, the Niuean Government chose to rebuild 
with the assistance of aid. Some islanders re-
turned to assist with reconstruction and, by 
the last census in 2006, residents on the island 
numbered at least the same as before the storm 
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(Bedford et al. 2006). This is, in large part, a re-
flection of the importance of return migration 
and islander attachment to their homelands, 
also reflected in islander attitudes in the climate 
change context, where they have repeatedly 
stressed that actions must be taken to allow them 
to remain (European Parliament 2009).
Micronesia, finally, contains many fragile 
atoll and reef islands (e.g. in Kiribati and Mar-
shall Islands) and countries in this sub-region are 
marked by high levels of urban populations facing 
great pressures regarding sea level rise and fresh-
water supply. Similarly to Polynesia, inhabitants 
of many of the islands are able to move to Pacific 
Rim countries (especially the U.S.) due to historic 
ties, though this is not an option for fragile at-
oll nations of Kiribati and Nauru. In the past, the 
fragility of these islands was recognized by co-
lonial administrators, who resettled communities 
amongst the islands for reasons which included 
severe drought (Federated States of Micronesia) 
and population pressures (Kiribati) (Lieber 1977). 
Resettlement was sometimes forced: Banaba is-
land, for example, (interestingly, the only island 
not a low-lying coral atoll in Kiribati), was once 
a source of phosphate. Mining of this by outsid-
ers meant that, eventually, 90 per cent of the is-
land became uninhabitable. After World War II, 
British authorities resettled the population to the 
Fijian island of Rabi, which raised, and continues 
to raise, many important issues of concern for 
potential climate change related resettlement in 
the region: problems with land rights, citizenship, 
destruction of homeland, financial hardship, and 
loss of culture, identity and language.
Climate change will impact the region’s is-
lands differently and add to pre-existing environ-
mental and other risk factors. Many, if not most, 
of the islands will certainly permit continued 
habitation for some time, though significant ad-
justments to food supply, housing, water supply, 
and infrastructure may have to be made. There 
is little doubt that climate change will also add 
to push factors that lead to migration, whether 
internally or externally. The role of labour migra-
tion policies in neighbouring New Zealand and 
Australia in facilitating necessary migration will 
be explored in the following sections. In doing 
so, particular attention will be paid to the co-
development dimension contained in the various 
schemes explored, which it is argued are relevant 
in the climate change adaptation context.
Labour Migration Opportunities with New  
Zealand
The Pacific Island population is the largest immi-
grant minority population in New Zealand (Stahl 
and Appleyard 2007: 21). Approximately 232,000 
persons of Pacific Island descent were living in 
New Zealand at the time of the 2001 Census, 
comprising 6.5 per cent of the total population 
(Stahl and Appleyard 2007: 21). Though New 
Zealand, like most developed countries, favours 
migrants with high levels of skills and qualifica-
tions, since the 1970s, successive governments 
have recognized the importance of short-term 
labour migration from the islands (amongst other 
places) in addressing the problem of seasonal la-
bour shortages, especially in the horticulture and 
viticulture sectors.  In 2007, the Recognized Sea-
sonal Employer (RSE) scheme, permitting tempo-
rary labour migration from several of the Pacific 
Islands, became the latest, and most ambitious, 
of such initiatives. It stands out particularly as a 
genuine attempt to develop policy which would 
benefit migrants, their country of origin, as well 
as the destination country (Ramasamy et al. 
2008: 171). The foreign minister at the time, Win-
ston Peters (2006), highlighted the development 
component as such:
First and foremost, it will help alleviate po-
verty directly by providing jobs for rural and outer 
island workers who often lack income-generating 
work. The earnings they send home will support 
families, help pay for education and health, and 
sometimes provide capital for those wanting to 
start a small business.
Following extensive consultation with island 
partners, the policy was launched in April 2007 
and now allows up to 8,000 seasonal work-
ers to come to New Zealand for a maximum of 
seven months per eleven-month period, though 
employers can request the same workers to re-
turn for more than one season. All Pacific Island 
countries are eligible to participate; however, 
Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu 
were selected for special, expedited trial status 
(‘kick-start’ states) in the initial stages (as was 
Fiji, whose participation was withdrawn follow-
ing political turmoil). Under the scheme, New 
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Zealand employers in the horticulture and viticul-
ture industries can apply to become RSEs, then 
apply for an Agreement to Recruit (AtR) island 
workers. An island worker with an employment 
offer linked to an AtR can then apply for a sea-
sonal work visa, the granting of which depends 
on supplying a passport, successful screening 
for tuberculosis, a medical evaluation, police 
clearance, and showing a return air ticket, half 
of which the sponsoring RSE pays for. Workers 
then attend pre-departure orientations, which 
cover issues such as taxation, insurance, remit-
ting, climate variability and appropriate clothing, 
as well as emergency contact information. Work-
ers are also reminded about the implications of 
overstaying and that they carry responsibility for 
the continued success of the scheme. Employers 
in New Zealand become accredited for participa-
tion in the scheme by meeting several criteria: 
they must be able to pay workers the minimum 
wage for at least 30 hours per week and provide 
accommodation, food, transport, and pastoral 
care (e.g. opportunity for religious observance) 
as specified. Implementation of the RSE scheme 
varies between countries, with the terms for each 
set out in inter-agency understandings (IAUs), 
usually between the New Zealand Department of 
Labour and the respective ministry of labour on 
the island. IAUs, for example, set the minimum 
age of employment and agree on the recruitment 
process. Recruitment takes place either through a 
pre-screened pool supplied by the relevant island 
ministry (often with the assistance of local offic-
ers, as well as church and community leaders), or 
New Zealand employers can recruit on the islands 
directly but must inform the relevant island min-
istry.
In the first full season (2007/08) of the RSE 
scheme, 126 participating employers saw 2883 
overseas workers arrive, of whom 83 per cent 
came from the five Pacific ‘kick-start’ states, the 
bulk from Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu (Depart-
ment of Labour 2009: 4). A 2009 New Zealand 
Department of Labour study states that most 
workers felt they benefitted by returning home 
with savings, as well as by gaining valuable work 
and language skills (Department of Labour 2009: 
5). The success of the RSE policy was also evi-
denced by the number of skilled workers who re-
turned for a subsequent season, with the study 
showing about 55 per cent of RSE workers from 
the Pacific who worked during the 2007/08 sea-
son returning for the 2008/09 season, most to 
one of their previous employers (Department 
of Labour 2009: 5). Immigration risks were suc-
cessfully managed, with less than one per cent 
of overstayers among the RSE workers who were 
in New Zealand between April 2007 and January 
2009 (Department of Labour 2009: 5).
Nevertheless, the report also highlights that 
although the RSE scheme was designed as a win-
win-win programme, the first season saw the 
biggest benefits for New Zealand-based employ-
ers (Department of Labour 2009: 9). Although 
Pacific workers and states benefitted via remit-
tance incomes, the extent to which these have 
been used for development outcomes, an impor-
tant pillar of the scheme, remains unclear (Ra-
masamy et al. 2008). Maclellan (2008: 2) further 
highlights the need to connect such schemes to 
broader development assistance by maximizing 
the outcomes of increased remittance flows into 
Pacific villages and rural communities, which he 
does not see being done in a coordinated fash-
ion. He also points out that almost 20 per cent 
of workers in the first year of the programme 
came from Asia, undermining the stated purpose 
of development for Pacific neighbours (Maclellan 
2008: 4). If migration was to aid the development 
of adaptive capacity to climate change in regional 
island nations, then the development component 
of the RSE scheme will probably have to be em-
ployed with greater care.
In addition to temporary and circular labour 
migration channels, the New Zealand Govern-
ment also encourages limited permanent labour-
linked migration from the islands (note, for exam-
ple, the Samoa Quota Scheme). Most recently, 
in 2002, it created the Pacific Access Category 
(PAC), which permits small quotas of citizens 
from Tuvalu (75), Kiribati (75) and Tonga (250) to 
permanently migrate to New Zealand (Fiji’s par-
ticipation was suspended in 2006 for the above-
cited reason). It is sometimes mistakenly cited 
(e.g. by Friends of the Earth 2006: 6) as a bilateral 
agreement concerning formal migration for so-
called ‘climate refugees’. Although pertaining to 
migration from island nations threatened signifi-
cantly by sea level rise and other climate change 
impacts, and although the New Zealand Govern-
ment acknowledged that it will ‘provide some 
certainty for these countries’ (Gosche 2001), 
the scheme does not formally present a climate 
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change displacement approach. Applicants must 
meet character, health, and age stipulations, have 
basic English language skills, as well as a job offer. 
These requirements are so stringent that less than 
30 per cent of places allocated to Tuvalu (with an 
annual quota of just 75) were filled in the early 
stages (Anonymous 2004; note that some adjust-
ments were made to address this in 2005 (Stahl 
and Appleyard 2007: 30f)).
New Zealand, then, has significant and long-
standing channels permitting labour-related mi-
gration from many of the Pacific Islands. It has 
also stressed ‘that current climate change efforts 
in the Pacific should continue to focus on adapta-
tion, and should be underpinned by the desire of 
Pacific peoples to continue to live in their own 
country’ (New Zealand Government; in McAdam 
2010: 19). The continued facilitation of labour 
migration could very well become an increasingly 
important tool to facilitate this.
Labour Migration Opportunities with Australia
Australia’s position concerning climate change 
displacement in the Pacific was once cynically 
expressed by Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics Executive Director, Dr 
Fisher, who stated that an evacuation of small 
island states might be more efficient than forc-
ing industrialized countries to cut greenhouse 
gas emissions (in Edwards 1999: 318). In a 2006 
pre-election discussion paper, Our Drowning 
Neighbours, the Australian Labour Party, though 
guilty of dramatizing the issue, indicated an in-
tention to engage more meaningfully with the 
Pacific on climate change in general should it be 
elected. This was to include addressing the ques-
tion of displacement, proposing assistance with 
intra-country evacuations when citizens have to 
be moved from low-lying areas to higher ground 
(Sercombe and Albanese 2006: 9) and the es-
tablishment of an international coalition to ac-
cept climate change refugees when a country 
becomes uninhabitable (Sercombe and Albanese 
2006: 10). However, since forming a government 
in 2007, it has not acted on these suggestions 
(McAdam 2010: 20) and further policy has not 
been developed.
In the meantime, Australia has less substan-
tial labour migration arrangements with the Pa-
cific Islands compared to New Zealand, though 
many islanders consider Australia their ultimate 
destination after migrating to New Zealand 
(eventually reaching Australia from New Zealand 
is facilitated, for example, by the Trans-Tasman 
Travel Arrangement of 1973). However, because 
Australia’s labour migration policy is so firmly fo-
cused on skilled migration and has traditionally 
not favoured specific countries, the low skill le-
vels of many Pacific Islanders have prohibited the 
possibility of direct migration to Australia in most 
cases (Stahl and Appleyard 2007: 39). It is there-
fore unsurprising that, in 2001, Pacific Islanders 
comprised only 0.6 per cent of Australia’s popu-
lation, compared to New Zealand’s 6.5 per cent 
(Stahl and Appleyard 2007: 39).
Australia has, in the past, debated whether 
Pacific Islanders could be granted temporary vi-
sas to engage in seasonal work, especially in the 
rural agricultural sectors (see Mares 2007). Many 
such efforts faltered, with governments repeat-
edly taking a protectionist stance that would 
not permit the arrival of unskilled foreign work-
ers (Mares 2007). However, in 2008, the Labour 
Government announced a three-year trial period 
for the Pacific Seasonal Workers Scheme (PSWS), 
partially in response to significant practices of il-
legal employment in the rural agriculture sector 
(Ball 2010). Like the New Zealand scheme, the 
PSWS has an acknowledged development com-
ponent and is expected to contribute to econom-
ic development in home countries through Pacific 
seasonal workers’ employment experience, re-
mittances, and training (DEEWR 2008: 2). 
Until 2012, 2,500 temporary work visas for 
employment in the Australian horticultural sector 
for up to seven months in each twelve-month pe-
riod will be granted to citizens of Kiribati, Tonga, 
Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea (DEEWR 2010). 
The scheme is largely modelled on New Zealand’s 
RSE scheme and shares many of its features. Al-
though it is too early to comment on the success 
or failure of the scheme, some early indicators 
point to problems. In the first year, just over half 
the visas made available were eventually taken 
up and recruitment under the scheme for 2010 
has been plagued by problems, with businesses 
finding the scheme too expensive in comparison 
to traditional temporary, unskilled labour avenues 
of labour supply (for example, backpackers) (Ra-
dio Australia 2010).  Although, as with the New 
Zealand schemes, there is the potential for the 
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PSWS scheme to eventually address develop-
mental as well as adaptation needs of sending 
countries, the utility of the scheme in that regard 
(and, in fact, its very survival) is somewhat more 
doubtful.
However, in 2007, the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID), the gov-
ernment’s overseas aid agency, began funding 
the Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI), 
which offers 30 I-Kiribati per year the opportu-
nity to train and later work as nurses in Australia 
or elsewhere (AusAID 2010). This corresponds to 
the long-term goals of the Kiribati President, who 
has expressed a desire for skilled migration of his 
people, especially to Australia and New Zealand, 
as a response to climate change risks (McAdam 
and Loughry 2009), favoured particularly as it 
would permit the gradual build-up of communi-
ties and diasporas abroad, which could ease the 
trauma of eventual full resettlement.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The extent to which climatic shifts will influence 
population movement within and from the Pa-
cific Islands will partially depend on the success 
or failure of global efforts to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions. Equally, migration patterns will be im-
pacted both by the ability of affected societies to 
adjust and to use a range of adaptive strategies, 
as well as the willingness of receiving countries to 
accept migrants. The emphasis in this paper has 
been on external migration that assists in reduc-
ing vulnerability and which provides an opportu-
nity to enhance adaptive capacity for Pacific Is-
landers. It is acknowledged that labour migration 
as a response to climate change will not always 
be an adequate approach, especially as climate 
change impacts become more severe in future. 
Nevertheless, it is promising in that it may be pal-
atable to nation states keen to regulate flows of 
migration, and in the process it may also turn af-
fected people into agents of positive change in 
their area of origin.
All the schemes highlighted emphasize a de-
velopment component to Pacific Island migration 
to metropolitan neighbours. Engineering such 
schemes to also assist with climate change adap-
tation needs in Pacific Island countries is to take 
existing schemes only slightly further, at least 
conceptually, though some alteration and en-
hancement of existing programmes would have 
to take place in practice. Measures to consider 
include:
Ensuring maximum uptake:
•  Proactively identify skills and attributes of 
 sending country workers that are in demand 
 in destination labour markets; 
•  Provide opportunities for training and up- 
 skilling of migrants to match destination la- 
 bour market demands.
Decreasing vulnerability:
•  Facilitate labour migration from places most 
vulnerable to climate change;
•  Facilitate the flow of remittances and return 
migration; establish channels that ensure 
these assist with climate change adaptation 
goals;
•  Facilitate recognition that labour migration 
may have a positive influence on adaptive ca-
pacity to climate change in sending countries 
by helping to enhance human, social, and fi-
nancial capital.
 Improved mechanism:
•  Develop appropriate transport links and im-
migration procedures that facilitate migrants’ 
travel to destination labour markets;
•  Establish regional cooperation mechanisms;
•  Establish appropriate governance and regu-
latory systems in both sending and receiving 
countries. This should involve migrants, go-
vernments, unions, employers, aid agencies, 
NGOs, and all other stakeholders.
If such measures are implemented, migration may 
influence positively for some time the quality of 
life for many individuals, families, and communi-
ties, even given some adverse climate change im-
pacts. In other words, it may permit more people 
to stay for longer, whilst facilitating the gradual 
expansion of communities and networks abroad, 
aiding necessary eventual permanent relocation 
and adaptation to a new culture.
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Temporary Labour Migration for  
Victims of Natural Disasters:  
The Colombia-Spain Model
Nicole de Moor
Abstract
Environmental degradation is increasingly caus-
ing large-scale migration. This paper looks into 
international labour migration as a strategy to 
adapt to a changing environment. Facilitating 
legal migration for persons affected by envi-
ronmental degradation can prevent them from 
being forcibly displaced, can reduce their vul-
nerability to future environmental disruptions, 
and can contribute to the development of vul-
nerable communities. This paper analyses how 
environmental migration could be facilitated. It 
does so through a case study of the Colombian 
Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) 
project. Through this innovative migration model, 
based on an agreement between Colombia and 
Spain, Colombians facing recurring natural disas-
ters are offered a livelihood alternative through 
temporary work abroad, while affected zones can 
recuperate. This programme, supported by the 
IOM, illustrates how a European Member State 
can enable vulnerable people to migrate overseas 
by providing labour migration opportunities for 
selected beneficiaries. By supporting migrants 
in maximizing the impact of remittances on the 
recovery of their place of origin, the TCLM pro-
gramme increases their resilience to natural disas-
ters, and offers them an alternative to permanent 
and/or urban migration. The paper discusses the 
normative framework supporting the TCLM pro-
gramme, and identifies some conditions for the 
replication of the programme in other states. The 
potential of the project for both development 
and adaptation to environmental changes is be-
ing considered.
Key-words: Environmental migration, Interna-
tional migration, Temporary migration, Adapta-
tion, Development 
 “Mobility may... contribute to the adaptation of 
people affected by environmental change. Con-
versely, immobility may increase people’s vul-
nerability to environmental pressures.” Annual 
Report UN Population Fund (UNFPA) (Engelman 
2009)
Introduction
The phenomenon of global warming, together 
with the loss of biodiversity, is increasingly caus-
ing large-scale migration. Both slow-onset envi-
ronmental degradation and sudden natural disas-
ters threaten to force millions of people to leave 
their environment. This paper looks into interna-
tional labour migration as a strategy to adapt to 
a changing environment, and to increase the re-
silience of disaster-affected populations. Facilitat-
ing international migration for persons affected 
by environmental degradation can prevent them 
from being forcibly displaced to already over-
populated and environmentally-fragile places 
within their own region. Temporary international 
migration could furthermore act as an alterna-
tive to permanent and rural-urban migration, 
and may mitigate pressure on vulnerable places 
and urban centres. Through earning a livelihood 
abroad, migrants can also reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of their communities of origin, so as to cope 
better with future environmental disruptions. 
Through a case study of TCLM, this paper 
analyses how international migration could be 
facilitated for disaster-affected communities. 
Through this innovative migration model, sup-
ported by IOM, Colombians facing recurring 
natural disasters are offered a livelihood alter-
native through temporary work abroad, while 
affected regions can recuperate. The programme 
illustrates how a European Member State can 
enable environmentally vulnerable people to 
migrate overseas by providing labour migration 
schemes for people coming from the most affect-
ed regions. By supporting migrants in maximizing 
the impact of remittances on the recovery of their 
place of origin, the TCLM programme increases 
their resilience to environmental disruption.
By analysing the TCLM programme, the pa-
per aims to contribute to the discussion on the 
nexus between environmental migration, devel-
opment, and adaptation to environmental dis-
ruptions. In Chapter I, the project therefore will 
be framed within the existing academic debate 
on migration for development and adaptation to 
environmental disruptions. After introducing the 
main features of the TCLM programme in Chap-
ter II, the legal framework supporting the pro-
gramme will be discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion D. Finally, the benefits of the programme for 
both development and adaptation are examined 
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and the conditions for its consolidation and repli-
cation in other states identified.
I. Environmental Migration for Development 
and Adaptation
A. Migration for Development
The interconnection between migration and de-
velopment is rising on global, regional, and na-
tional agendas. Recent decades have shown a 
renewed optimism about the effectiveness of mi-
gration for development (De Haas 2010). While 
not all international migration (e.g. that which 
is forced) is positive, there is an increasing rec-
ognition among scholars and policymakers that 
some forms of international migration can help 
migrants, their families, and their communities 
to improve their living conditions and welfare. 
According to the United Nations Human 
Development Report, international migration can 
contribute greatly to human welfare and devel-
opment (UNDP 2009). Money transferred by 
foreign workers to their native countries provides 
families left behind with livelihood opportunities, 
and contributes to the economic growth of home 
communities. Remittances even exceed interna-
tional development aid (Deprez 2010a; Engelman 
2009)1. In the country of destination, migrants 
furthermore fill gaps in the labour market. Migra-
tion can thus be a tool for development, both in 
regions of origin and of destination. 
In 2007, the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development (GFMD) was initiated by the United 
Nations Member States, in order to enhance the 
international dialogue on the growing importance 
of the migration and development nexus (Martin 
and Abella 2009). Through this government-led 
process, the Member States want to promote le-
gal migration at the global and national level as 
an opportunity for development, rather than as a 
threat (GFMD 2007). During the second GFMD, 
held in Manila in 2008, the governments argued 
for circular migration as a way to strengthen the 
connection migrants have with their country of 
origin (Martin and Abella 2009).
B. Migration as Adaptation Strategy
Aside from a development strategy, migration 
can also be regarded as an adaptation strategy 
for communities affected by environmental dis-
asters.  The GFMD Chair-in-office 2010, Mexico, 
has already called upon United Nations Member 
States to start a dialogue on the connection be-
tween environmental degradation, migration, 
and development (GFMD 2010). The phenom-
enon of global warming, which now poses new 
challenges to migration and development, asks 
for a comprehensive adaptation strategy to help 
and protect vulnerable populations. It is therefore 
advisable to develop a coherent approach linking 
policies on migration, development, and adapta-
tion to a changing environment.
Under certain conditions, environmental mi-
gration can be seen as an adaptation strategy, 
rather than as a failure to adapt to a changing 
environment. Facilitating legal migration for per-
sons affected by environmental degradation is 
both a way to prevent forced displacement and 
the suffering it generates, and a way to relieve 
pressure on vulnerable regions. If migration due 
to climate change is managed effectively, hu-
manitarian crises could be minimized, and con-
flicts avoided. Furthermore, most environmen-
tally affected persons migrate to nearby places 
which are also under environmental, social, and/
or political threats. By targeting existing migra-
tion programmes at populations affected by 
environmental disruption, the most vulnerable 
persons could be enabled to leave their destroyed 
environment, either temporarily or permanently 
(Boncour 2009). Migration might even help to 
slow down the process of environmental degra-
dation, and allow those left behind to adapt their 
livelihood provision. Finally, remittances can help 
home communities to mitigate and/or adapt to 
environmental degradation (Acketoft 2008; Bar-
nett and Webber 2009).
Proactive environmental migration could be 
part of a comprehensive European strategy to-
wards climate change effects, natural disasters 
and other forms of environmental disruption. 
Where people do not have sufficient resources to 
flee from an uninhabitable environment, the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) could enable them to migrate 
by providing legal migration schemes for people 
coming from the most affected regions. Good 
practices of planned environmental migration can 
lead to recommendations for appropriate policy 
responses, or could even serve as an example for 
the elaboration of environmental migration pro-
grammes in the EU. 
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C. Temporary and Circular Migration for Devel-
opment and Adaptation
As discussed earlier, the debate on environmen-
tal migration as an adaptation strategy can be 
situated within the broader debate on the nexus 
between migration and development. There are 
many links between the environment, develop-
ment, and migration. Both sudden and gradual 
environmental changes act as a push-factor for 
migration. Migration is in many cases also trig-
gered by a lack of development, weakening 
the resilience of communities to environmental 
events, which even adds to the migration pres-
sure of vulnerable communities.  
In the present study, the focus will be on 
temporary and circular migration2. By maintain-
ing contact between the migrant and his home 
country, circular migration turns the migrant into 
a protagonist of development. For the country of 
destination, circular migration has the advantage 
of reducing the social and political costs of immi-
gration, as circular migrants return to their coun-
try of origin. Similarly, the latter does not have to 
deal with permanent outmigration, hollowing out 
its economy (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2010; Deprez 
2010b). In this sense, circular migration offers a 
more durable solution for countries severely af-
fected by environmental degradation. Finally, 
circular migration can provide countries of origin 
with financial and social remittances needed to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change effects, and 
reduce the vulnerability of their population (Ack-
etoft 2008). 
II. Temporary and Circular Labour Migration 
Programme
A. Origin of the TCLM Project
During recent decades, Spain often encountered 
a reduced seasonal labour force. Since the 1990s, 
the Unión de Pagesos (UP), the main agricultural 
trade union in the Spanish region of Catalonia, 
has been organizing and supporting the recruit-
ment of foreign seasonal workers in order to re-
spond to its members’ needs. In 2001, the UP 
initiated a TCLM project, facilitating seasonal 
migration from Colombia to Spain, in order to 
solve a shortage in the labour force for harvest-
ing fruit in Catalonia (Magri 2009; IOM 2010). 
The initial UP project offered logistical assistance 
in the recruitment process (selection of the work-
ers, travel arrangements, visa procedure, etc.), 
and supported the workers during their stay in 
Spain, informing them about available facilities 
and services, the host region, the healthcare sys-
tem, and the local culture. What makes UP stand 
out from other trade unions is its focus on co-
development. UP recognizes the potential bene-
fits of migration for development and adaptation 
to climate change. Together with the Fundaciò 
Pagesos Solidaris (FAS)3, its foundation, the UP 
therefore provides training courses for migrants, 
with the aim of creating opportunities and pro-
ductive processes in the country of origin (Engel-
man 2009; Magri 2009). 
Recurring environmental disruptions, togeth-
er with a long-lasting conflict, have displaced 
many Colombians. When in 2006 the Galeras 
volcano in south-west Colombia erupted, the 
TCLM programme, which targets different vul-
nerable communities, was used to provide a mi-
gration opportunity for thousands of affected 
people. This programme allowed them to tempo-
rarily migrate to Spain, where they could earn an 
income in the seasonal harvest. Afterwards, the 
programme was also expanded to rural popula-
tions whose crops and land are particularly vul-
nerable to floods, droughts, and other environ-
mental disruptions. During their working period 
in Spain, the temporary migrants acquired the 
knowledge and skills to diversify their income 
upon their return to Colombia. This way, they 
could reduce their vulnerability to environmental 
disruptions without being forced to permanently 
relocate. Furthermore, their absence allowed the 
recovery of their fragile land (Engelman 2009; 
Irin Humanitarian News and Analysis 2010).
In 2007, IOM joined the TCLM project, with 
the aim of strengthening it and making it replic-
able. IOM also wanted to help certain targeted 
communities to benefit from the programme 
(Magri 2009). Thanks to funding of the European 
Commission’s AENEAS programme4, IOM ex-
panded the initial project, increasing the number 
of beneficiaries and the number of Spanish em-
ployers taking part. The organization also provid-
ed technical assistance to national institutions de-
veloping a migration policy and legislation (IOM 
2010). While the UP had initiated the project as 
an opportunity for economic welfare and devel-
opment, IOM added the perspective of ‘migra-
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tion management’, as required by the AENEAS 
programme (Magri 2009).
B. Goal
The TCLM programme offers Colombian workers 
the possibility to work in Catalonia doing seasonal 
labour for one of the employers associated with 
the UP. The goal of this programme is twofold: 
firstly, it aims at effectively managing seasonal 
labour migration. The programme is an answer to 
Catalonia’s demand for low skilled labour, and is 
meant to legally regulate labour migration flows. 
Secondly, and of greater importance for the pur-
pose of this study, the programme also aims at 
supporting “the generation of wealth in both 
countries” (Magri 2009: 28). In other words, it 
wants to enhance the impact of migration on the 
development of local communities in Colombia 
(IOM 2010). Since the experience of seasonal 
migration can provide skills and resources, mi-
grants could be made “innovators and entrepre-
neurs in their country of origin” (Magri 2009: 
13). This way, the seasonal worker can improve 
not only his social status and personal income, 
but the economic welfare of his home community 
as well. The idea is to provide the migrants with 
temporary residence and work permits in order 
to allow them to earn a living and acquire knowl-
edge and skills, making them more resilient when 
returning to Colombia. As for the beneficiaries 
coming from environmentally affected regions, 
the programme offers a temporary income alter-
native while the affected regions recuperate. Ac-
cording to Koko Warner (UNU-EHS), the TCLM 
programme is “an important source of post-dis-
aster rehabilitation” (Irin Humanitarian News and 
Analysis 2010).
To achieve these ambitious goals, the par-
ticipating workers need to be well prepared 
and guided during the whole migration proc-
ess. Through various training activities the TCLM 
programme prepares migrants to generate eco-
nomic and social development in their region 
of origin. Participating workers are supported 
in the planning, coordination, formulation, and 
management of community projects, and in the 
structuring and follow-up of business plans. They 
are also encouraged to achieve self-sustainability 
through marketing, services or import/export 
activities. Moreover, remittances are channelled 
towards productive initiatives or the purchase of 
goods improving the socio-economic status of 
the community of origin. IOM’s local partners 
are responsible for some of the preparation work 
in the country of origin, such as the selection of 
the migrant workers, and the identification of 
job-generating initiatives. In order to reduce the 
families’ separation distress and assist them to 
earn a livelihood, the migrants’ families receive 
support while their relatives are working abroad 
(Magri 2009).
C. Beneficiaries
Two of the innovative aspects of the TCLM 
programme are the targeted communities in 
the country of origin, and the way of selecting 
beneficiaries. The communities participating in 
the programme are extremely heterogeneous: 
from ex-guerrilla fighters over vulnerable and 
displaced communities and indigenous groups to 
single mothers and people from zones at high risk 
of natural disaster. In 2007, 1519 migrants par-
ticipated in the programme, while 1400 partici-
pated in 2008 (Magri 2009). 
The selection criteria vary slightly from com-
munity to community depending on the local 
partners involved, and the features of the com-
munities. IOM has identified some specific target 
populations, and IOM’s local partners take care 
of the pre-selection of the migrants. In order to 
strengthen the development impact of the pro-
gramme, an important selection criterion is the 
migrant’s community involvement. The loyalty 
and strong links of the workers with their com-
munities of origin is a discouragement to leave 
the TCLM programme (Magri 2009).
Of particular interest for this research are the 
communities selected with the aim of ‘relocating’ 
people from zones at high risk of natural disaster 
(mainly volcanic areas), offering them the op-
portunity to earn a livelihood through the TCLM 
programme.  
As for people affected by environmental dis-
ruptions, the TCLM programme was originally 
conceived to offer a livelihood alternative to fam-
ilies affected by the eruption of the Galeras vol-
cano. As discussed above, the programme later 
was expanded to include other environmentally 
vulnerable communities.
D. Legal Framework
An innovative migration model such as the TCLM 
project, can only work when it is sustained by a 
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solid legal framework, allowing for temporary 
and circular migration. Bilateral agreements be-
tween countries of origin and destination can 
support migration projects, as well as agreements 
signed by the EU with third countries. Obviously, 
strong national migration legislation is a conditio 
sine qua non for any migration programme. After 
briefly discussing a bilateral agreement between 
Spain and Colombia which forms the backdrop to 
Spain’s establishment of the TCLM project, this 
section covers in particular the Spanish proce-
dures and conditions for the migration of third-
country nationals for the purpose of seasonal 
work.
1. Bilateral Agreements such as those between 
Spain and Colombia
In order to manage international migration, Euro-
pean Member States conclude agreements with 
third countries. Besides facilitating the manage-
ment of migration flows, simplifying the selection 
of foreign workers, and establishing rights and 
obligations of migrants, those agreements often 
include measures to fight irregular migration and 
to facilitate the return of irregular migrants. Re-
cent trends in agreements with third countries re-
flect a move away from the traditional migration 
policymaking in the EU, increasingly associating 
migration policy with other policy areas, such as 
development aid and external relations.
In order to regulate migration flows, Spain 
has signed bilateral migration agreements with a 
number of third countries. In 2001, the first ‘re-
cruitment agreement’ was signed with Colombia 
(Agreement Spain-Colombia 2001). Later, agree-
ments followed with, among others, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Morocco, Poland, Senegal, Ecuador, 
and Peru (IOM 2009; Vergé Oms 2010). Most of 
the agreements focus on labour migration: they 
regulate the recruitment process, the issuance of 
residence and work permits, the rights and obli-
gations of foreign workers, and the transfer of en-
titlements acquired in each country (IOM 2009). 
Specific to the agreement with Colombia is that 
this agreement refers to co-development and the 
development impact of migrants’ remittances. 
This provision was suggested by the UP, and has 
not been repeated in any other bilateral agree-
ment between Spain and third countries (Vergé 
Oms 2010). The agreement obliges the parties to 
take measures to encourage the reintegration of 
Colombian migrants, with the migration experi-
ence as a factor of economic, social, and tech-
nological development (IOM 2009). Supported 
by this agreement, the UP later established the 
TCLM programme. 
2. National Migration Law
The national legal basis of the TCLM programme 
is covered by the Ley Orgánica (Organic Law) 
on rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain 
and their social integration (Zapata-Barrero et 
al. 2010).  The procedure for the recruitment of 
foreign workers is covered by the Reglamento de 
Extranjeria (Immigration Rules). This legislation is 
of course subject in turn to European and interna-
tional legislation, and to the bilateral agreements 
signed between Spain and third countries. With 
the exception of some “hard to fill” vacancies, 
Spanish legislation only allows the hiring of non-
resident third-country nationals in accordance 
with a quota system for foreign workers (IOM 
2009). The Spanish Government determines a 
yearly quota of migrant workers who can enter 
the country, considering the economic situation 
and the interests of various stakeholders (Organic 
Law, Article 39; Immigration Rules, Articles 77-
80). The quota, which can be modified through-
out the year, is established for three categories of 
migrant workers: permanent workers, temporary 
workers, and job seekers. 
As for seasonal workers, the Royal Decree 
(2393/2004) enumerates the sectors where mi-
grants can be employed. Seasonal labour migra-
tion is allowed for a maximum period of nine 
months within 12 consecutive months (Royal De-
cree, Article 55). The quota for seasonal workers 
is mainly reserved for those countries that have 
signed a bilateral agreement with Spain, including 
Colombia (Organic Law, Article 42; Immigration 
Rules, Article 55; Magri 2009; IOM 2009). The 
bilateral agreement with Colombia has installed a 
fast track system for seasonal migrants, with the 
support and supervision of IOM Colombia and 
UP. On the basis of the bilateral agreement, Spain 
introduced a temporary visa, the T Visa, valid for 
up to nine months. 
An important feature of the Spanish legisla-
tion is the concept of recruitment in the coun-
try of origin. Workers have to pass selection in 
their country of origin, with priority given to 
states which have signed a bilateral migration 
agreement with Spain (IOM 2009). After verifi-
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cation that no workers already residing in Spain 
are willing to accept a particular job, employers 
can request to employ a foreign worker. In the 
consular offices, foreigners can then subscribe 
to lists showing available vacancies, prepared by 
the Public Service of State Employment (Royal 
Decree, Article 50). Once approved, the em-
ployment contract is signed by the worker in the 
Spanish consulate abroad. Afterwards the worker 
is issued a temporary work visa with which he/
she can enter the Spanish territory (Magri 2009). 
Several requirements have to be met in order 
to issue a residence and work permit. Firstly, a la-
bour market test verifies that the vacancy cannot 
be filled by a Spanish worker, before allowing the 
recruitment of a migrant worker. For seasonal mi-
gration however, no formal labour market test is 
required (IOM 2009). Furthermore, the employer 
must provide adequate accommodation, make 
travel arrangements, and register the migrant 
worker with the Spanish social security system 
(Immigration Rules, Article 56). The worker must 
also agree to return to his country of origin at the 
end of his employment in Spain, and has to go 
to the Spanish consulate within one month of his 
return. Non-compliance could limit his opportu-
nities to work in Spain in the future (Magri 2009). 
Moreover, after two years of seasonal labour in 
Spain, and subsequent returns to the country of 
origin, the migrants benefit from an exception to 
the labour market test (Organic Law, Article 40,k; 
IOM 2009). Compliance with the obligation to 
return can thus lead to being assigned priority for 
permanent employment in Spain.
The Spanish migration legislation allows for 
some flexibility, with the possibility to request an 
extension of the temporary residence permit, of 
up to a maximum of nine months. Furthermore, 
seasonal migrants can work for several employers 
during this time limit of nine months within a pe-
riod of 12 consecutive months (Magri 2009). The 
T visa allows migrant workers to move from one 
employer to another. As the agricultural sector 
requires some flexibility, this is very useful. Some 
harvests require quick shifts of workers, and have 
a temporary character. 
In many European countries, the link between 
migration and development has not been recog-
nized, whereas Spain has introduced the concept 
of co-development into its migration policy.  The 
Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 
(Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration) 
2007-2010 from the Ministry of Work and So-
cial Affairs, “aims at identifying and promoting 
development opportunities for the countries of 
origin while incorporating co-development strat-
egies in the process of integrating migrants” (Ma-
gri 2009: 72-73). The plan emphasizes the impor-
tance of cooperation among local governments 
in the countries of origin and destination, and 
promotes the channelling of remittances towards 
productive initiatives. 
E. Potential for Development and Resilience 
Building
This chapter discusses the potential of the TCLM 
programme for the migrants, the country of des-
tination, and the community of origin. In other 
words, is there a win-win-win outcome for the 
parties involved?
There is a wide agreement that the TCLM 
programme impacts positively on the country 
of destination. The programme fills gaps in the 
Spanish labour market in a flexible way, without 
the country having to accept migrants on a per-
manent basis (Magri 2009; Zapata-Barrero et al. 
2010). Secondly, the circular migration experi-
ence clearly benefits the participating migrants, 
as they are offered the possibility to earn a liveli-
hood abroad, which allows them to send remit-
tances to their families. The impact of the pro-
gramme is even greater if they are able to acquire 
new skills and learn from their experience abroad 
(Magri 2009). These ‘social remittances’ can help 
the beneficiaries to diversify their income upon 
their return home (Engelman 2009). It can even 
help the migrants to increase their resilience to 
environmental disruptions, and it gives them an 
alternative to permanent, urban, and/or forced 
migration. 
A more challenging question however is, 
whether the TCLM programme benefits the mi-
grants’ region of origin. During the absence of 
the migrant workers, environmentally fragile land 
can recover, allowing marketable crops to start 
growing again (Engelman 2009). According to 
Magri, the TCLM project also has the potential 
to generate development in Colombia, mainly 
through income-generating activities creating 
employment opportunities. Due to their strong 
commitment and loyalty to their home commu-
nities, the participants attach great importance 
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to the development impact of the programme. 
Through interviews with participants, it has been 
shown that many of them have plans to start a 
business. Since the TCLM programme in itself is 
insufficient to solve Colombia’s unemployment 
problem, income-generating activities are re-
garded as a tool to generate jobs for the home 
community (Magri 2009). However, as too little 
time has passed since the project was introduced, 
it is not clear yet whether the programme has 
indeed increased the possibility of implementing 
productive initiatives. For the moment, only the 
potential and likelihood of this specific outcome 
can be assessed. 
The co-development goal of the TCLM 
project is supported by the local governments in 
Colombia. Together with social workers and the 
FAS, they assist the workers and their families in 
the channelling of remittances towards produc-
tive initiatives in the region of origin, and help 
them to develop job-generating projects. How-
ever, research has also shown that returned mi-
grants often lack sufficient capital and expertise 
to start their own business. Although their goal 
was to reduce the unemployment and increase 
the resilience of their home communities, most of 
their first Spanish wage payment was used to pay 
off debts, improve their own living conditions, 
and pay for education. Aside from a lack of capi-
tal, returning migrants willing to start a business 
often suffer from a lack of expertise. Even though 
the migrants have learned from their experiences 
in Spain and from the training they have received, 
they still lack the knowledge to deal with bureau-
cratic and technical issues when starting up a 
business. Therefore, it can be recommended to 
provide more professional and technical support 
in developing and implementing business plans in 
order to accomplish the programme’s develop-
ment goal (Magri 2009). 
F. Replicability of the TCLM Programme
The aim of this final section is to examine whe-
ther the TCLM programme could be implement-
ed in other European Member States. As the Eu-
ropean Commission proposes the programme as 
a “good practice” (Magri 2009: 82), it is interest-
ing to investigate the possibility of copying this 
model, taking national specificities into consid-
eration. In addition, since the TCLM programme 
has been designed to tackle some of the concerns 
that have been raised about temporary and circu-
lar migration programmes, certain features of the 
project should be taken into account for a suc-
cessful territorial replication of the TCLM model. 
Firstly, the political, economic, and institu-
tional context of the host region is decisive for 
the successful implementation of any labour 
migration programme. The political will to sup-
port temporary labour migration with a focus 
on co-development is imperative for the replica-
tion of the TCLM project. A gap between labour 
supply and demand in the destination country is 
another indispensible factor for a labour migra-
tion programme. Seasonal labour migration is 
also stimulated by an economic sector with a cal-
endar linked to the circularity of the temporary 
migrant. The TCLM project was implemented in 
the Spanish agricultural sector, where there is a 
large demand for seasonal migrant workers for 
the harvesting and processing of fruit. In 2006, 
foreign workers even counted for 74.1 per cent of 
the labour forces in this sector (Zapata-Barrero et 
al. 2010). In addition, a strong employer’s organi-
zation, with a coordinating and mobilizing man-
agement role, facilitates such a project. Finally, 
the way in which countries deal with irregular 
migration and with sanctioning employers hiring 
irregular migrants, plays a vital role (Magri 2009). 
Furthermore, respect for migrants’ funda-
mental rights is a necessary condition for the 
development of a humane and efficient labour 
migration policy. The lack of legal protection for 
temporary migrant workers has often been criti-
cized in literature (Castles 2006; Zapata-Barrero 
et al. 2010). In order to protect the migrants’ 
rights and reduce their vulnerability, the work-
ers participating in the TCLM programme are 
informed of their rights prior to their departure. 
They receive information on the destination and 
the working conditions, and they are assisted by 
the FAS foundation before departure and during 
their working period in Spain (Magri 2009). Fur-
thermore, only those employers fulfilling certain 
requirements are selected for the programme. 
At the international level, the most comprehen-
sive instrument protecting labour migrants is the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
which specifies a comprehensive set of rights for 
both regular and irregular migrant workers (Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 45/158 of 18 Decem-
ber 1990; Boeles et al. 2009). The convention 
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unites the most important legal provisions from 
previous International Labour Organization (ILO) 
instruments (IOM et al. 2007). However, al-
though the convention is open for signature by all 
states in accordance with its article 86 (1), it has 
only been ratified by 42 countries, none of which 
are important destinations for migrant workers 
(Martin and Abella 2009). 
A solid national legal framework, allowing 
third country nationals for temporary labour mi-
gration, is another indispensible factor in the rep-
lication of the TCLM programme. The conditions 
and procedures for (seasonal) labour migration 
vary between EU Member States (IOM 2009). 
In order to select the European Member States 
where such a model could be replicated, a com-
parative analysis of their legal and institutional 
framework is needed. Firstly, replication of the 
TCLM programme is only possible for those Eu-
ropean Member States that allow seasonal labour 
migration for low-skilled workers. Furthermore, 
the issuance of residence and work permits for 
third country nationals in some Member States 
is limited to nationals of certain third countries. 
In Italy for example, the seasonal quota is mainly 
reserved for citizens of listed countries, or coun-
tries which have signed a cooperation agreement 
with Italy. The intention is to combat irregular mi-
gration and repatriate irregular migrants (Magri 
2009). Countries like Spain and Italy, with a large 
demand for seasonal labour, tend to facilitate 
seasonal migration through bilateral agreements 
on migration management with third countries 
(IOM 2009). Moreover, according to some na-
tional legislation, labour migration can only take 
place within certain quotas established by the 
government. Furthermore, some countries only 
allow migrant workers to be employed in cer-
tain sectors or certain jobs, while others apply 
a broader approach regarding the employment 
of third country nationals. For those countries 
where labour migration is limited to nationals 
of certain third countries, the introduction of a 
TCLM programme might have to be preceded by 
a cooperation agreement with countries of origin. 
Another important aspect is the encourage-
ment of the circularity of the migrant in national 
policy and legislation. In order to reduce the risk 
of circumvention of the programme, and to guar-
antee the return of the temporary worker, the 
visa that workers in the TCLM programme are 
granted is valid for a period of maximum nine 
months, and does not allow a change of residence 
status. At the end of the season, the migrant has 
to return to Colombia. As discussed above, after 
compliance with this rule for two years of sea-
sonal work in Spain, the “national employment 
situation” will not be considered in the applica-
tion for a permanent work permit (Organic Law, 
Article 40, k; IOM 2009). In order to prevent the 
programme from acting as an incentive for work-
ers to remain in Spain, participating migrants are 
also informed about the consequences and risks 
of an illegal stay in Spain. Moreover, circularity 
of the migrants is encouraged by the strong ex-
pectations of their families and their commitment 
to their communities of origin. Therefore, the 
project focused on beneficiaries demonstrating 
community involvement and leadership (Magri 
2009). Migrants are also encouraged to return by 
the incentive of being re-invited to Spain during 
the next working season. In order to guarantee 
the circularity of the participants, it is also impor-
tant to guarantee that returned migrants can sus-
tain themselves and their families in the country 
of origin; otherwise, there would be no incentive 
to return home (Magri 2009). 
For countries implementing temporary and 
circular migration programmes, it is advisable to 
introduce incentives for the migrants to return to 
their country of origin. The Italian migration law 
for example, aims at guaranteeing the return of 
temporary workers by giving workers who com-
ply with the rules priority for re-entrance during 
the following season (Magri 2009). Of course, 
much depends on the contents of bilateral agree-
ments between home and host countries. How-
ever, it is impossible to completely avoid the risk 
of settlement in Spain. Approximately five to six 
per cent of the workers did not return to Colom-
bia (Magri 2009). Though this is a rather small 
percentage, it might act as a discouragement for 
the replication of the programme by other Mem-
ber States, as the migrants are free to move and 
travel in the Schengen area.
A programme like the TCLM model further-
more requires some flexibility in national migra-
tion law. Employers in the agricultural sector, 
where Colombian beneficiaries were employed, 
are exposed to sudden changes in production, 
and need to be able to respond to changes in 
the demand for workers. Spanish legislation al-
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lows for a temporary permit extension, according 
to changes in the seasonal work planning. This 
means that employers can choose to employ a 
person longer than the period that was initially 
authorized. In some countries (e.g. Italy), such an 
extension is not possible. Another aspect of legal 
flexibility is the possibility for a seasonal migrant 
to work for more than one employer within the 
allowed time period. In some countries, such an 
authorization can even be given after the worker 
has entered the country (Magri 2009). It would 
be better to have a legal framework allowing for 
such flexibility before introducing a seasonal la-
bour migration programme on the basis of the 
TCLM model. 
Another key to success is the efficiency of 
the migration procedure. In many countries, the 
complexity of the procedures for legal employ-
ment of temporary workers is one of the main 
obstacles to labour migration. Inefficient proce-
dures even act as a stimulus for employing ir-
regular migrants already residing in the country 
(Magri 2009). Both the swiftness and reliability 
of the institutions, in the country of origin as well 
as in the country of destination, contribute to the 
effectiveness of the recruitment process (Vergé 
Oms 2010). 
Furthermore, the social and psychological im-
pact of the temporary migration on the migrants 
and their families staying behind has raised some 
concerns with scholars. In the TCLM programme, 
this impact is mitigated through workshops aim-
ing at identifying possible situations of family dis-
tress or conflict. Social workers not only prepare 
the worker for the migration experience, but also 
his family members left behind. Finally, integra-
tion in the place of destination is facilitated both 
through preparatory activities in Colombia, in-
forming the worker about the local community 
and its cultural context, and through a wide vari-
ety of activities in Spain, organized by the Receiv-
ing Area of FAS (Magri 2009). 
Last but not least, it is vital for the TCLM 
programme to be supported by a national policy 
linking migration with development.  In many Eu-
ropean Member States, such a strategy does not 
exist at present.
The aim of this section was to highlight some 
of the conditions necessary for the implementa-
tion of a project based on the TCLM model. This 
paper does not constitute an exhaustive analy-
sis of all issues involved.  Further research of the 
national legal frameworks is needed in order to 
establish whether the above mentioned condi-
tions are present in the specific Member States. 
It is clear however that flexible legislation, com-
bined with a migration policy linked to co-devel-
opment, is a condition sine qua non for the TCLM 
programme.
Conclusion and Future Challenges 
The TCLM programme is an innovative and in-
spirational migration model, as it turns environ-
mental migrants into agents for development. It 
illustrates that the phenomenon of environmen-
tal migration can be beneficial for the migrants 
themselves, and their countries of origin and des-
tination. The aim of this paper was to show how 
a well-organized programme of environmental 
migration can help communities to adapt to a 
changing environment, by providing temporary 
relief and livelihood alternatives, generating co-
development, and building resilience. The pro-
gramme acts as an opportunity to address some 
of the underlying motives of forced environmen-
tal displacement, such as the lack of resilience to 
disasters and underdevelopment of environmen-
tally fragile communities. For certain affected 
populations, planned environmental migration 
(whether preventive or post-disaster) might be a 
more durable solution than mere emergency re-
lief.
The TCLM project has been relatively suc-
cessful. Without this programme, most of the 
beneficiaries would not have had the opportu-
nity to work temporarily in Spain. It has offered 
them a facility to increase their income and gain 
knowledge and skills. Some of the criticisms of 
temporary and circular labour migration have 
been adequately addressed. As the programme 
is, in itself, not a solution for all affected persons, 
the challenge is to maximize its co-development 
outcome, and to turn it into a tool creating op-
portunities for development and adaptation. As 
more time is needed to observe whether or not 
the returned migrants will be able to materialize 
sustainable income and job generating activities, 
the outcomes of the programme will only be-
come visible after a few years. 
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Nonetheless, the European Commission has 
already presented the TCLM programme as a 
‘good practice’ for the management of migra-
tion. This paper has identified different variables 
involved in realizing the programme’s consolida-
tion and replication. Further research into nation-
al migration legislation and policy is necessary to 
examine the possibilities for implementing the 
model in other European Member States. How-
ever, some limitations have to be taken into ac-
count when promoting the TCLM programme 
as a model for environmental migration. Firstly, 
circular migration is only relevant for regions of 
origin that have not become permanently un-
inhabitable. A TCLM programme furthermore 
represents a context-based migration framework 
that should be adapted to the specific local con-
text, both in the country of origin and of destina-
tion. Finally, the number of direct beneficiaries, 
i.e. participating migrant workers, seems to be 
limited. Therefore, the focus must be on the de-
velopment impact of the migration experience for 
the communities of origin. 
In the author's opinion, one of the most im-
portant merits of the TCLM programme is that 
it brings together migration policy and environ-
mental and development policy. Governments 
could integrate environmental migration into 
their development policy by enhancing migrants’ 
contribution to the sustainable socio-economic 
development of their countries of origin through 
recognizable local and community projects. 
Moreover, migration could be mainstreamed into 
national and international adaptation plans, as it 
can relieve pressure on destructed or degraded 
regions, and provide alternatives to the affected 
population. Finally, environmental motives could 
be included in a coherent migration policy. By 
creating programmes of legal short-term migra-
tion, and prioritizing victims of environmental 
disruptions, we can both manage migration when 
migration pressure rises, and offer relief to affect-
ed persons. 
The association of migration with adapta-
tion and development of disaster-affected com-
munities represents a coherent, comprehensive, 
and durable approach towards environmental 
degradation. If the EU would adopt such a coher-
ent migration policy, it might set a precedent for 
linking migration, development, and adaptation 
in the rest of the world. One of the challenges 
is to manage this type of migration in ways that 
protect the rights of migrants. For the author's 
research, this case study is the beginning of a 
new theoretical process in which it is tried to put 
forward the nexus between the mentioned policy 
areas, and define the necessary legal framework 
to support this nexus. This could in turn help to 
define new directions and innovations in the field 
of environmental migration.
1 As for Colombia, an estimated 3.3 million nationals have 
moved to other countries, and their remittances to Colombia 
counted for $4.6 billion in 2007 alone.
2 Circular migration as a pattern of human mobility is a mi-
gration model giving migrants the option to move back and 
forth between home and host countries, often with mutually 
beneficial policy goals.
3 Foundation for Peasant Solidarity.
4 The 2004-2006 AENEAS programme is now succeeded by 
the ‘Thematic programme for cooperation with third countries 
in the areas of migration and asylum’ (http://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/how/finance/dci/migration_en.htm).
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Climate Change and Organizational 
Change in UNHCR
Nina Hall 1
Abstract
UNHCR was created in 1950 to deal with mass 
displacement caused by World War II. Refugees 
were defined as those fleeing persecution based 
on race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion (1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). 
UNHCR was neither designed nor conceived as a 
protection agency for those displaced by climate 
change. Yet climate change has since risen up 
the international agenda, and the agency faces 
a strategic challenge: does it engage with or ig-
nore this new issue area? This paper examines the 
changes in organizational rhetoric, policy, struc-
ture, operations and mandate in response to the 
issue of climate change induced displacement. It 
finds that despite reluctance from many Member 
States, UNHCR has engaged with climate change 
and significantly changed its rhetoric and policies. 
However, it has only made minor changes to its 
operations and structure and has not sought a 
formal change of mandate. These findings have 
significant implications for international relations 
theory as they illustrate how intergovernmental 
organizations act independently and at times 
against member states’ preferences – contrary 
to the assumptions of neo-liberal institutional-
ism (Keohane 1989). Policymakers and academ-
ics seeking to address the gaps in international 
protection frameworks will also be interested in 
these findings. Although UNHCR does not ex-
plicitly endorse a new convention or a broad-
ening of the 1951 convention, the current High 
Commissioner is looking to expand the agency’s 
mandate into natural disaster displacement. 2011 
may provide the ideal forum for this, with two 
major ministerial meetings planned. 
Key-words: UNHCR, Climate change, Displace-
ment, International organizations, Organizational 
change
Introduction
UNHCR was created to address a specific problem: 
refugee protection. The emergence of new interna-
tional issues which fall outside its mandate poses 
a challenge to UNHCR. The agency must make a 
strategic decision about whether to engage with or 
ignore these new problems. Climate change is one 
such difficult challenge. In the past decade climate 
change has risen to the top of the international 
agenda. However, UNHCR has a narrow mandate; 
it is not an agency of forced displacement, and 
could not currently offer protection to those dis-
placed internationally by climate change. Moreo-
ver, UNHCR’s executive committee, compromised 
of Member States, has not mandated the agency 
to assist those displaced by climate change. In fact, 
many Member States have expressed concern that 
such a move would overstretch the agency and de-
tract from its core work of refugee protection. This 
poses an interesting puzzle: why, given the reluc-
tance of many Member States, has the agency cho-
sen to pursue the issue of climate change induced 
displacement? In addition, how is it changing to ad-
dress the issue? 
This paper focuses on the processes of or-
ganizational change within UNHCR in response 
to the issue of climate change. It traces how 
UNHCR has adapted to address climate change 
by examining five types of organizational chang-
es: rhetoric, policy, structure, practice, and man-
date. This typology is new and addresses a gap in 
the international relations literature as there are 
few typologies that distinguish between differ-
ent types of organizational change. International 
relations scholars often reduce organizational 
change to one dimension and thus conflate man-
date or policy changes with operational or im-
plemented changes that have occurred (Gutner 
2005; Luken 2009; Nielson and Tierney 2003). 
As a result, international relations have been un-
able to investigate if different types of organi-
zational change are factors of different causal 
processes. This typology addresses this gap and 
proposes that a change in rhetoric occurs when 
the leader of an organization engages with a 
new issue and advocates a new organizational 
position on this issue. Changes in policy can be 
identified by the publication of new policy papers 
and reports that outline a new approach to an 
issue. Meanwhile, changes in structure represent 
the creation of new roles, units, or departments 
or a significant modification of old roles or de-
partments. A change in programming is associ-
ated with the development and implementation 
of new operational programmes. Lastly, a change 
in mandate is a broader category, encompassing 
the other four, in which the organization changes 
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the core mission of its work and seeks a formal 
endorsement from the executive board to do so. 
While there is a certain degree of change in rhet-
oric, which we would expect to happen as new 
issues arise, what is of interest is when and why 
this change translates to significant policy, struc-
tural, programming, and IO-led mandate change. 
To identify these changes this paper 
draws on fieldwork at the UNFCCC Nego-
tiations in Copenhagen in December 2009 
and in Geneva in March 2010. Over 20 semi- 
structured interviews with United Nations 
officials, NGOs, and Member States were con-
ducted. The chapter begins by examining the po-
sitions of NGOs, governments, and academics in 
the politicized debate on climate change and dis-
placement. The substantive section briefly out-
lines UNHCR’s history and then traces the chang-
es in each of the five aforementioned categories. 
Climate Change and Displacement 
Climate change has become recognized as one of 
the most significant international challenges this 
century. The IPCC has predicted that it will lead 
to an increase in extreme weather events, such 
as floods, storms, and cyclones, as well as slow-
onset environmental change – drought, deser-
tification, and sea level rise (IPCC 1990). These 
changes are likely to have major humanitarian 
impacts. The Stern Report, for instance, fore-
casts that "greater resource scarcity, desertifica-
tion, risks of drought and floods, and rising sea 
levels could drive millions of people to migrate" 
(Stern 2006). NGOs such as CARE, Christian Aid, 
and World Vision have also argued that climate 
change will trigger mass displacement and up to 
one billion so-called "climate refugees" (Chris-
tian Aid 2007). This message has been reinforced 
by a broad transnational civil society movement 
calling for "climate justice" which has identified 
"climate refugees" as the tangible victims of gov-
ernment inaction to mitigate carbon emissions. 
Images of low-lying Pacific Islands submerged by 
water, such as Tuvalu and the Carteret Islands, 
have dominated the press coverage and are high-
lighted as canaries of the climate change coal 
mine (Telegraph 2009). Governments have re-
framed this problem in national security terms, 
the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, for exam-
ple, in 2010 identified climate change as a future 
cause of conflict and mass migration (US Depart-
ment of Defense 2010). From a security perspec-
tive, climate change is seen as a threat multiplier 
that could trigger humanitarian crises and region-
al instability and thus lead to more humanitarian 
interventions (Gleditsch et al. 2007).
Climate change is a massive global challenge 
that could have major impacts on societies across 
the globe, particularly in developing countries. 
However, the assumption that there is a direct and 
linear causal relationship between climate change 
and migration is problematic. Such a causal link 
has been the subject of much debate between 
"maximalists" (predominantly environmental 
social scientists) and "minimalists" (mainly mi-
gration theorists) (Morrissey 2009). Maximalists 
have emphasized the fact that climate change is 
likely to lead to hundreds of millions of displaced 
peoples – Meyers’ estimates of 250 million "en-
vironmental refugees" are often cited (Meyers 
1993 and 1997). Minimalists, such as Richard 
Black (2001), have challenged these claims and 
stated that environmental change is not a deter-
mining factor of migration or displacement (ex-
cept in very extreme cases). They claim that mi-
gration is a multi-causal, complex phenomenon 
and thus one cannot separate out climate change 
– or environmental change – as a distinct driver of 
migration (Brown 2008; Gemenne 2009; Morris-
sey 2009; Zetter 2009). Migrants move because 
of a range of social, political and economic fac-
tors (Black 2001). These theorists also take issue 
with the negative view of migration portrayed 
by many governments and NGOs who frame cli-
mate change as a security threat (Elliott 2010). 
They highlight that migration is not necessarily a 
problematic response to environmental change, 
and for centuries has been an important adapta-
tion and survival strategy (Barnett and Webber 
2010).
Refugee law scholars have also problematized 
the term "climate change refugee" (McAdam 
2010b). A refugee, according to the international 
refugee convention (1951) does not specifically 
include someone displaced by a natural disaster 
or by climate change related impacts. A refugee is 
defined as someone who: owing to a well-found-
ed fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable, or ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
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the protection of that country; or who, not hav-
ing a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwill-
ing to return to it (UNHCR 2007a: Article 1A (2) 
[author’s emphasis].
Any attempt to create a new category of 
"climate change refugees" would be inherently 
problematic as it is difficult to causally link climate 
change to a specific natural disaster. Further-
more, even if one could prove that a particular 
drought was caused by climate change it would 
be difficult to prove that these slow-onset cli-
matic changes resulted in displacement (McAdam 
2010b). For these reasons, this chapter rejects the 
notion of "climate change refugee" and stresses 
that the notion of "environmental migrant" is 
problematic. Yet, despite the inherent problems 
with these terms they are part of the policy, ad-
vocacy, and even academic discourse and must 
be engaged with on these grounds.
In short, there is a politicized debate on the 
humanitarian impacts of climate change. On the 
one hand, many NGOs, civil society movements, 
and governments have argued that climate 
change will lead to mass displacement and result 
in "climate change refugees". On the other hand, 
migration and legal experts have problematized 
the direct causation implied in these arguments. 
They have argued that migration is an important 
coping strategy and should not only be seen in 
negative terms. While there is a growing body 
of literature contributing to our understanding 
of how environmental changes may contribute 
to migration there has been no analysis of how 
UNHCR, the UN agency responsible for refugees 
(and increasingly other displaced peoples), is re-
sponding. 
Organizational Change and UNHCR
UNHCR was established in 1950 with a limited 
mandate to offer protection to European refu-
gees displaced by the war (UNHCR 2007a; Loe-
scher 2001; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007)2. 
The agency was created to respond to the specific 
problems of post-war Europe – thousands of peo-
ple displaced by war who sought refuge in another 
state (Loescher 2001; Loescher et al. 2008). The 
agency was neither designed nor conceived as a 
protection agency for people displaced by natu-
ral disasters. Moreover, UNHCR had limited au-
tonomy to determine its own agenda. Its statute 
(1950) stated that the High Commissioner was 
to act "under the authority of the General As-
sembly" and should report annually to the Gen-
eral Assembly through the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) and follow policy directives 
issued by either of these two bodies (Loescher et 
al. 2008: 75). The agency has an executive com-
mittee, made up of Member States who delegate 
it responsibility and authority on refugee issues, 
and to whom it has to report on an annual basis 
(Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007; Loescher et 
al. 2008). Through this annual reporting and fre-
quent informal discussions Member States have 
monitored UNHCR’s work to ensure that neither 
"mandate creep" nor budget creep occur. Mem-
ber States’ fundamental concern is that UNHCR 
does not expand beyond its mandate and thus 
require additional funds (Loescher 2002)3. As 
Loescher describes, the agency "often walks a 
tightrope maintaining a perilous balance between 
the protection of refugees and the sovereign pre-
rogatives and interests of states" (Loescher 2002: 
2).
Although UNHCR began with a limited man-
date it has dramatically expanded in the past 60 
years, both geographically and in scope (Crisp 
2008; Loescher 2001; Loescher et al. 2008; Mar-
tin 2004). In the 1960s, UNHCR expanded be-
yond the European continent into Africa; in the 
1970s into South East Asia, and now its opera-
tions span the globe from Latin America to the 
Middle East (Loescher et al. 2008). In addition to 
refugees, UNHCR also offers protection and/or 
assistance to: returnees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, 
and stateless people (Crisp 2001; Loescher 2002; 
Loescher et al. 2008). Moreover, the current High 
Commissioner is seeking to position the agency 
as the UN agency for "forced migration" rather 
than focusing solely on refugees and stateless 
people.4 Although UNHCR’s de facto assistance 
role has expanded, its de jure, or formal legal role, 
has not expanded to the same extent. The ten-
sion between this narrow formal mandate and 
UNHCR’s tendency towards expansionism is an 
important context for this chapter. 
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UNHCR and Climate Change
Climate change came onto the world agenda in 
the late 1980s and 1990s; however, it was only 
framed as a humanitarian issue in the 2000s.5 
For most of the 1990s, climate change was con-
ceptualized as a problem of mitigation - reducing 
carbon emissions to avoid climate change – not 
adaptation – or preparing and addressing the 
impacts of climate change (Hulme 2009; Moore 
2010). Securing a global agreement on mitigation 
of greenhouse gases was, understandably, not an 
issue that was perceived as relevant to the work 
of UNHCR or other humanitarian actors. In the 
early to mid-2000s the framing of climate change 
shifted as NGOs and Member States realized that 
climate change was already having and would 
continue to have a major impact on people, par-
ticularly in developing countries. It was no longer 
enough to reduce emissions; states had to decide 
how they would foster ‘adaptation’ to these envi-
ronmental changes (Moore 2010). Discussions on 
adaptation were also framed by the North-South 
divide. Developing states argued that developed 
countries must offer financial assistance to the 
most vulnerable to adapt to the impacts of cli-
mate changes (Hulme 2009; Malone 2009). 
In this context, humanitarian agencies real-
ized they could apply their expertise in disaster 
relief and reduction to addressing the impacts of 
climate change in developing countries. In the 
early 2000s some agencies began to work on the 
humanitarian impacts of climate change. IFRC, 
for example, established a climate change cen-
tre in 2002 to ‘better understand and address the 
risks of climate change, in particular in the con-
text of disaster risk reduction, disaster manage-
ment, and health and care programs, with a focus 
on the most vulnerable people’.6 UNHCR, how-
ever, did not engage in any climate change-relat-
ed work in the early to mid 2000s. Senior staff 
did not see climate change as an important prior-
ity and were reluctant to engage with the issue, 
which was perceived as outside their mandate. In 
fact, a number of UNHCR staff members stated 
in interviews that ‘UNHCR was a late starter’ as 
there was a high degree of internal resistance to 
working on the issue.7
As a result the research and policy leadership 
on the issue was initially taken by other humani-
tarian agencies – such as the Norwegian Refu-
gee Council, IFRC and IOM.8 In June 2008, for 
example, Madeleen Helmer, the Director of the 
Red Cross’s Climate Change Center, put climate 
change on the agenda of the Inter-Agency Stand-
ing Committee (IASC) for the first time.9 In a 
speech to the committee she urged the humani-
tarian community to engage with the UNFCCC 
and the issue of climate change. As a result of her 
speech, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
decided to establish a climate change task-force 
and worked on collective submissions to the UN-
FCCC. UNHCR was initially sceptical of this new 
stream of work.10
Rhetoric Change
The new High Commissioner, António Guterres, 
who started in 2005, began to change this. Gu-
terres, a former Prime Minister of Portugal, saw 
climate change as an important issue to engage 
with. According to one staff member he had a 
"strong belief that climate change was a new 
phenomenon that must be dealt with".11 In 2007 
at the annual meeting of the Executive Commit-
tee, UNHCR’s governing body, Guterres began 
his annual speech to donors by highlighting that 
the drivers of displacement were changing. He 
claimed that: "Almost every model of the long-
term effects of climate change predicts a contin-
ued expansion of desertification, to the point of 
destroying livelihood prospects in many parts of 
the globe.  For each centimetre that the sea level 
rises, there will be one million more displaced. 
The international community seems no more 
adept at dealing with those new causes than it is 
at preventing conflict and persecution. It is there-
fore important to examine the reasons, the scale, 
and the trends of present-day forced displace-
ment." (UNHCR 2007b) 
This was a significant step for Guterres to 
take: it was the first time the agency sought to 
link climate change directly to its refugee man-
date to donors. 
The Official Summary Record of the 2007 
Executive Meeting notes a mixture of responses 
from states to the High Commissioner’s state-
ments. One state was actively supportive (Nor-
way), some states were vaguely supportive, and 
one was completely opposed (Austria) (UNHCR 
2007). Interestingly, when the issue was raised 
next at the September 2009 Executive Commit-
tee, the Bangladeshi representative stated that he 
had "reservations about any enlargement of the 
108
office’s responsibility to cover climate change-
induced displacement scenarios. UNHCR should 
remain focused on its mandated areas where it 
had comparative advantages" (UNHCR 2009c). 
While Bangladesh does now appear to support 
revision of UNHCR’s mandate12 an interview with 
another Member State delegate confirmed that 
many states were opposed to UNHCR expanding 
into new areas such as climate change-induced 
displacement.13 Furthermore, most of the UN-
HCR staff interviewed claimed that states were 
completely opposed to UNHCR expansion into 
this area. As Jeff Crisp, the head of UNHCR’s Pol-
icy Development and Evaluation Service, states, 
in his personal view many key UNHCR donors 
have "expressed persistent wariness with regard 
to the organization's expansion, often expressing 
the opinion that the organization should return to 
its ‘core mandate’ which they consider to be that 
of providing refugees with protection in develop-
ing regions" (Crisp 2009: 76). While some Mem-
ber States have supported UNHCR’s engagement 
with climate change, the institutional memory 
and official record suggest that the majority of 
the executive committee did not actively encour-
age the agency to engage with this new issue. 
Nevertheless, over the course of 2008 and 
2009 the High Commissioner continued to em-
phasize in many high-level speeches, interviews, 
and articles that climate change would trig-
ger mass displacement (Dickson 2010; Guterres 
2008). On 17 June 2008 in an interview with the 
Guardian he claimed that: "Climate change is to-
day one of the main drivers of forced migration, 
both directly through impact on environment – 
not allowing people to live any more in the areas 
where they were traditionally living – and as a 
trigger of extreme poverty and conflict" (Borger 
2008). In December 2009 he made his first ap-
pearance at the UNFCCC negotiations where 
he spoke at a number of high-level side-events 
and press conferences about the humanitarian 
impacts of climate change. He claimed that "Cli-
mate change is expected to unseat conflict as the 
main driver of mass migration in coming years" 
and has blurred the boundaries between migra-
tion and displacement (Bennhold and Brothers 
2009). He also implied the need for a new con-
vention stating that "the international commu-
nity must develop new mechanisms for the pro-
tection of climate refugees".13 These were "bold 
statements" and constituted a radical shift in UN-
HCR’s position.14 
The High Commissioner, by suggesting that 
there was a need for new protection frameworks, 
was in part positioning his agency as a key player 
in providing this protection. These statements 
were also potentially dangerous for UNHCR’s 
core work in refugee protection as he implied 
that the legal refugee definition was no longer 
relevant and should be significantly reworked. 
Some UNHCR staff conveyed to me that the 
High Commissioner made a strategic decision, as 
an astute politician, to take a proactive stance on 
climate change, natural disasters, and displace-
ment.15 He saw that the issue was moving up the 
international agenda and UNHCR needed to en-
gage with it in order to retain relevance and cred-
ibility. As previously documented, some states in 
the donor and recipient communities raised ques-
tions about this shift (UNHCR 2007). They did 
not see climate change as relevant to UNHCR’s 
work and were concerned with potential man-
date creep (and thus budget creep) if it were to 
get involved in this new issue area. Despite this, 
the High Commissioner continued to make ‘bold’ 
statements on UNHCR’s potential role in provid-
ing protection to victims of natural disasters and 
climate change. 
Policy Change 
While the High Commissioner was emphasiz-
ing the humanitarian impacts of climate change, 
there was comparatively little policy work under-
taken on the subject within UNHCR. The first 
policy paper was produced in September 2008 
by the Policy Development and Evaluation Serv-
ice of UNHCR – a year after Guterres first raised 
it with the Executive Committee. This paper was 
needed to catch up with, and back up, the High 
Commissioner’s previous statements. The paper 
was directed as much at an internal audience as 
an external one, and aimed at offering a prelimi-
nary policy stance. 
The UNHCR policy paper (2008a) described 
the complex links between climate change and 
displacement, and made three central points. 
Firstly, the agency was strongly opposed to the 
use of the term "environmental or climate change 
refugee". The paper argued it was a misleading 
and "potentially dangerous" term and that "refu-
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gee" should only be applied to those covered by 
the refugee convention (UNHCR 2008a). Sec-
ondly, it recognized that climate change could 
lead to displacement but this would predomi-
nantly be internal displacement. UNHCR had re-
sponsibility for protection of such internally dis-
placed peoples under the cluster approach – the 
UN’s consensual division of labour in humanitar-
ian emergencies. As it stated "Some movements 
prompted by climate change could indeed fall 
within the traditional refugee law framework 
bringing them within the ambit of international 
or regional refugee instruments… as well as with-
in UNHCR’s framework" (UNHCR 2008a: 6)16. 
Finally, the paper identified gaps in the interna-
tional protection framework where those dis-
placed internationally by climate change would 
not fall under their mandate. It stated that ‘UN-
HCR does recognize that there are indeed certain 
groups of migrants, currently falling outside of 
the scope of international protection, who are in 
need of humanitarian and/or other forms of as-
sistance’ (UNHCR 2008a: 9). The paper displayed 
a cautious approach and offered few insights into 
how UNHCR would integrate climate change ad-
aptation measures more systematically into its 
work or how it would respond to those who fell 
outside its mandate.
In 2009 in the lead-up to Copenhagen the 
policy paper was updated yet barely changed at 
all. The most significant changes in the updated 
policy paper were two new sentences that called 
for significant operational and structural shifts to 
integrate climate change into the agency’s work. 
The 2009 policy paper stated that:
"All UNHCR staff involved at the country level 
with refugee and IDP settlements, both rural and 
urban, will need to be equipped with strategies 
to combat and cope with the effects of climate 
change, impacting not just on persons of concern 
to UNHCR but also broader host communities" 
(UNHCR 2009a: 11).
The policy paper also claimed that UNHCR 
would, going forward, have an "overarching pol-
icy to tackle the effects of climate change" which 
would be reflected in "operations management; 
protection strategies; and advocacy" (2009a: 11). 
While these were bold statements there is little 
evidence that they have been supported by any 
larger climate change policy development. There 
was, for example, no "climate strategy", although 
one is mentioned in the 2009 paper.17 Most im-
portantly, a significant fact about the paper was 
that, apart from the two sentences highlighted 
above, almost nothing changed. The structure 
and content followed almost verbatim the 2008 
policy paper. In fact, a number of UNHCR staff 
expressed their confusion about why UNHCR 
had attempted to update this paper and yet made 
no substantive changes.18 In mid-2009 there was 
also a legal paper drafted on statelessness and cli-
mate change but this never appeared publicly.19 
Alongside these internal policy developments 
UNHCR was engaging more constructively with 
the humanitarian community’s Inter-Agency 
Task Force on Climate Change. They developed 
a number of joint submissions to the UNFCCC 
on climate change induced displacement with 
IOM and other humanitarian actors.20 Yet there 
was little further internal policy development on 
climate change between 2008 and 2009 in UN-
HCR.  This lack of policy development appears 
particularly odd given it was the year of Copen-
hagen – the biggest climate change negotiations 
ever (Schroeder 2009).
Structural Change
Why was there so little policy change in UNHCR? 
Part of the explanation is that there was little 
"structural change" within the agency.  In 2008 
the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon had called 
for UN agencies to establish climate change fo-
cal points to prepare for Copenhagen and to 
give higher organizational priority to the issue 
(Ki-Moon 2008). The High Commissioner set up 
an internal UNHCR task force on climate change 
backed by his "desire for the Office to engage 
fully and effectively in the international discus-
sion on these issues" (UNHCR 2008b).  Its brief 
included: liaising with the executive office to en-
sure that a consistent UNHCR position on climate 
change was articulated; tracking developments 
related to climate change as they concerned the 
mandate of UNHCR, and providing inputs to 
the IASC task force on climate change (UNHCR 
2008b). The task force included a number of peo-
ple across the agency – from the department of 
operations support to protection – to work on as-
pects of climate change within their other routine 
responsibilities. 
110
However, the task force neither triggered nor 
constituted organizational change within UNHCR 
– in fact there is evidence to suggest there was 
almost no change at all. Only a few new posi-
tions were created to work on climate change and 
all were temporary and/or part-time. Moreover, 
some UNHCR staff reported that even though 
they were supposedly responsible for working 
on climate change, they had neither the time nor 
the space to work on it. One staff member, for 
instance, claimed that he "was not encouraged 
to make substantive changes or to take the issue 
seriously" as he never had the means or author-
ity to turn it into a serious policy issue.21 Some 
senior managers did not prioritize climate change 
and were reluctant to delegate staff to work on 
it. Moreover, the agency did not establish a for-
mal focal point for climate change: although one 
nominally existed they were given no formal brief 
note on this work.22 Instead the lead role for cli-
mate change was passed around the agency like 
a ‘hot potato’. The focal point role was originally 
in the Policy Development and Evaluation Service 
in 2008; in 2009 it was handed to the Division 
of Operations and now (2010) UNHCR is in the 
process of transferring it to the Division of In-
ternational Protection. These examples illustrate 
that the agency is struggling to decide how to ad-
dress the issue, where it should be located within 
the agency, and who should be working on it. 
This suggests there is no consensus that climate 
change is an important issue to which UNHCR 
should dedicate staff resources.
Operational Change
From an operational perspective, UNHCR has 
made no significant changes to integrate climate 
change into its humanitarian work.23 At the Ge-
neva level there has been no impetus to support 
field offices in mainstreaming climate change into 
their work or developing adaptation programmes. 
According to one UNHCR staff member, there 
are "so far no concrete plans to operationalize cli-
mate change-related changes in our programmes 
or works in the field".24 Within UNHCR Geneva 
there is only one person who has worked spe-
cifically on climate change from an operational 
perspective. This staff member visited Kenya to 
explore if and how UNHCR could access adapta-
tion funds. He found that the Kenyan field level 
offices had difficulty responding to questions on 
how climate change was impacting their opera-
tions and did not have the capacity to work on 
developing climate change adaptation projects. 
In April 2010 this staff member left on a posting 
and said it was "not clear" if his position would 
be filled.25 From this preliminary research it ap-
pears that changes in rhetoric and minor changes 
in policy have not filtered down to the opera-
tional level of UNHCR, nor have they been driven 
from the field level.
Mandate Change
It comes as no surprise given the lack of struc-
tural and operational change that at this stage 
UNHCR has not formally changed its mandate 
to integrate people displaced by climate change. 
Although UNHCR representatives continue to 
highlight protection gaps in their mandate they 
are clear that the agency is not seeking to take 
on new ‘clients’ such as those displaced inter-
nationally by climate change. In fact, there has 
been a strategic decision within the agency not 
to bring up the issue for deliberation at Executive 
Committee meetings.26 Senior staff members are 
reluctant to raise the issue with states, who they 
believe will be unsupportive of mandate creep 
into climate change-induced displacement. 
However, more recent developments suggest 
that the High Commissioner is seeking to expand 
UNHCR’s mandate into the protection of those 
displaced by natural disasters. There has been a 
significant shift in language – which was visible 
even before Copenhagen – with the High Com-
missioner emphasizing the role that UNHCR can 
play in natural disasters. For example, the agency 
has increasingly taken a de-facto role in provid-
ing assistance to those displaced by natural disas-
ters: it was involved in the recovery efforts after 
the Asian tsunami (2004) and more recently fol-
lowing the earthquake in Haiti (2010).27 At a re-
cent principals’ meeting of the IASC (the annual 
meeting of the directors of the core humanitarian 
agencies) the High Commissioner made a bid to 
lead the protection cluster for natural disasters in 
addition to the protection cluster for conflict and 
the IASC assigned the agency this responsibility 
for a 12 month trial period in late 2010.28 This 
marks a significant expansion for the agency. 
The High Commissioner has also clearly stated to 
staff in internal discussions since his re-election in 
2010 that he sees the agency as one of "forced 
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migration".29 Thus, although the language of cli-
mate change is not often used, the High Commis-
sioner is making a clear bid to expand UNHCR’s 
mandate into the area of so-called environmental 
displacement.
The 60th anniversary of the refugee conven-
tion and the 50th anniversary of the statelessness 
convention in 2011 may provide the ideal open-
ing for further expansion of UNHCR’s role. While 
the plans at this stage (in mid-2010) are in an 
early, formative phase (in their "diapers" as one 
staff member described them 30) there is discus-
sion within UNHCR about how these commemo-
rations, and the two ministerial state party meet-
ings that they will culminate in, could be used to 
fill protection gaps for forced displacement. In 
these discussions it is possible that the High Com-
missioner will seek states’ support for the creation 
of new protection frameworks for those currently 
falling outside the refugee and statelessness 
convention – in particular for those displaced by 
natural disasters and/or climate change. We will 
have to wait to see how these plans unfold. 
However, if the debate about climate change 
and displacement is reframed solely in terms of 
natural disasters and displacement, UNHCR may 
end up excluding some people. While there is 
some overlap between the two categories, nei-
ther completely covers those who currently fall 
outside UNHCR’s protection framework. On the 
one hand "climate change induced displacement" 
could cover those fleeing extreme weather events 
as well as slow-onset environmental change (sea 
level rise, desertification, and drought) but not 
earthquakes (which have been a major cause of 
displacement in recent years). While natural dis-
asters include all disasters – from earthquakes 
to floods – it is not certain whether slow-onset 
changes would be included in this category. 
Moreover, displacement from slow-onset climate 
change will blur the distinctions between volun-
tary and forced migration. It is not clear what 
UNHCR’s protection role would be in these ‘grey’ 
areas where migration is neither clearly forced nor 
voluntary. Furthermore, both of these terms ("cli-
mate change induced displacement" and "natural 
disaster displacement") fail to include all "survival 
migrants": people who flee failed states or ab-
ject poverty (Betts and Kaytaz 2009). Moreover, 
migration scholars have argued that it is those 
who are left behind who are often the worst off 
(Gemenne 2009; Morrissey 2009). In short, while 
the climate change debate is an important de-
bate for UNHCR, to engage with the notion of a 
"climate change refugee" is problematic. UNHCR 
will need to think much more holistically about 
creating a new refugee category in order not to 
exclude people or further add to the problem. 
Conclusion
UNHCR was created with a narrow mandate to 
protect political refugees in Europe fleeing con-
flict and persecution. It was never envisaged that 
it would or could provide assistance or protection 
to people fleeing climate change or natural dis-
asters. Despite this narrow mandate the agency 
has evolved and expanded over the past sixty 
years. It began in the 1990s, for example, to of-
fer de-facto humanitarian services to people in-
ternally displaced by natural disasters. However, 
it was slow and reluctant to engage with policy, 
academic, and advocacy debates over climate 
change and displacement. The agency adopted 
a significant shift in rhetoric in 2007 under a new 
High Commissioner who sought to position the 
UNHCR as a ‘forced migration’ rather than just 
a ‘refugee’ agency. He made a series of bold 
statements identifying the need for protection 
for those displaced by climate change. UNHCR’s 
policy position has evolved somewhat over the 
last five years. It has shifted from ignoring the is-
sue (early 2000s) and resistance to any discussion 
of climate change and displacement, to engag-
ing with the issue (2008 – 2009). However, this 
shift has not translated into any significant struc-
tural, operational, or mandate change. UNHCR’s 
attempts to integrate climate change have been 
shallow rather than deep. 
What are the broader implications of this 
research? From a policy perspective, this chap-
ter offers important insights into how UNHCR 
is positioning itself within the debate on climate 
change, migration, and displacement. This is cru-
cial as many academics and civil society actors 
have called for the creation of a new conven-
tion for ‘climate change refugees’, but there has 
been no analysis of what institutional potential 
or support exists within UNHCR for such a major 
change. This research has highlighted that such 
a convention is unlikely at this point, given UN-
HCR’s lack of structural change in response to the 
issue of climate change – and its disagreement 
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that the Convention is the appropriate method 
by which additional protection can be advanced. 
However, this chapter has also highlighted the 
potential for UNHCR expansionism into natu-
ral disaster protection, which may provide new 
institutional frameworks for those displaced by 
climate change. Further research needs to be 
carried out to investigate if there are differences 
between UNHCR’s de jure protection (what they 
officially say they are offering) and de facto pro-
tection (what they actually end up doing on the 
ground in times of crisis).
1 This research is part of a PhD thesis and was made pos-
sible thanks to a Cyril Foster grant from the Oxford 
Department of Politics and International Relations. Thanks 
are also due to all the interview participants, in particular 
staff from UNHCR who shared their views and time gener-
ously with me. 
2 Circular migration as a pattern of human mobility is a mi-
gration model giving migrants the option to move back and 
forth between home and host countries, often with mutually 
beneficial policy goals.
3 Their mandate was set out in General Assembly Resolution 
428 (V) of 14 December 1950. 
4 Interview with delegate from a donor state to UNHCR, Tues-
day 23rd March, Geneva 2010.
5 Interview with UNHCR senior staff member e, 14 May 2010. 
Susan Martin (2004) has also advocated such a shift. 
6 The most significant formal expansion of UNHCR’s mandate 
was the 1967 Protocol. This enabled UNHCR to offer protec-
tion and assistance to refugees without the time limitation 
stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. According to the 
convention UNHCR could only offer protection to those dis-
placed as a consequence of events occurring before 1 January 
1951.
7 Telephone interview with IFRC staff member, 16 April 2010.
8 The Climate Change Centre, International Federation of 
the Red Cross, http://www.climatecentre.org/site/about-us 
viewed 10 May 2010. 
9 Telephone Interview with UNHCR senior staff member e, 
14 May 2010.
10 Interviews with UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, IFRC and IASC 
members March – May 2010.
11 The committee is a grouping of humanitarian organizations, 
including the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM). Interviews with 
UNHCR, IOM, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA). IFRC and IASC members March – May 2010.
12 Interviews with UNHCR, IOM, OCHA, IFRC and IASC 
members March – May 2010.
13 Interview with UNHCR staff member a, Geneva, 17 March 
2010.
14 In December 2009 the Bangladeshi Finance Minister Abul 
Maal Abdul Muhith argued that ‘UNHCR needed to be re-
vised’ in an interview with the Guardian newspaper (Grant 
et al 2009). 
15 Interview with delegate to UNHCR, Geneva, 23 March 
2010.
16 This is translated from the French: ‘la distinction actuelle 
entre réfugiés et déplaces est dépassée par les effets du 
changement climatique. La communauté internationale doit 
inventer de nouveaux mécanismes de protection pour les ré-
fugiés climatiques’ (Allix 2009).
17 UNHCR senior staff member e, Thursday May 14 2010, Tel-
ephone Conversation. 
18 Interviews with UNHCR staff member a 17 March and sen-
ior staff member c 30 March 2010.
19 Although UNHCR is only legally mandated to engage with 
IDPs caused by armed conflict.
20 UNHCR senior staff member e, Thursday 29 April 2010, 
Telephone Conversation.
20 Interview with UNHCR staff members March – May 2010.
21 UNHCR has published other documents outlining if and 
how the stateless convention could cover populations af-
fected by climate change. Statelessness is within UNHCR’s 
mandate. See UNHCR 2009.
22 IOM, UNHCR and the United Nations University (UNU), 
(2009). Climate change, migration, and displacement:  im-
pacts, vulnerability, and adaptation options, Submission to 
the 5th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 5). 
Bonn, March 29 – April 8 2009
23 Telephone interview with UNHCR senior staff member e, 
14 May 2010.
24 Telephone interview with UNHCR senior staff member e, 
14 May 2010.
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